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Introduction 
  
 
 
1.1 Topics and research questions 
 
There are many changes in marine ecology taking place in European seas. This thesis 
contributes to the need to understand the economic implications of these changes 
and to formulate management strategies. To do so, the thesis is divided into two 
parts which consider marine ecological change within two distinct sub-topics. Firstly, 
in Part A, this thesis focuses on economic analysis of marine invasive species. 
Invasive species are taxa that have been introduced outside of their native range 
(IUCN, 2000). These introduced taxa may then be detrimental to economic output 
and lead to biodiversity loss and reduced ecological services (Frésard and Boncoeur, 
2006). Secondly, Part B concerns International Fisheries Agreements (IFAs). IFAs aim 
to ensure profitable and sustainable fishing when multiple countries have an interest 
in a given fish stock (Hilborn et al., 2005). Part B focuses on the impacts of changing 
fish stock location and possible fish stock collapse on the success of IFAs. The topics 
in Parts A and B represent important contemporary concerns in Europe, as reflected 
by the focus on these topics within the EU Seventh Framework Program project 
named VECTORS (www.marine-vectors.eu), to which the research in this thesis has 
contributed.  
 
1.1.1 Part A: Invasive species  
European seas are reported to contain 879 multicellular invasive species (Galil et al., 
2014) and 176 marine invasive species are known to have an economic impact (Vilà 
et al., 2010). Human health, ecosystem services and biodiversity can all suffer due to 
invasions (Frésard and Boncoeur, 2006; Pimentel et al., 2005; Scalera, 2010). 
Managers concerned with these impacts have two problems which must be 
considered in tandem. These are the prevention problem and the control problem 
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(Olson and Roy, 2005; Burnett et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2006; Finnoff et al., 2007; 
Finnoff et al., 2010b; Sanchirico et al. 2010; Burnett et al. 2012). The prevention 
problem refers to determining appropriate management actions to attempt to 
prevent the establishment of invasive species in a given area. The control problem 
refers to determining appropriate management actions should an invasion become 
established in a given area. Chapter 2 in this thesis is concerned with the prevention 
problem and Chapter 3 with the control problem. Note that both of these problems 
have a spatial aspect. The spread of an invasive species from its native range to a 
non-native range is a spatial process. Further, the spread of an invasive species 
within its new non-native range can also be considered as a spatial process.  
Invasive species prevention 
Chapter 2 addresses the prevention problem by considering Ballast Water 
Management (BWM). Ballast water is a major vector for the spread of invasive 
species (Ruiz et al., 1997). Ballast water is pumped into ships in order to increase 
their weight and balance them when the ship is unloaded. The ship then travels to 
another area and pumps out the unneeded ballast water upon loading cargo. The 
ballast water is thus a vector which transports species globally. The BWM convention 
has been set up by the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 2004) to manage 
this vector. The stated aim of the BWM convention is to eliminate the risks from IAS 
transported by ballast water (Gollasch et al., 2007), to be achieved by a combination 
of measures including ballast water treatment. Ballast water treatment is the process 
of removing organisms from ballast water, and thus reducing the probability that an 
invasive species will become established. This is normally achieved with a 
combination of technologies, such as filtration, biocides and UV light (Dobbs and 
Rogerson, 2005). These technologies are used in ballast water treatment systems 
which are units installed into ships. Ballast water treatment systems are designed to 
operate to a specific standard, which is set in the BWM convention. The standard is 
defined in terms of the concentration of organisms in treated ballast water. Lower 
(stricter) concentration standards result in lower probabilities that invasions will 
become established. 
Purchasing an individual ballast water treatment system can cost between $640,000 
and $950,000 (King et al., 2012), but the damage prevented could also be 
substantial. The number of potential invasive species is large (Molnar et al., 2008; 
Galil et al., 2014) and the arrival of a single invasive species can lead to large 
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economic damages. For example, the arrival of the comb jelly in the Black Sea led to 
a US$16.7 million reduction in the present value of anchovy fishery rents (Knowler 
and Barbier, 2000). Ballast water treatment can also avoid the cost of controlling 
established invasions. For example, the cost of controlling the invasive slipper-limpet 
in order to protect the scallop fisheries in the Bay of St-Brieuc, France, is estimated 
at circa €1 million per year (Frésard and Boncoeur, 2006). BWM is thus an economic 
problem of choosing a ballast water treatment standard which minimises the sum of 
treatment costs and expected damages. The ballast water treatment standard which 
minimizes this sum is the optimal standard. There are many features of BWM which 
need to be accounted for to determine the optimal standard. The theoretical 
analysis in Chapter 2 considers two specific features of BWM, namely Minimum 
Viable Populations (MVPs) of the invasive species, and Allee effects. This leads to 
Research Question 1:  
Research Question 1: What are the implications of minimum viable populations 
and Allee effects for optimal ballast water management standards? 
An MVP is the smallest number of individual organisms which is sufficient to ensure 
that the population can sustain itself upon arrival (i.e. become established). It is 
inefficient to reduce the population in ballast water to more than marginally below 
the MVP, because the probability of invasion establishment is zero for all population 
sizes less than marginally below the MVP. An Allee effect occurs when smaller 
invasive populations face disproportionately greater probabilities of extinction due 
to poor resilience to fluctuations in birth and death rates or environmental shocks 
(Williamson, 1989). In the context of the conservation of endangered species, 
greater probabilities of extinction are considered to be a bad thing, but in the 
context of invasive species, any effects which increase the probability of extinction 
can be exploited in order to mitigate against invasions in the most effective manner.  
Invasive species control 
The BWM convention is not yet in force (Scriven et al., 2015) and there are many 
other vectors via which invasive species can be transported. Therefore, Chapter 3 
addresses the optimal management of established invasions, i.e. the control 
problem. The control problem concerns the trade-off between the damages 
resulting from the invasion and the costs of controlling the invasion. Costs are 
incurred by the efforts to limit the size of the invasive species population or its 
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spread within a non-native range. Determining whether such interventions are worth 
the cost and exactly the best way to implement these interventions is a complex 
management problem which has many different aspects. In particular, a better 
understanding of the spatial aspects of invasion control is needed (Albers et al., 
2010; Epanchin-Niell and Hastings, 2010; Savage and Renton, 2014). Chapter 3 aims 
to contribute towards the understanding of the spatial aspects of the control 
problem in determining optimal management.  
Space can be treated as either continuous or discrete. Continuous space is 
considered most recently by Finnoff et al. (2010a) and Carrasco et al. (2010a). 
Discrete space, which we adopt in Chapter 3, divides the non-native range into 
“patches”, as is done most recently by Carrasco et al. (2012), McDermott et al. 
(2013), Fenichel et al. (2014) and Kovacs et al. (2014). Each patch may contain an 
invasive species population. When considering all patches together, we are 
considering a population of populations, or a “metapopulation”. The 
metapopulation approach has the advantage that it allows for certain patches of the 
non-native range to be invaded or uninvaded, but also, crucially for the novelty of 
Chapter 3, that it allows patches to contain varying populations of the invasive 
species. This modelling approach is relevant for several pertinent real-world cases, 
which are detailed in Chapter 3. We therefore construct a model which allows for 
varying invasive population sizes in patches and for removal of any amount of the 
population from any patch (cf. Burnett et al., 2007), as opposed to treating patches 
as either invaded or non-invaded (as in and Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012). This 
leads to Research Question 2: 
Research Question 2: What are the implications for optimal spatial control of 
invasive species when the invasive population is modelled with varying invasive 
population sizes within patches?  
Modelling varying invasive population sizes within patches increases the level of 
modelling detail. We can therefore expect the model to produce more detailed 
optimal management interventions. For example, when a patch can only be invaded 
or non-invaded, the management choice for that patch is restricted to doing 
nothing or destroying the invasive population in that patch. When the invasive 
population size within a patch can vary, management can remove a proportion of 
the invasion from that patch. We can also expect that there is greater scope for 
timing of interventions. For example, when the invasive population size can vary 
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within a patch, the management decisions depend not only upon whether the 
invasion has arrived in that patch, but also the length of time that the invasion has 
been present in that patch, i.e. how much time the invasive population within that 
patch has had to grow.  
 
1.1.2 Part B: International fisheries agreements 
Part B focuses on the effects of ecological changes on cooperation in IFAs. It has 
long been recognized that international fisheries management is a problem of 
cooperation (Crutchfield, 1964). Cooperation leads to larger fish stocks and greater 
total profits (Clark, 2010). Cooperation is maximized when all fishing nations decide 
on how much to fish, not to maximize their own profit from the fish stock, but to 
maximize the sum of the profit of all nations who wish to fish the stock. Such a state 
of affairs is referred to as a Grand Coalition. If a nation decides to fish to maximize 
its private profit from the fish stock, with no concern for how this might affect the 
profits of other nations, then that nation is said to be free-riding. Not only does 
free-riding reduce the profit of other nations, it also reduces the size of the fish 
stock, which has implications for the sustainability of the fish stock. Determinants of 
successful IFAs are therefore of scientific interest in general (Hilborn, 2007) as is the 
potential for IFAs to be affected by ecological changes or the possibility of 
ecological changes (Munro, 2008). Of particular concern are the impacts of climate 
change on the location of fish stocks (Cheung et al., 2009) and the risk of stock 
collapse caused by overfishing (Mullon et al., 2005). Therefore, Chapter 4 considers 
changing stock location and Chapter 5 considers a risk of stock collapse. 
Fisheries management under changing stock location 
Chapter 4 analyses the effects of changing stock location on cooperation in IFAs. 
Changes in stock location are likely due to climate change (Cheung et al., 2009). For 
example, mackerel stocks in the North East Atlantic have recently shifted northwards 
(Jansen and Gislason, 2011). This has led to unilateral setting of national fishing 
quota by Iceland which violated the existing IFA agreement and resulted in 
increased exploitation of the fish stock (Haraldsson and Carey, 2011; Arnason, 2012). 
This shows that changes in fish stock location may have a destabilising effect on 
IFAs. It is therefore important to understand the conditions under which coalitions 
can maintain their stability in the face of changing stock location. This leads to 
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Research Question 3: 
Research Question 3: To what extent can farsightedness stabilize IFAs in the face of 
changing fish stock location? 
As we have established, cooperation in IFAs is a strategic problem and therefore we 
employ coalition theory. Coalition theory requires assumptions about how other 
players will respond to the cooperative choices of others. These assumptions imply 
particular behaviours on behalf of the players. We are therefore interested in 
analysing plausible behaviours in terms of their implications for whether the game is 
played in a socially optimal, i.e. cooperative, way. Specifically, we are interested in 
behaviours which determine how players respond to a choice to not cooperate (i.e. 
to deviate) by other another player. One such plausible behaviour is embodied by 
the Nash conjecture. Under the Nash conjecture, players do not change their 
cooperative choice in response to such a change by another player. In this respect, 
players are “shortsighted”. The shortsightedness of the Nash conjecture has been 
criticized by Harsanyi (1974). An alternative, and more plausible behavioural 
assumption, is that players may respond to a deviation by another player by 
changing their choice of whether to cooperate. This is the farsightedness concept of 
Chwe (1994). Players who adopt farsighted conjectures may respond to a change in 
the cooperative choice of another player by changing their own cooperative choice. 
Different behavioural assumptions imply that cooperative agreements will be 
affected differently by changes in fish stock location. We therefore address Research 
Question 3 by analysing whether cooperation in the face of changing stock location 
can be better maintained under farsighted conjectures rather than under Nash (or 
shortsighted) conjectures.    
IFAs under a risk of fish stock collapse 
Chapter 5 analyses the effect of the possibility for fish stock collapse on the stability 
of Grand Coalitions. Globally, from 1950 to 2000, 366 fisheries collapsed and the 
collapses are generally attributed to over-fishing (Mullon et al., 2005). The risk of fish 
stock collapse is likely to be important in determining the strategic harvest choices 
of fishing nations (Hannesson, 2014). Avoiding fish stock collapse is an important 
motivation for the formation of IFAs (Hilborn et al., 2005). A risk of fish stock 
collapse can be considered as exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous risk exists 
when the actions of agents do not affect the probability that an event occurs. A 
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suitable example is a tsunami because there are no actions available which can 
reduce the probability of a tsunami occurring. Endogenous risk exists when the 
actions of agents affect the probability of the event occurring. This is particularly 
relevant for fisheries agreements because lower fish stocks are at greater risk from 
collapse (Mullon et al., 2005). This leads to Research Question 4: 
Research Question 4: What are the implications of an endogenously determined 
risk of fish stock collapse on cooperation in IFAs? 
The intensity of renewable resource exploitation can either increase or decrease due 
to endogenous risk (Ren and Polasky, 2014; Sakamoto, 2014). Of particular interest 
in Chapter 5 are the implications for cooperation of such changes in exploitation. It 
is important to consider these implications because theoretical modelling of IFAs 
has yet to successfully replicate empirical observations regarding the number of 
players for whom cooperation can be successfully maintained (Breton and Keoula, 
2014). This is highlighted by Hannesson (2014) who demonstrates that it is not 
possible to reconcile theoretical predictions regarding resource exploitation in the 
North East Atlantic mackerel fishery with empirical observations. Existing theoretical 
insights suggest that cooperation can only be sustained for small numbers of 
players, whereas in reality, much larger coalitions can be observed. This divergence 
between theory and empirical observations is referred to as the “puzzle of small 
coalitions” (Breton and Keoula, 2014). We are therefore particularly interested in the 
effects of endogenous risk in terms of the extent to which they provide insight into 
the puzzle of small coalitions. 
 
1.2 Methods 
 
This thesis employs diverse methods to address the research questions. The 
approach is always theoretical, but employs both analytical and numerical methods. 
Chapter 2 adopts a purely analytical modelling approach. The model consists of a 
“loss function” which includes the cost of BWM and the expected damage under 
different standards. The properties of the loss function are analysed to gain insight 
into the determinants of optimal standards. Our modelling approach respects the 
irreversibility in invasion establishment. An irreversible invasion is one for which it is 
 8 
 
impossible to reduce the size of the IAS population to zero. This is the most general 
assumption as far as marine invasive species are concerned (Vitousek et al., 1997; 
Parker et al., 1999). Accordingly, this study relates in terms of methodology to the 
work on optimal resource management in the face of irreversible events stemming 
from Tsur and Zemel (1998). More directly, this study builds on Knowler and Barbier 
(2005), Kim et al. (2006) and Burnett et al. (2012), who treat invasions as irreversible. 
In Chapter 3, optimal spatial control policies for an invasive species are determined 
using Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP). SDP is frequently applied to study 
the optimal management of invasive species and can be used to analyse various 
sources of stochasticity. For example, the growth of the invasive population can be 
treated as stochastic (Olson and Roy, 2002), as can the detection of new invasions 
(Mehta et al., 2007) or the damages of the invasion (Sims and Finnoff, 2013). Chapter 
3 uses SDP to model the stochastic spread of an invasion through a landscape of 
discrete patches (the analysis focuses on a two-patch landscape). This approach is 
closely related to that of Carrasco et al. (2010b), who employ a stochastic spread 
process in continuous space. The method is also closely related to studies 
considering deterministic spread between discretized patches (Blackwood et al., 
2010; Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012).   
Specifically, we model the case where the invasion can grow within a patch and 
spread to neighbouring patches, in which it can also grow. The spread between the 
areas is stochastic and the probability of spread into a non-invaded patch increases 
in the size of the invasive population in adjacent invaded patches. Patches are 
arranged in a one-dimensional network, which consists of a series of patches 
connected in a line. One-dimensional networks have been used to analyse invasive 
species control by Chadès et al. (2011) and are relevant for invasive species 
spreading along coastlines such as the pacific oyster in the Wadden Sea (Troost, 
2010). The model allows for the invasion to be controlled by reducing the size of the 
invasion in a given patch or by implementing a barrier which reduces the probability 
of spread between patches without affecting the invasive populations within 
invaded patches. Optimal application of these interventions is determined using 
value function iteration and the optimal interventions are presented graphically. 
Optimal interventions are presented for specific parameterizations to demonstrate 
the implications of allowing for varying invasive populations within patches. 
Chapters 4 and 5 employ game theory to analyse IFAs. Game theory is the study of 
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multi-agent decision problems (Gibbons, 1992). Fisheries can be conceptualized as a 
common-pool resource whereby multiple nations (players) can exploit the stock 
(Munro, 1979). As such, nations must decide how intensively to exploit the stock and 
in making this decision, take the actions of other nations into account. Game theory 
is therefore an appropriate approach. Chapters 4 and 5 employ game theory and 
coalition theory to analyse cooperation, following in the tradition of Mesterson-
Gibbons (1992). Coalition theory allows nations to cooperate, with the aim of 
maximizing the sum of the benefits from exploiting the resource for all nations in a 
coalition. Thus, coalition theory allows a group of nations to behave as one single 
player. If all nations with an interest in the fish stock are members of an agreement, 
then a “Grand Coalition” exists. In fisheries games, if a Grand Coalition exists then 
optimal management of the stock ensues (Clark, 2010). Thus coalition theory is a 
useful lens enabling us to analyse the common-pool resource problem in terms of 
IFAs. 
Chapter 4 analyses IFAs under changing fish stock location using the classic Gordon-
Schaefer model and a farsighted stability concept. We analytically determine the 
implications of farsightedness in the simplest case where stock location is constant 
and players are symmetric. We then proceed to analyse changing stock location. In 
the Gordon-Schaefer model, the fish stock is conceptualized as existing at a single 
point in space. We define the location of this point in relation to the locations of the 
fishing nations, which are also conceptualized as points in space. If fish stock 
location changes then the point giving the location of the fish stock changes such 
that some nations will be closer to the fish stock and others become further away. 
We analyse the effects of changing stock location on the stability of Grand 
Coalitions using numerical sensitivity analysis. Accordingly, we analyse the extent to 
which farsightedness can ensure cooperation, relative to shortsightedness, in the 
face of changing stock location. 
In Chapter 5, we adopt the Levhari and Mirman (LM) model (Levhari and Mirman, 
1980) to analyse the effect of an endogenous risk of stock collapse on Grand 
Coalition stability. We adopt this model because it employs a more suitable 
conceptualization of the externality for our purposes than the Gordon-Schaefer 
model. In the Gordon-Schaefer model, the externality of fishing is that if one nation 
fishes more, then it becomes harder for other nations to catch a given amount of 
fish. In the LM model, the externality is dynamic, in that if one nation fishes more 
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now, then there will be fewer fish in the future
1
. The conceptualization of the 
externality of fishing in the LM model is more suitable if we wish to extend the 
model to include an endogenous risk of fish stock collapse. In that case, the 
externality is two-fold. If one nation fishes more now, then there will be less stock in 
the future and also a greater risk that the stock will collapse such that fishing in the 
future will not be possible. 
We extend the LM model by including a risk of stock collapse which increases at an 
increasing rate as fish stock size reduces (i.e. the function is convex). This approach is 
similar to that of Ren and Polasky (2014), although they only assume that risk 
increases as stock size reduces, not that the function is convex. Our approach is 
most similar to Nikuiya et al. (2014), who assume that the risk is convex in fish stock 
size. Under these conditions, optimal harvest is non-linear in stock and therefore, 
the model becomes analytically intractable (Antoniadou et al., 2013). Therefore, we 
adopt a numerical approach. Our model calculates steady state fish stock sizes 
across a parameter space of different growth and discount rates. Payoffs are then 
calculated and used to determine the implications of endogenous risk on the 
stability of Grand Coalitions.  
 
1.3 Novel contributions in each chapter 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides the first general theoretical insights into the 
economics of BWM. BWM has been studied only by Fernandez (2006), who adopts a 
game theoretic perspective to study what standards individual countries would set 
while taking the standards of other countries into account. However, this is not a 
relevant specification given the current institutional context, in which the 
International Maritime Organization chooses the standard. The strategic 
consideration is whether a nation should ratify the convention given the ratification 
choices of other nations. In terms of results, Chapter 2 of this thesis is novel in that it 
provides the first well-grounded (albeit theoretical) evaluation of BWM standards. 
Gollasch et al. (2007) highlight that there is some dissatisfaction with the manner in 
                                                 
1  The externality in the Gordon-Schaefer model can also be modelled dynamically. However, 
when the Gordon-Schaefer model is used to analyse IFAs, the analyses predominantly focus on the static 
externality (cf. Pintassilgo et al., 2010). This is partly because of the complexity of analysing the Gordon-
Schaefer model dynamically. 
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which BWM standards were derived, but there has been no formal grounding for 
this critique other than that more information upon which to base the choice of 
standards would have been preferable, and that some relevant stakeholders and 
experts were not involved in the process. In Chapter 2, by formally analysing BWM in 
an appropriate setting, we generate insights into the drivers of optimal BWM 
standards and hence provide a formal basis with which current standards can be 
evaluated, and with which possible new standards can be considered.  
Chapter 3 of this thesis makes a predominantly methodological contribution to the 
invasive species literature. The literature on invasive species control has progressed 
from deterministic models where the invasion is expressed as a single variable, 
depicting invasive population size or extent of spread (e.g. Eiswerth and Johnson, 
2002) to include various stochastic elements (e.g. Olson and Roy, 2002) and 
uncertainty about parameters of the model (e.g. D’Evelyn et al., 2008). Recently, 
more focus has been given to the spatial aspects of invasive species control (e.g. 
Blackwood et al., 2010). All these different directions have resulted in valuable 
insights into the invasive species control problem. The insights provided by our 
modelling approach essentially stem from combining previous modelling 
approaches. Within a patch, our model is exactly the same as the basic models of a 
deterministically growing invasive species. The novelty stems from linking such 
patches via a stochastic spread process. This is an extension of models where 
patches can be only invaded or uninvaded (e.g. Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012). 
Chapter 3 demonstrates how this extension facilitates novel and more detailed 
optimal management policies.  
Chapters 4 and 5 make contributions to the recent literature on applying coalition 
theory to fisheries, most recently by Pintassilgo et al. (2010), Long and Flaaten 
(2011), Bjørndal and Lindroos (2012), Breton and Keoula (2012), Rettieva (2012) and 
Breton and Keoula (2014). Chapter 4 of this thesis makes novel contributions 
through the modification of the farsighted stability concept of Chwe (1994). Stability 
concepts are rules which are applied to determine the choices of a player regarding 
whether or not to cooperate. A stability concept embodies behavioural assumptions 
about how players will respond to the choices of others. In order to answer the 
research question, modifications are made to the farsighted stability concept such 
that it can be operationalized in games with asymmetric players and transfer 
payments. This is required because the original farsightedness stability concept can 
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result in a situation where, ceteris paribus, the cooperative choices of players 
continuously change. We term this a “cycle”. Cycles happen when a cooperative 
agreement collapses due to progressive deviations and then rebuilds itself again, 
only to infinitely repeat the process. Our modification to the farsighted stability 
concept, which we term Farsighted Downwards Stability (FDS) prevents these cycles 
from occurring. Furthermore, Chapter 4 is novel in the way in which changing stock 
location is modelled. Changing stock location has been considered in a variety of 
settings by Brandt and Kronbak (2010), Ekerhovd (2010), Ellefsen (2012) and 
Ishimura et al. (2012). Chapter 4 provides a more general approach, based on the 
Gordon-Schaefer model, by using the variable determining harvesting technology 
(normally given by q) to represent fish stock location. The idea is that having fishing 
grounds closer to the home port increases the efficiency of fishing effort in much 
the same way as more efficient fishing technology.   
The innovative contribution of Chapter 5 is two-fold. Firstly, Chapter 5 contributes to 
the literature by analysing endogenous risk in renewable resource games, as in 
Sakamoto (2014), Ren and Polasky (2014) and Nikuiya et al. (2014), from a coalition 
theory perspective. Secondly, Chapter 5 contributes to the literature by relaxing a 
common assumption, namely that payoffs are determined in steady states. A steady 
state refers to a fish stock size at which total harvest is equal to the growth of the 
stock such that, once this fish stock size is achieved, it remains constant. Payoffs 
calculated in these steady states inform the decisions of players regarding whether 
or not to cooperate. Chapter 5 relaxes this assumption by including payoffs in the 
transition between steady states. Transitions between steady states result from a 
change in the cooperative decisions of players. For example, if all players are 
cooperating, then a deviation by one player will mean that fishing will increase. The 
new steady state will therefore be lower. Transition payoffs occur in the time that it 
takes for the fishery to adjust to increased fishing and to settle at its new steady 
state. The importance of transition payoffs is highlighted by Sakamoto (2014), but 
the implications of transition payoffs for cooperation have not yet been elucidated. 
Insights generated regarding the effects of endogenous risk and transition payoffs 
are useful in furthering the debate on the puzzle of small coalitions. 
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Optimal ballast water management standards: implications 
of Allee effects and minimum viable populations  
  
 
ABSTRACT 
The stated aim of the Ballast Water Management (BWM) convention is to eliminate 
the risk from invasive species transported via ballast water by enforcing a ballast 
water treatment standard. Accordingly, a standard has been set with the aim of 
reducing the size of invasive populations to below their Minimum Viable Population 
(MVP) and thus prevent their establishment. This study develops a theoretical model 
of irreversible invasions to study the determinants of optimal BWM standards. The 
analysis suggests that a BWM standard which aims to reduce the size of invasive 
populations to marginally below their MVP can only be optimal if the function 
determining the hazard rate of invasion establishment is non-continuously 
differentiable around the MVP. We proceed to analyse the conditions under which 
the hazard function would be non-continuously differentiable. Non-continuous 
differentiability of the hazard function may not hold in the presence of an Allee 
effect. An Allee effect occurs when the probability of successful invasion 
establishment increases at an increasing rate in the number of individuals of the 
invasive species emitted in ballast water. We conclude therefore that the presence of 
an Allee effect fundamentally determines whether the current BWM standard is 
optimal. 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper: Walker, A.N., Groeneveld, R.A., Gabbert, S. Optimal ballast water 
management standards: implications of Allee Effects and minimum viable populations. Submitted to a peer 
reviewed journal. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Ballast Water Management (BWM) standards are used to manage the risks from 
invasive species transported in ballast water. This risk is being addressed by the 
International Maritime Organisation’s BWM Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments (IMO, 2004). The stated aim of 
the BWM convention is to eliminate risks from invasive species transported by 
ballast water (Gollasch et al., 2007) achieved by treating ballast water such that the 
concentration of organisms is reduced to a given concentration standard. The 
concentration standard in the BWM convention aims to reduce invasive population 
sizes below their Minimum Viable Population (MVP) size, and thus ensure failure of 
establishment (Gollasch et al., 2007). Such a policy possesses intuitive appeal 
because it precludes the potentially significant damages from invasive species 
transported in ballast water. Invasive species affect commercial fish stocks 
(Leppäkoski et al., 2002) and aquaculture (Switzer et al., 2011) and are a global 
problem. Indeed, only 16% of marine ecoregions have no reported invasions 
(Molnar et al., 2008). 
However, BWM comes at a cost. Ballast water treatment systems are designed to 
achieve a given ballast water treatment standard. Purchasing an individual ballast 
water treatment system can cost between $640,000 and $950,000 (King et al., 2012). 
Given the number of ships which will be required to fit such systems, costs are 
clearly significant. Determining an optimal BWM standard is thus an economic 
problem of balancing costs and expected damages. The current BWM standard has 
been arrived at via a process of deliberation (Gollasch et al., 2007) and hence, not by 
empirical economic analysis of the costs and reduced expected damages resulting 
from different standards. Such an empirical derivation of an optimal BWM standard 
is challenging due to the global and complex nature of BWM. In Molnar et al. (2008), 
aggregation of data sets identified 329 invasive species, ranging from fish to plants, 
and algae to molluscs and crustaceans. For each species, diverse types of 
information must be collected. In non-exclusive general terms, data should include 
ecological and economic impact, geographic extent, invasive potential (how 
“invasive” a species is) and potential management options (for if the species does 
become established) including their costs and efficacy. The challenges of empirically 
deriving an optimal BWM standard necessitate a sound theoretical understanding of 
Chapter 2: Ballast water management 
17 
 
the mechanisms behind such standards. In the first instance, as will be the focus of 
this paper, such a theoretical analysis can provide insights into the conditions 
required for the current BWM standard, which aims to eliminate risk, to be optimal. 
In turn, such an understanding serves to focus natural science research on the most 
policy relevant questions. In the second instance, a theoretical understanding of the 
mechanisms behind an optimal BWM standard can aid future deliberative decision 
making.  
Theoretical insights into the determinants of an optimal BWM standard must respect 
that marine alien species invasions are best conceptualised as being irreversible 
(Vitousek et al., 1997; Parker et al., 1999), such that once an invasion becomes 
established in an area, it cannot be completely eradicated. While there has been 
little literature which specifically considers BWM, the economics of BWM is 
grounded in the economics of irreversible events as in Tsur and Zemel (1998, 2004). 
Irreversible invasions have been considered in contexts other than BWM by Knowler 
and Barbier (2005), Kim et al. (2006) and Burnett et al. (2012). Knowler and Barbier 
(2005) consider the risks from importing exotic plant species. Kim et al. (2006) 
consider the trade-off between measures to reduce the risk of invasion 
establishment and measures to control an invasion should it become established. 
They do so in a general setting given uncertain discovery times of an invasion. 
Burnett et al. (2012) study two specific terrestrial invasive species on the island of 
Hawaii. Related literature considers issues such as tariffs (e.g. Costello and 
McAusland, 2003) and inspections (e.g. Springborn, 2014), or considers invasive 
species establishment or arrival as random, i.e. Bernoulli processes (Horan et al., 
2002; Leung et al., 2002; Burnett et al., 2006; Finnoff et al., 2007; Adams and Lee, 
2012; Hyytiäinen et al., 2013). Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by 
analysing the optimal management of irreversible events in the specific context of 
BWM, with the aim of providing theoretical insights into the determinants of an 
optimal BWM standard. This specifies the most general modelling framework (as 
provided by Finnoff et al., 2010b) for the particular case of BWM.  
Our method is to build and analyse a model of irreversible invasions using a hazard 
function, which determines the hazard rate of successful invasion establishment as a 
function of ballast water treatment effort. We find that if the hazard function is 
continuously differentiable, then a standard which reduces the hazard rate to zero 
cannot be optimal. This is interesting because the current BWM standard is chosen 
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to achieve a hazard rate of zero. Therefore, whether or not the hazard rate is 
continuously differentiable has important implications for the evaluation of the 
current BWM standard. Accordingly, we consider in detail the differential properties 
of the hazard function which depends on the technology function, the Propagule 
Dose-Response (PD-R) function and network effects, each of which we shall now 
outline. 
Technology determines the relationship between treatment effort and the number 
of propagules (individual organisms) in ballast water. Reductions in the number of 
propagules is normally achieved via a combination of technologies, such as 
filtration, biocides and UV light (Dobbs and Rogerson, 2005). The design and testing 
of ballast water treatment systems is an important topic in marine engineering (see 
Tsolokai and Diamadopolous (2010) for a review). The PD-R function determines the 
relationship between the number of propagules in a single emission of ballast water 
and the probability of invasion establishment. The PD-R function is a central topic of 
study in invasion ecology (Lockwood et al., 2005; Simberloff, 2009; Blackburn et al., 
2015). The PD-R function includes a Minimum Viable Population (MVP) below which 
the hazard rate is zero. At and above the MVP, the PD-R function can be 
approximated as being concave (Leung et al., 2004) but may also display convexity 
at lower numbers of propagules. This convexity occurs due to an Allee effect
2
 (Leung 
et al., 2004). In natural resource economics, an Allee effect is a property of the 
growth function. This study does not employ a growth function. Instead, we follow 
the definition of Williamson (1989) who defines an Allee effect as occurring when 
smaller populations face disproportionately greater probabilities of extinction due to 
poor resilience to fluctuations in birth and death rates or environmental shocks. This 
is the common meaning of the term in invasion ecology (see, for example, Blackburn 
et al., 2015). Evidence for such an Allee effect has been found for many marine 
species (Kramer et al., 2009). Allee effects are therefore likely to be relevant for 
marine invasive species (Williamson, 1989; Lee et al., 2013; Blackburn et al., 2015). 
Network effects recognise the complex interactions between areas from which 
invasive species emanate, and to which they can spread (Hulme, 2009; Keller et al., 
                                                 
2  Note that there is some inconsistency in the use of the term Allee effect. Sometimes it is used to 
refer to minimum viable populations. Allee effects are also often employed in a deterministic context to 
refer to convexity in the function mapping current population size to future population size. In this chapter, 
we use the term Allee effect solely to refer to convexity in the PD-R function as in Leung et al. (2004) and 
Lee et al. (2013). 
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2011; Liu and Tsai, 2011). A central aspect of this complexity is that the more 
countries which have been invaded by a particular species, the greater the 
probability that another country will be invaded. This implies that there is a network 
effect from setting a stricter standard. If the standard is made stricter, then 
individual countries benefit directly, because they are less likely to be invaded, and 
also indirectly, because it is less likely that other countries will become invaded and 
function as stepping stones for the invasion.  
The analysis of the technology function, the PD-R function and network effects 
shows that continuous differentiability of the hazard function depends principally on 
whether an Allee effect exists. If an Allee effect exists then it is possible that the 
hazard function is continuously differentiable such that a standard other than one 
which achieves a probability of establishment of zero (as is aimed for by the BWM 
convention) must be optimal. This demonstrates the importance of Allee effects for 
BWM and the need to empirically investigate the PD-R functions of invasive species. 
While the PD-R function is indeed a central topic in invasion ecology, the issue of 
continuous differentiability of the PD-R function is not a central concern. This study 
therefore demonstrates that, from an economic perspective, the continuous 
differentiability of the PD-R function is of central importance. This study also 
contributes by conceptualising the roles of technology, the PD-R function, network 
effects and irreversibility in the context of BWM, which facilitates an understanding 
of the theoretical determinants of optimal BWM standards.  
Section 2.2 describes how the PD-R function, technology function and network 
effects determine the hazard rate of successful invasion establishment. This section 
then uses the hazard rate to determine the damage function and shows how the 
damage function, along with the costs of BWM, constitute the loss function, which is 
minimised to determine an optimal standard. Section 2.3 analyses the loss function, 
demonstrates the significance of differential continuity in the PD-R and analyses the 
role of an Allee effect in terms of the differential continuity of the loss function. 
Section 2.4 discusses the generalisability of the results given our modelling 
assumptions and concludes.  
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2.2 The model 
 
The description of the model begins by specifying the PD-R and technology 
functions. Next, we consider how the PD-R and technology functions are included, 
along with network effects, in the hazard function. We proceed to show how the 
hazard function is used in the expected damage function. Finally, the objective 
function (the loss function) is defined, which contains the expected damage and cost 
functions. 
 
2.2.1 The PD-R and technology functions  
Let 𝑥 be the amount of ballast water treatment effort. Ballast water treatment effort 
reduces the number of propagules of a single invasive species in a single emission 
of treated ballast water. The number of propagules is given by 𝑞, which is 
determined by the technology function
3
 𝑄(𝑥), i.e. 𝑞 = 𝑄(𝑥). The number of 
propagules determines the probability of invasion establishment from a single 
emission event and is given by 𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑞), which is the PD-R function. Thus the 
probability of invasion establishment from a single emission event is given by 
𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)). We proceed to specify the technology and PD-R functions. 
Ballast water treatment systems are predominantly designed to meet the standards 
set in the BWM convention. Therefore there are too few data points to gain insights 
into the form of the technology function. We make the assumption that marginal 
effectiveness of effort declines in treatment effort such that removing the nth 
propagule from ballast water requires more effort than removing the first. Formally, 
we assume that the technology function is downward sloping and convex, i.e. 
𝜕𝑄(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝑄(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
> 0.  
Let us define the Maximum Non-Viable Population (MN-VP) as the number of 
propagules marginally below the MVP. The MN-VP is therefore the largest number 
of propagules for which the probability of establishment is zero. The PD-R function 
𝑃(𝑞) includes an MN-VP at ?̅? propagules, where ?̅? ≡ 𝑄(?̅?), such that 𝑃(𝑞 ≤ ?̅?) = 0. 
                                                 
3  Note that throughout this chapter, when both upper and lower case letters are used, the lower 
case letters denote the outputs of functions and upper case letters denote the functions themselves.  
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For 𝑞 > ?̅?, 𝑃(𝑞) is increasing in 𝑞. The function 𝑃(𝑞) may or may not be continuously 
differentiable (smooth) at ?̅?. Whether the function ?̅? increases at an increasing or 
decreasing rate depends on whether an Allee effect is present for the species in 
question. If no Allee effect exists then 𝑃(𝑞) increases at a decreasing rate, i.e. it is 
concave. If an Allee effect is present then there exists some interval of 𝑞 ∈ (?̅?, 𝑏], 
where 𝑏 > ?̅?, such that 
𝜕2𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞2
|
𝑞<𝑏
> 0, 
𝜕2𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞2
|
𝑞=𝑏
= 0 and 
𝜕2𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞2
|
𝑞>𝑏
< 0. We will 
consider the cases in which an Allee effect is present and not present in the function 
𝑃(𝑞) in order to understand the role of an Allee effect in determining an optimal 
standard. These cases are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustrations of the PD-R function with an Allee effect (Panel A) and without an Allee effect (Panel 
B) where 𝑞 is the MN-VP.  
The PD-R and technology functions thus determine the probability of invasion 
establishment from a single emission of ballast water. This probability is used to 
determine the hazard rate of invasion establishment. 
 
2.2.2 The hazard rate function  
The function 𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)) is used to determine the hazard rate of invasion 
establishment at time 𝑡, along with the number of invaded countries at time 𝑡, which 
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is given by 𝑛𝑡 . The number of invaded countries will increase over time at a rate 
which depends on the probability of establishment from a single emission event. 
Therefore 𝑛𝑡 = 𝑁 (𝑡, 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥))). The hazard rate of invasion establishment at time 𝑡 is 
given by 𝑟𝑡 , which is determined by the hazard function 𝑅 (𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)), 𝑁(𝑡, 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)))). 
Hence, the hazard rate is determined directly by 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)) and also indirectly, via the 
effect of 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)) on the number of invaded countries. To shorten the length of 
equations, we will often denote 𝑅 (𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)), 𝑁(𝑡, 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)))) simply as 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡). 
The MN-VP is an important determinant of the form of the hazard function. Because 
𝑅 (𝑃(𝑄(𝑥 ≥ ?̅?)), 𝑁(𝑡, 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥 ≥ ?̅?)))) = 0, there is no benefit in reducing the number 
of propagules to below the MN-VP and as such, the domain of 𝑥 is [0, ?̅?]. Appendix 
2.1 shows that the first derivative of the hazard function with respect to 𝑥 is 
negative, i.e. 
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥<?̅?
< 0. Whether or not the hazard function is continuously 
differentiable depends solely on whether the PD-R function is continuously 
differentiable. When an Allee effect is not present (Figure 1(B)), it is clear that that 
𝜕𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞
|
𝑞=?̅?
 is not defined. The PD-R function is therefore not continuously 
differentiable and in turn, the hazard function is not continuously differentiable. The 
hazard function is continuously differentiable if it holds that lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0. It can 
only hold that lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0 in the presence of an Allee effect. However, an Allee 
effect is not sufficient for lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0. An Allee effect is therefore a necessary 
condition for differential continuity in the hazard function.  
The hazard function is therefore determined by the technology and PD-R functions 
and network effects. The form of the hazard function, and in particular, whether it is 
continuously differentiable, effects the form of the expected damage function. 
 
2.2.3 The expected damage function  
Given the hazard function, we now proceed to specify the expected damage 
function. Let 𝛩 be the time at which the invasion occurs. We assume that 𝛩 has an 
exponential probability density function given by 𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝(−∫ 𝑟𝜏𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
). In other words, 
the probability that the invasion will happen at time 𝑡 is determined by the hazard 
rate 𝑟𝑡 , conditional upon the invasion not having happened in the period up to time 
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𝑡, given by 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− ∫ 𝑟𝜏𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
). Expected damage is determined by the annual damage, 
should the invasion arrive, given by 𝑦 and the discount rate, 𝛿, such that the present 
value of the damage from an invasion (evaluated from 𝑡 = 0 to ∞) is given by 
𝑦
𝛿
. The 
present value of damage is discounted according to the discount factor for the time 
in which the invasion establishes, 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡). Therefore, expected damage is given by 
𝑍(𝑥) =
𝑦
𝛿
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡)𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
∞
𝑜
𝑑𝑡,       (2.1) 
or 
𝑍(𝑥) =
𝑦
𝛿
∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡 − ∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
∞
𝑜
𝑑𝑡.                     (2.2) 
The expected damage function is therefore determined by the hazard function and 
the irreversibility of an invasion. The expected damage function can now be 
incorporated into the objective function, which we term the loss function.   
 
2.2.4 The loss function 
The loss function is the objective function of a benevolent social planner who is 
concerned with a single invasive species. The loss is the sum of the cost of 
implementing the BWM standard and the expected damage under the standard, 𝑧, 
for the total number of countries m, which we assume to be symmetric in that they 
face the same damages from an established invasion and the same costs of 
treatment. For simplification, we assume that all countries export and import the 
same amount of ballast water and that the export from a given country (and thus 
also import to a given country) is evenly distributed across all countries. Further, we 
assume that all vessels carry the same amount of ballast water on all journeys.  
The objective of the social planner is to minimise expected loss by choosing 
treatment effort 𝑥, which is the control variable. Effort is chosen at 𝑡 = 0 and remains 
constant thereafter. This is appropriate because of the impracticality of frequently 
changing the BWM standard. The BWM convention will only come into force if 
enough states ratify the agreement such that 35% of global shipping is covered by 
the agreement. Attempts to achieve a sufficient number of ratifications have been 
ongoing since 2004, but enough ratifications have not as yet been achieved (Scriven 
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et al., 2015). While it is technologically possible to change treatment effort 
frequently, this is clearly impractical given the amount of time it takes to ratify the 
current standard. Therefore, we assume that effort is chosen once and then that it 
remains at that level.  
The loss function is determined by the expected damage function (and thus the 
hazard function), and the cost of treatment effort. Effort has a unit cost 𝑘, where 
𝑘 > 0, such that 𝑘𝑥 gives the costs per country of a given level of treatment. 
Remember that the technology function displays decreasing marginal returns to 
effort. Therefore, there are increasing marginal costs of reducing the number of 
propagules. Expected damages and costs of treatment are used in the loss function, 
which is given b  
𝐿(𝑥) = 𝑚(𝑘𝑥 + 𝑍(𝑥)),           (2.3) 
where 𝑚 is the total number of countries. We therefore assume that all countries 
have not yet suffered an established invasion. We also assume that countries must 
continue ballast water treatment after they suffer an established invasion. This is 
reasonable because the BWM standard is binding after ratification regardless of 
whether an invasion has become established.  
 
2.3 Analysis of optimal standards 
 
This section proceeds to analyse the loss function in terms of an optimal BWM 
standard. The First Order Condition (FOC) for an extremum and the Second Order 
Condition (SOC) for a minimum are 
𝜕𝐿(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 0 and 
𝜕2𝐿(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
> 0 respectively. Given that  
𝜕𝐿(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑚 (𝑘 +
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
)                        (2.4) 
and  
𝜕2𝐿(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
= 𝑚
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
,                                      (2.5) 
the FOC and SOC can be represented as 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= −𝑘 and 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
> 0. Appendix 2.2 
demonstrates that 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
< 0. Appendix 2.2 also provides 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
 and shows that 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
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is ambiguous in sign. Therefore, the damage function may be either concave or 
convex. Further, the damage function may display convexity for part of the domain 
of 𝑥 and concavity for another part.  
We have established that the hazard function may or may not be continuously 
differentiable in Section 2.2.1. Further, Section 2.2.1 demonstrated that differential 
continuity of the hazard function requires differential continuity of the PD-R 
function. This has implications for the damage function. To repeat, continuous 
differentiability of the hazard function means that lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) = 0. Considering 
Equation (2.2), we see that lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) = 0 means that lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑍(𝑥) = 0, which 
means that the damage function is continuously differentiable. Further, 
lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑍(𝑥) = 0 implies that the damage function is convex as it approaches ?̅?. 
Formally, let us define a convex sub-domain of the function 𝑍(𝑥) as the interval 
[𝑎, ?̅?] where 0 ≤ 𝑎 < ?̅? and where 𝑎 is equal to the smallest value of 𝑥 for which 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
> 0. In the interval [𝑎, ?̅?], it holds that 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
|
𝑥>𝑎
> 0. Because lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑅(𝑥) = 0 
implies lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑍(𝑥) = 0, continuous differentiability of the hazard function implies 
that there must exist such a convex sub-domain in 𝑍(𝑥). Given that the hazard 
function will be continuously differentiable if the PD-R function is continuously 
differentiable, lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0 implies lim𝑥→?̅? 𝑍(𝑥) = 0. Therefore, a convex sub-
domain exists in 𝑍(𝑥).  
Given this understanding of the properties of the damage function, we proceed to 
analyse the implications for the optimal standard, as determined by the FOC and the 
SOC under the assumption that the PD-R is continuously differentiable. Figure (2.2) 
illustrates two possible forms for 𝑍(𝑥), depending on the range of the convex sub-
domain, and two possible marginal costs 𝑘1 and 𝑘2. The implications of these 
functions for the loss function are also illustrated.  
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Figure 2.2: Diagrammatic illustration of forms of the damage function and the marginal damage function if 
the PD-R function is continuously differentiable, and the implications thereof for minimisation of the loss 
function.  
In Panel (A), the convex sub-domain [𝑎, ?̅?] is equal to the domain [0, ?̅?]. The damage 
function is therefore decreasing at an increasing rate for all 𝑥 such that the SOC is 
satisfied for all 𝑥. If marginal cost is equal to 𝑘1, an interior minimum exists (the FOC 
is satisfied), as shown by the loss function. When marginal cost is equal to 𝑘2, no 
interior minimum exists (because the FOC cannot be satisfied) and the optimal 
standard is a corner solution with zero treatment effort. In Panel (B), the damage 
function decreases at a decreasing rate for 𝑥 < 𝑎 and then at an increasing rate for 
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𝑥 ≥ 𝑎. The convex sub-domain is therefore a subset of the domain [0, ?̅?], i.e. 
[𝑎, ?̅?] ≠ [0, ?̅?] because 𝑎 ≠ 0. If the damage function intersects the marginal cost 
where marginal damage is decreasing then an interior maximum exists (i.e. the FOC 
is satisfied but the SOC is not). An interior minimum exists in Panel (B) where 
marginal cost 𝑘1 intersects the marginal damage function in the convex sub-domain. 
Such an interior minimum may not be a global minimum: a BWM standard of 𝑥 = 0 
may be a global minimum.  
Under the assumption that the PD-R function is continuously differentiable, we see 
that the solution is driven by whether or not [𝑎, ?̅?] = [0, ?̅?] and whether or not there 
exists some 𝑥 such that 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= −𝑘. We summarise the possible outcomes in terms of 
these two drivers in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Possible solutions under the assumption that the PD-R function is continuous. 
 [𝑎, ?̅?] = [0, ?̅?] [𝑎, ?̅?] ≠ [0, ?̅?] 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= −𝑘 is satisfied for 
some 𝑥. 
A global interior solution 
exists. 
A global interior minimum 
exists 
or 
an interior local minimum 
exists with a global 
minimum at 𝑥 = 0. 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
≠ −𝑘  ∀  𝑥.  
A global corner solution 
exists at 𝑥 = 0. 
A global corner solution 
exists at 𝑥 = 0. 
 
Table 2.1 shows all possible outcomes and therefore demonstrates that, given the 
assumption that 𝑘 > 0, a minimum where 𝑥 = ?̅? is not possible if the PD-R is 
continuously differentiable. The reason for this is that treatment effort always has a 
strictly positive marginal cost (𝑘 > 0). No matter how low the marginal cost is, there 
will always be a treatment level where the FOC is satisfied. Further, at very low 
marginal cost, the FOC would be satisfied in the convex sub-domain, where the SOC 
is satisfied also.  
Let us proceed to analyse the case where the PD-R function is not continuously 
differentiable. In this case, it is possible that ?̅? is the optimal amount of treatment 
effort. If the PD-R function is not continuously differentiable around ?̅?, then the 
hazard function is not continuously differentiable around ?̅? and therefore marginal 
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damage is not continuous around ?̅?. This implies that a marginal cost 𝑘 can exist 
such that −𝑘 > 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
 ∀  𝑥. This means that a global corner solution can exist where 
𝑥 = ?̅?. This is illustrated in Figure 2.3(A). Alternatively, a global corner solution can 
exist where 𝑥 = ?̅? because no convex sub-domain exists, as illustrated in Figure 
2.3(B). If the PD-R function is not continuously differentiable then it is not necessary 
that a convex sub-domain exists. 
 
Figure 2.3: Diagrammatic illustration of the possibility for an optimal standard where 𝑥 = ?̅? when the 
hazard function not continuously differentiable. In Panel (A), 𝑥 = ?̅? is optimal because −𝑘 > 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
 ∀  𝑥. In 
Panel (B), 𝑥 = ?̅? is optimal because the SOC is never satisfied and, in this example, loss is not minimised 
where 𝑥 = 0.  
We summarise our results up to now in Result 2.1. 
Chapter 2: Ballast water management 
29 
 
Result 2.1: A non-continuously differentiable PD-R function is a necessary condition 
for the optimality of a level of treatment effort equal to ?̅?. 
Furthermore, we can also establish the following result.  
Result 2.2: The existence of an Allee effect is a necessary condition for continuous 
differentiability in the hazard function. 
For proof of Result 2.2, consider that for the PD-R function to be continuously 
differentiable around the MN-VP, it must hold that lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0. In turn, this 
implies that a sub-domain [?̅?, 𝑏] must exist where 
𝜕2𝑃(𝑞)
𝜕𝑞2
|
𝑞∈[?̅?,𝑏]
≥ 0, i.e. where the PD-
R function is convex. This is definition of an Allee effect. Panel (A) of Figure 2.1 
shows the case where no Allee effect is present, for which it is clear that 
lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0 cannot hold. However, even if an Allee effect does exist, this does 
not guarantee that lim?̅?←𝑞 𝑃(𝑞) = 0, i.e. the PD-R function may still be not be 
continuously differentiable around the MN-VP. An Allee effect is therefore a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for continuity in the hazard function.   
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
This study analyses a model of the optimality of Ballast Water Management (BWM) 
standards. The objective of a benevolent social planner is to minimise loss, which is 
the sum of the expected damages from an invasion and the costs of treatment 
effort. Expected damage is calculated in accordance with an irreversible invasion 
with an exponential probability density function. Expected damage depends on the 
hazard rate of invasion establishment. The hazard function determines the hazard 
rate and includes the technology function, Propagule Dose-Response (PD-R) 
function and network effects. The PD-R function includes a Minimum Viable 
Population (MVP) and may include an Allee effect. We analyse the possibility for a 
BWM standard which eliminates the risk of invasion establishment (as is aimed for 
by the BWM convention) to be optimal. This is achieved by reducing the number of 
propagules in ballast water emissions to below the MVP. We find that such a 
standard can only be optimal if the PD-R function is not continuously differentiable 
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around the MVP. Furthermore, we find that the PD-R function will not be 
continuously differentiable around the MVP in the absence of an Allee effect.  
These results have both shorter term implications regarding future research as well 
as longer term value regarding decision making on BWM. In the shorter term, this 
study contributes by demonstrating that PD-R functions and in particular, the 
prevalence of Allee effects, are vital information needs for policy making. In addition 
to the importance of Allee effects in invasion ecology, this study demonstrates the 
Allee effects have important policy implications. What then are the prospects for 
gaining more information about Allee effects to inform decision making? It is well 
established that Allee effects play an important role in determining the probabilities 
of establishment of small populations (Blackburn et al., 2015). However, Allee effects 
are only part of the story. Demographic and environmental stochasticity as well as 
genetic effects all play a role. Disentangling the role of Allee effects requires 
empirical study such as that by Duncan et al. (2014). Duncan et al. (2014) analyse 
data from 55 experimental releases of a non-native terrestrial insect species into 
New Zealand. They fit the data to different PD-R functions. They find that the 
probability of survival was best explained by a function combining demographic 
stochasticity plus Allee effects. However, the best fit PD-R function does not 
converge to zero as the number of propagules approaches zero. This is evidence 
that the PD-R function for this particular species is not continuously differentiable. 
The analysis of Duncan et al. (2014) demonstrates that, if data is available, statistical 
analysis can provide evidence regarding the differentiable continuity of the PD-R 
function.  
The longer term implications result from our conceptualisation of the key 
mechanisms behind optimal BWM standards. This demonstrates how the 
mechanisms can be incorporated into an optimisation framework. In turn, this 
provides the theoretical foundations for BWM standards from an economic 
perspective, which has, up to now, received little attention. The combination of the 
theoretical foundation provided in this study and the collection of more data to be 
analysed in the same manner as Duncan et al. (2014), can be employed in an 
evaluation of the current BWM standard. Evaluation of the current BWM standard is 
particularly necessary because of the problems in achieving sufficient signatories to 
ratify the current agreement. The analysis of Scriven et al. (2015) shows that the rate 
of ratification increased in the five years to 2009, but thereafter has slowed 
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dramatically. They argue that there may still be a long period before the BWM 
convention is put into force. Our study shows that the current BMW standard can 
only be optimal under specific conditions. Empirical insights into whether these 
conditions are met will help to evaluate the current standards. An evaluation of 
current standards may provide evidence which encourages nations to ratify the 
convention, or alternatively, for the IMO to modify the convention such that more 
nations will ratify it.  
Our findings are subject to a number of simplifying assumptions. The most 
significant assumption relates to our conceptualisation of BWM as a single species 
problem. BWM is inherently a multispecies problem. The most important issue to 
deal with when considering the multispecies case is that the PD-R function will vary 
between species. In this case, the extent of continuous differentiability in the 
expected damage function will depend on the PD-R functions of all invasive species. 
The generalisability of our results to the multispecies case is an important issue for 
future research. Future research should also consider that the standard set in the 
BWM convention actually consists of three standards for different size classes of 
organism. Organisms are therefore either classed as small, medium or large sized 
and different concentrations of organisms in are permitted for each size class. It may 
be the case, for example, that Allee effects are more prominent for one size class 
than for another, and this would need to be taken into account for standards, by size 
class, to be optimal.  
 
Appendix 2.1 Derivatives of the hazard function 
 
This appendix shows that the hazard function is downward sloping in effort and, for 
completeness, derives the second derivative of the hazard function with respect to 
effort. To do so, we omit the arguments of functions in order to save space.  
The first derivative of 𝑅 (𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)), 𝑁(𝑡, 𝑃(𝑄(𝑥)))) is 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑥
=
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
.                            (2.i) 
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Given that 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
, 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
, 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
 and 
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
 are positive in sign and that 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
 is negative in sign, it 
holds that 
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑥
|
𝑥<?̅?
< 0. 
The second derivative is given by 
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑥2
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
)
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
)
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
            
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
                              (2.ii) 
=
𝜕2𝑄
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
)
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
)
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
)
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
+
    
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
                           (2.iii) 
= (
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
) (
𝜕2𝑄
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
)
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
) +
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
)
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
).      (2.iv) 
Let us establish the following four identities from Equation (2.iv). 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
) =
𝜕2𝑃
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
                                                             (2.v) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
) =
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑝2
+
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
)                                  (2.vi) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
)
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
=
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
(
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
2 +
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡𝜕𝑝
)                (2.vii) 
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
(
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
)
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
=
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕2𝑁
𝜕𝑝2
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
                                (2.viii) 
Substituting Equations (2.v) through (2.viii) into (2.iv) gives 
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑥2
= (
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
) (
𝜕2𝑄
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕2𝑃
𝜕𝑞2
(
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
)
2
) + (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
)
2
(
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑝2
+
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
(
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
2 +
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡𝜕𝑝
) +
             
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕2𝑁
𝜕𝑝2
)                            (2.ix) 
= (
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
) (
𝜕2𝑄
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕2𝑃
𝜕𝑞2
(
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
)
2
) + (
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
)
2
(
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑝2
+
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑝
(2
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡𝜕𝑝
+
𝜕2𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
2) +
𝜕𝑅
𝜕𝑛𝑡
𝜕2𝑁
𝜕𝑝2
).       
                             (2.x)  
We do not require an assumption about the sign of the second derivative of the 
hazard function because, as demonstrated in Appendix 2.2, the sign of the second 
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derivative of the damage function is ambiguous in sign regardless of whether the 
hazard function is concave or convex. 
 
Appendix 2.2 Derivatives of the damage function 
 
This appendix provides the first derivative of the damage function and explains our 
assumption that the damage function is downward sloping in 𝑥. This appendix also 
provides the second derivative of the damage function and shows that it is 
ambiguous in sign. The damage function is  
𝑍(𝑥) =
𝑦
𝛿
∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡 − ∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
∞
𝑜
𝑑𝑡.        (2.xi) 
The first differential of the damage function is 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
=
𝑦
𝛿
∫ (
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡 − ∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
−𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) ∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡 − ∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑜
,      (2.xii) 
which can be simplified to  
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
=
𝑦
𝛿
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡 − ∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
) (
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
− 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) ∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
) 𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑜
.   (2.xiii) 
Note that 
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
< 0 and therefore 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
 is ambiguous in sign. For example, if 
𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) ∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
<
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
  ∀  𝑡,       (2.xiv) 
then it will hold that  
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
> 0. We assume that 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
< 0 hold for the following 
reason, which relates to the “tens rule” and the effects of discounting.  The tens rule 
of Williamson (1996) is a well-established general rule determining the probability of 
invasion establishment. It states that there is a 10% chance that a species will arrive 
in a given year, a 10% chance that the species will become established and a 10% 
chance that the species will cause economic damages. Hence, a reasonable 
approximation of the probability of invasion establishment in a given year is 
𝑃𝑟 = 0.001. The hazard rate for an event with probability of occurrence within a year 
of 𝑃𝑟 = 0.001 is calculated by solving 0.001 = 1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 for 𝑟 where 𝑡 = 1 which gives 
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𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡)  ≈ 0.001. This implies that 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) ∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 will be a small relative to 
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
 even if the integral ∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 is taken over many periods. Further, (A2.4) is 
most likely to hold for higher values of 𝑡, because the integral is calculated over a 
longer time period. However, as 𝑡 increases, discounting increases also. Discounting 
thus means that for points in time where (A2.4) is most likely to hold, the fact that it 
holds will have very little effect on the sign of 
𝜕𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
.  
We obtain the second derivative from the first derivative. After simplifying, we 
obtain 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
=
𝑦
𝛿
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑡 − ∫ 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
[
 
 
 
 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) (∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
)
2
−2
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥
∫
𝜕𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
𝜕2𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥2
− 𝑅(𝑝, 𝑛𝑡) ∫
𝜕2𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0 ]
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑜
.          (2.xv) 
We can analyse the sign of the second derivative by considering the three lines of 
terms within the square bracket (outside the square bracket, everything is positive in 
sign). Note that we have made no assumption regarding the second derivative of 
the hazard function. The first and second lines within the bracket are unaffected by 
the second derivative of the hazard function. The terms within the first and second 
lines are therefore positive in sign. However, the second line is preceded by a minus 
sign. Thus 
𝜕2𝑍(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥2
 is necessarily ambiguous in sign regardless of whether 
𝜕2𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑥2
 and 
∫
𝜕2𝑅(𝑝,𝑛𝜏)
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 are positive or negative in sign. Therefore, the damage function may 
either be concave or convex. Further, the damage function may display convexity for 
part of the domain of 𝑥 and concavity for another part. 
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Invasive species control in a one-dimensional 
metapopulation network  
  
 
ABSTRACT 
The growth and spread of established Invasive Alien Species (IAS) cause significant 
ecological and economic damages. Minimising the costs of controlling, and the 
damages from, IAS depends on the spatial dynamics and uncertainty regarding IAS 
spread. This study expands on existing modelling approaches by allowing for 
varying stock sizes within patches and stochastic spread between patches. The 
objective of this study is to demonstrate the added value from this more detailed 
modelling approach. This is achieved in the context of coastal and riparian systems, 
which can be accurately modelled one-dimensional landscape, i.e. a series of 
patches connected in a line. The model allows for two types of intervention, namely 
(1) partial or complete removal of the population in within any patch; and (2) 
containment to reduce spread between patches. We analyse the general properties 
of the model using a two-patch setup to determine how the optimal policy depends 
on both the location and size of the invasion in patches. We find that allowing for 
varying stock sizes within patches facilitates optimal timing of the application of 
containment. We also identify two novel optimal policies: the combination of 
containment and removal to stop spread between patches and the application of up 
to four distinct policies for a single patch depending on the size of the invasion in 
that patch. 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper: Walker, A.N., Poos, J.-J., Groeneveld, R.A., 2015. Invasive species control 
in a one-dimensional metapopulation network. Ecological Modelling 316, 176-184.   
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3.1 Introduction 
 
IAS (Invasive Alien Species) are species that proliferate, spread, and persist after 
introduction into a natural environment (Mack et al., 2000). IAS can cause dramatic 
changes in ecological systems and have profoundly altered terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems worldwide (Gurevitch and Padilla, 2004; Hulme, 2006). Although 
invasions are not necessarily human-driven, the number of invasions has grown 
substantially as a result of global travel and trade (Mack et al., 2000). Invasions can 
lead to significant losses in terms of human health, biodiversity, and  ecological 
services (Frésard and Boncoeur, 2006; Pimentel et al., 2005; Scalera, 2010). These 
losses can be mitigated by appropriate management in response to invasions, 
informed by scientific decision support (Carrasco et al., 2010a). A better 
understanding of the costs and benefits of controlling IAS improves management 
efficiency (Genovesi, 2005). A particular aspect requiring more attention is our 
understanding of the spatial aspects of invasion control (Albers et al., 2010; 
Epanchin-Niell and Hastings, 2010; Savage and Renton, 2014).  
 
Much of the literature concerning spatial dynamics is concerned with the interaction 
of multiple jurisdictions in response to both the invasive species and the actions of 
other jurisdictions. These include Huffaker et al. (1992), Albers et al. (2010), 
Sanchirico et al. (2010), Zhang et al. (2010), Carrasco et al. (2012), McDermott et al. 
(2013) and Fenichel et al. (2014). The literature considering single jurisdictions 
consisting of multiple spatial areas has the shortcoming that it either does not allow 
for varying stock sizes within areas (i.e. areas are modelled in binary terms: either 
invaded or not invaded) or restricts removal of invasions in a given area to complete 
eradiction only (Carrasco et al., 2010a; Finnoff et al., 2010a, Epanchin-Niell and 
Wilen, 2012; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012).  Restricting removal of the invasive 
population to complete eradication only is particularly problematic in the marine 
context because a policy of eradication is rarely pursued in practice (Vitousek et al., 
1997). 
 
The binary restriction (areas are modelled as either invaded or not invaded) limits 
modelling richness as it excludes within-patch density dependence of damages. 
Further, the binary restriction limits the set of potential management options. When 
patches are either invaded or not invaded, the set of management options in terms 
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of reducing the size of the stock is restricted to doing nothing or completely 
eradicating the invasion in that area. This precludes the identification of optimal 
management policies which maintain an intermediate invasive population in a given 
patch.  
 
We therefore construct a model which allows for varying stock sizes in patches and 
removal of any amount of the population from any patch (cf. Salinas et al., 2005 and 
Burnett et al., 2007), as opposed to being invaded or non-invaded in a binary sense 
(as in Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012 and Chadès et al., 2011), in a single jurisdiction 
setting. Additionally, we allow for a second intervention which we term containment. 
Containment reduces the probability of spread between patches without affecting 
the population size within the patch. This paper therefore builds on Burnett et al. 
(2007), who consider varying population size within patches (but do not allow for 
measures to directly contain the spread of the invasion) by allowing for a 
containment intervention, such as employed by Sharov (2004). 
 
Allowing for varying stock sizes in patches increases the dimensionality of the 
problem. In a network of two patches which can only be invaded or non-invaded 
there are only four possible states. However, if a patch can either be invaded, 
invaded at an intermediate population size, or fully invaded, (thus, three possible 
states for a given patch) then there are nine possible states for the network as a 
whole. Thus, the computational burden of modelling more complex systems can 
quickly become problematic. This burden is further increased by our use of two 
interventions; removal and containment. In this paper, we consider the case of a 
one-dimensional network, which limits the increased computational burden 
resulting from varying population size within patches. A one-dimensional network 
consists of a series of patches connected in a line. Chadès et al. (2011) refer to such 
a spatial arrangement as a line network and employ line-networks to analyse 
invasive species management. A one-dimensional network consists of two end 
patches which are linked to only one other patch, and all other patches are linked to 
only two other patches such that all the patches, visually, form a line. A one-
dimensional network is therefore fully defined by the number of patches. We 
assume that an invasion can only spread between patches for which there is a 
connection. Hence, if there are three patches with Patch 1 and 3 as the end patches 
and Patch 1 is invaded, then Patch 3 can only become invaded after Patch 2 is 
invaded.  
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Invasions spreading in coastal and riparian systems are suitable to be modelled as 
one-dimensional networks. The modelling approach of this study is influenced in 
particular by two cases; that of the Pacific Oyster (Crassostrea gigas) in the Wadden 
Sea and the Chinese Mitten Crab (Eriocheir sinensis) in European rivers. The Pacific 
Oyster can affect commercial mussel yields and cause injury to recreationists due to 
its sharp shells (Troost, 2010). Further, the increase in substrate which may result 
from Pacific Oyster invasions can form a platform for the establishment of future 
invasions of other species (Haydar and Wolff, 2011). Barriers to spread between 
parts of the Wadden Sea exist due to the presence of tidal basins. Tidal basins are 
systems of coastal currents which form a barrier to the spread of the Pacific Oyster 
larvae and thus the spread of the invasion through the Wadden Sea (Kraft et al., 
2010). The Chinese Mitten Crab causes damage to manmade structures such as 
flood defences via burrowing, damages nets and traps by feeding on the fish caught 
within them and increases the competition for food with native species (Herborg et 
al., 2003). In riparian habitats, the spread of the Chinese Mitten Crab can be 
impeded by installing traps at weirs (Herborg et al., 2003), although, this method is 
not totally effective at preventing further spread. 
 
The two case studies considered above share a common theme: that of a barriers to 
spread. Barriers to spread imply that the rate at which patches are invaded is not 
constant. Instead it depends on the invasive population size in adjacent patches. The 
model therefore employs a stochastic spread process as an intuitive way to link the 
size of the invasion within a given patches to the probability of spread to an 
adjacent patch. Such a relationship can be conceptualised in two ways. Firstly, a 
stochastic spread processes conforms to the principle of propagule pressure, 
whereby the probability of a species becoming established in a new patch increases 
with the number of arrivals (Kolar and Lodge, 2001). Hence, a greater population in 
one patch leads to a great number of arrivals in a connected patch, and thus that 
the probability of successful establishment of the invasion in the new patch 
increases. Alternatively, a greater population in an invaded patch implies a greater 
number of possible attempts to cross the barrier, and thus a greater total probability 
of success.  
 
In order to analyse optimal control of IAS with varying stock size within patches, we 
construct a model which is solved using Stochastic Dynamic Programming. We 
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assume that it is always possible (if not necessarily optimal) to remove all or some of 
an invasion in specific patches. In practice then, the invasion can be harvested or 
destroyed in a given patch. We do not assume that there are always feasible 
methods to restrict the ability of the invasion to spread. For example, it is difficult to 
conceive a realistic containment technology to limit the spread of Pacific Oyster spat 
between tidal basins. It is however, reasonable to attempt to trap invasive Chinese 
Mitten Crab as they cross a weir. Therefore, unlike Epanchin-Niell and Wilen (2012), 
we do not assume that the spread can be prevented with certainty, rather that the 
probability of spread can only be reduced.  
 
We construct a generalised model of N patches in one-dimensional space. Under 
the assumption that the invasion always arrives at one end of the line network, and 
spreads patch by patch through the network, a two-patch model is sufficient to 
analyse the optimality of removal, containment and combining both removal and 
containment. Two-patch models have been shown to provide useful insights in 
related settings by Salinas et al. (2005) and Sanchirico et al. (2010). We explore the 
effects of heterogeneity of damage costs between patches and the costs of 
interventions on optimal policies and thus demonstrate the added value from 
considering varying stock size within patches. We proceed to demonstrate how the 
invasion grows with, and spreads between, patches in a three-patch system under 
the optimal policy. This also demonstrates the generalisability of the modelling 
approach to larger systems. 
 
3.2 The model 
 
We consider the spread of an invasive species over time, indexed t, in a line network, 
with 𝑁 patches, indexed by 𝑖. The state of the system in a given time period is 
described by the size of the invasion in each patch and is given by  𝑺𝒕 =
[𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑠2,𝑡 … , 𝑠𝑁,𝑡]. The values which si,t can take (stock sizes) are determined by the set 
of values in the vector 𝑸 = [𝑞1, 𝑞2, . . , 𝑞𝑀] such that 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∈ 𝑸 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡. The final element of 
𝑸, 𝑞𝑀, is the maximum possible size of the stock in any given patch. Because we use 
a discrete approach, M gives the number of different values which stock in a given 
patch can take. Where j indexes the elements of 𝐐, the properties of 𝐐 are, firstly, 
0 ≤ 𝑞𝑗 ≤ 1 and secondly, 𝑞1 = 0. The second property means that if 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑞1 then 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
is non-invaded.  
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The stock within a patch increases deterministically according to a vector, 
𝑮 = [𝑔1, 𝑔2, . . , 𝑔𝑀]. As described above, the state of any patch is equal to an indexed 
element of 𝑸. If the current stock size of a given patch is equal to the jth element of 
𝑸 then the jth element of 𝑮 gives stock size in the next period for that patch. To 
illustrate, let us consider the example of a single patch (𝑁 = 1) with state given by 
𝑠𝑡 = 0.4. Taking the example of 𝑸 = [0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1], we see that 0.4 = 𝑞3. 
Hence, the jth element of interest is the 3rd element. If, 𝑮 = [0, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1], then 
the 3rd element of 𝑮 is 0.6, thus 𝑠𝑡+1 = 0.6. The first element of 𝑮 is always zero 
because stock sizes of zero cannot grow. The specification of 𝑮 can represent 
various types of growth functions. In the above example, the growth rate is constant 
for non-zero stock sizes less than 𝑞𝑀. For non-constant growth rates, for example 
the specification 𝑮 = [0, 0.6, 0.8, 1, 1, 1] could be used.  
 
The state of invaded patches adjacent to a non-invaded patches determines the 
probability that the non-invaded patch will become invaded. We set the values of qj 
such that 0 ≤ 𝑞𝑗 ≤ 1 for two reasons. Firstly, we choose the range of 𝑞𝑗 in order to 
express the state of the invasion in a given patch in terms of the probability that an 
adjacent non-invaded patch will become invaded by a single invaded patch. 
Secondly, we choose the range of qj such that it is never certain that a non-invaded 
patch adjacent to patch j will certainly become invaded (as would be the case if 
𝑞𝑗 = 1) or will certainly not become invaded (as would be the case if 𝑞𝑗 = 1). 
Whether the elements of 𝐐 increase in constant or non-constant increments affects 
whether there is linearity in the relationship between the size of the invasion in a 
patch and the probability of invasion in an adjacent non-invaded patch. We assume 
a linear relationship for reasons of simplicity, i.e. 𝑞𝑗+1 − 𝑞𝑗 = 𝑞2 ∀ 𝑗 < 𝑀. If a non-
invaded patch, i, has only one invaded adjacent patch e.g. 𝑖 − 1, then the probability 
that the non-invaded patch becomes invaded is given by 
 
Pr(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 > 0 | 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡 > 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡 = 0) = 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡                         (3.1) 
 
where Pr refers to the probability of a given event occurring. Hence, the probability 
that patch i becomes invaded in the next period, conditional upon that patch not 
currently being invaded, and that only one adjacent patch is invaded, is given by the 
stock size in the single adjacent patch. If a non-invaded patch i has two adjacent 
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invaded patches, 𝑖 − 1 and 𝑖 + 1,  then the probability that the non-invaded patch 
becomes invaded is given by 
 
Pr(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 > 0|𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡 > 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡 > 0 ) = 1 − [(1 − 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡)(1 − 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡)].        (3.2) 
 
Hence, non-invaded patches which are adjacent to two invaded patches are 
probabilistically invaded as a function of the stock size in both adjacent patches.  
There are two options for controlling the invasion. The first control option is 
containment. Containment reduces the probability of spread to uninvaded adjacent 
patches without affecting the size of the invasion in patches which are already 
invaded. For example, barriers have been used at weirs in Germany to reduce the 
spread of Chinese Mitten Crab (Herborg et al., 2007). The second control option is 
removal. Removal reduces the stock size in a patch by a chosen amount.  
The variable αt = (0,1) determines whether containment has been implemented in 
time period t.  When αt = 1, containment is implemented. Containment in time 
period t does not affect 𝐒𝐭, but does affect 𝐒𝐭+𝟏 by reducing the probability of 
spread. The factor by which containment reduces the probability of spread between 
patches is given by ψ where 0 < ψ < 1. Accordingly, when containment is possible, 
we modify Equation (3.1), which refers to the case when only one adjacent patch is 
invaded, in Equation (3.3). 
 
Pr(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 > 0 | 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡 > 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡 = 0) = 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝑡) + 𝛼𝑡𝜓𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡               (3.3) 
 
We also modify Equation (3.2), which refers to the case when two adjacent patches 
are invaded, in Equation (3.4). 
 
Pr(𝑠𝑖,𝑡+1 > 0 | 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡 > 0 ⋀ 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡 > 0 ) = (𝛼𝑡𝜓 − 𝛼𝑡 + 1)(𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡)  +
                                                                                                       𝑠𝑖−1,𝑡𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡(𝛼𝑡𝜓 − 𝛼𝑡 + 1)
2      (3.4) 
 
For modelling simplicity, we assume that containment cannot be targeted at specific 
patches and thus is either applied to all patches or no patches. Containment incurs a 
cost λ  which is the annuity of the investment costs and the annual operation and 
maintenance costs incurred each year that the containment policy is enacted.  
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The second option for controlling the invasion is removal. Removal reduces the size 
of the invasion in any given patch according to the vector 𝑲𝒕 = [𝑘1,𝑡 , 𝑘2,𝑡 , … , 𝑘𝑁,𝑡]  
where 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ∈ 𝑄 and 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 . The cost structure, expressed by a vector 
𝑬𝒍 = [𝑒1, 𝑒2, . . 𝑒𝑀−1], determines the incremental costs of removal (where 𝑀 gives the 
number of different values which stock in a given patch can take). The first element, 
𝑒1, refers to the cost of removing the final unit of the invasion from a patch. The last 
element, 𝑒𝑀−1, refers to the cost of reducing the size of the invasion in a given patch 
from size 𝑞𝑀 to size 𝑞𝑀−1. We parameterise two vectors of incremental costs 𝑬𝒍 
where 𝑙 ∈ (1,2).  Both vectors entail non-linear cost structures. The cost of control 
increases as the size of the invasion becomes smaller. This approach follows Mehta 
et al. (2007), Burnett et al. (2007) and Carrasco et al. (2010b) . We assume that it is 
always possible to remove the last unit of invasion but that removing the last unit is 
more expensive than removing the first. 
Specification 𝑬𝟏 displays low levels of non-linearity and 𝑬𝟐 displays higher levels of 
non-linearity. For clarity, we refer to 𝑬𝟏 as the “flatter” incremental cost function and 
𝑬𝟐 as the “steeper” incremental cost function. We illustrate the two incremental cost 
functions in the following figure for the example where 𝑀 = 6. For other values of 𝑀 
for a given specification, 𝑒1 and 𝑒𝑀−1 would retain the same value. Values for 
𝑒𝑖 where 1 < 𝑖 < 𝑀 are assigned via interpolation in order to retain the degree of 
non-linearity.  
Control cost for a given 𝑬𝒍 is given by  
𝑐𝑡 = ∑ ∑ 𝑒𝑗
𝑓(𝑠𝑖,𝑡)−1
𝑗=𝑓(𝑘𝑖,𝑡)
.       𝑁𝑖=1                        (3.5) 
The function 𝑓 gives the position (value of j) of 𝑦 ∈ (𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖,𝑡) in vector 𝐐 and is given 
by 
𝑓(𝑦) =
𝑦
𝑞2
+ 1                              (3.6) 
Damage costs are proportional to the size of the invasion in all patches. This is the 
most general assumption according to Parker et al. (1999). Damage cost by patch is 
determined by the vector 𝜞 = [𝛾1, 𝛾2, … , 𝛾𝑁]  where 𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑖 such that damage may 
vary between patches. Damage cost in a given period are calculated after any 
removal has taken place. Therefore, damage is given by  
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𝑑𝑡 = 𝜞(𝑺𝒕 − 𝑲𝒕)
𝑇                         (3.7) 
where 𝑇 indicates the transpose. 
 
Figure 3.1: The two specifications of incremental control in a single patch. For the purposes of illustration, 
we take the example where 𝑀 = 6. The first increment is the cost removing the last unit of invasion in a 
given patch. The last increment (5 in this example) is the cost of reducing the size of the invasion in a patch 
from its maximum size to its second to largest size (as determined by the vector 𝐐) . Incremental costs 
given in the figure are rounded to 1 decimal place.  
The objective function minimises 𝑉𝑡 by choosing a containment and removal policy. 
The policy affects the expected value of the 𝑧 possible future states 𝐗𝑗 . The Bellman 
equation is therefore given by: 
𝑉𝑡(𝐒𝑡) = min𝐊𝑡,𝛼𝑡 {
𝑐𝑡(𝐊𝑡, 𝐒𝑡: 𝐄𝑙) + 𝜞(𝑺𝒕 − 𝑲𝒕)
𝑇 + 𝜆𝛼𝑡
+𝛽 ∑ 𝑃𝑟(𝐒𝑡+1 = 𝐗𝑗|𝛼𝑡𝜓)𝑉𝑡+1(𝐗𝑗)
𝑧
𝑗=1
}                    (3.8) 
where 𝛽 is the discount factor and 𝜆 is the cost of implementing the containment 
policy. Throughout the analysis we set 𝛽 according to a 5% discount rate, such that 
𝛽 ≈ 0.95. 
We calculate solutions to Equation (3.8) using value function iteration (see Judd, 
1998) to analyse the dynamic effects of all possible policies and find optimal policies 
for all states in all time periods.  
The model is implemented in Matlab. The size of the state space determines the 
running time. Our two-patch model, used to analyse optimal interventions 
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depending on the state of the invasion, has a smaller state space in comparison to 
our three-patch model, which is used to demonstrate how the invasion grows 
within, and spreads between, patches in a larger system. The size of the state space 
is given by 𝑀𝑁 . The two-patch model uses 𝑀 = 21 and 𝑁 = 2 giving state space of 
size 441 which runs in under 5 minutes on a 2.50 GHz Intel Core i5 vPro with 4 GB of 
RAM. For a model calibrated to specific invasions, larger state spaces, and 
particularly, larger numbers of patches, would likely be required. Our three-patch 
model uses 𝑀 = 11 and 𝑁 = 3 giving state space of size 1331 which runs in 30 
minutes.  
 
3.3 Results from a two-patch model 
 
Throughout this section, the parameterisations for 𝜓, 𝐐 and 𝐆 remain constant. 
These values are given in Appendix 3.1. The values of 𝐆 have been chosen to 
approximate a logistic growth function. We will begin by evaluating the case where 
containment is not possible for both cost specifications. We then introduce 
containment and analyse different containment costs. We will analyse optimal 
policies, which consist of one or more types of interventions. Interventions are 
applied for specific states of the invasion. The optimal policy determines which 
intervention to apply to the system for every given state. Removal can be employed 
as an optimal policy in several ways. These are: Immediate Eradication (IE), which 
removes all invasion from all patches immediately; Full Removal (FR), which removes 
all of the invasion from a single patch; and Partial Removal (PR), which removes of 
some but not all of the invasion in a given patch or patches; and No Removal (NR), 
which removes none of the invasion in any patch. The amount of PR within a patch 
is endogenously determined. We will first consider cases where containment is not 
possible and then cases where containment is possible. When containment is 
possible, containment can be used in addition to the above interventions.  
 
3.3.1 No containment 
We analyse optimal policies for the two cost specifications by first considering the 
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case where containment is not possible. 
Flatter cost specification  𝐄1 
Olson and Roy (2002) established that optimal solutions in controlling IAS are often 
corner solutions. The corner solution is either No Removal (NR) or Immediate 
Eradication (IE). Small invasions are optimally immediately eradicated and larger 
invasions are often left to proliferate (i.e. nothing is done). The size of the invasion at 
which the optimal intervention switches from IE to NR is known as the “switching-
point”. In our model, the state of the system is not described by a single number, so 
we will refer to a switching threshold. Without the possibility for containment and 
using the incremental control costs given in specification 𝐸1, Figure 3.2 shows how 
the switching threshold between IE or NR depends on the damage cost.  
Figures 3.2(A) and 3.2(B) both show two steady states. The first is (0,0). This is the 
result of applying the IE intervention to all black states. The second is (0.95,0.95). 
This is the result of applying NR for all grey states. The border between the black (IE) 
and grey (NR) areas determines the switching threshold. Here, we can only see the 
effects of damage costs on the switching threshold. Other variables will also affect 
the switching threshold. The discount rate affects the present value of damages 
resulting from NR. The parameterisation of incremental removal costs affect the 
costs of IE. The damage function affects both the costs of NR and IE. We do not 
show analysis of the effects of the other determinants of the switching point 
because the general pattern seen in Figure 3.2 holds. Partial Removal (PR) is thus not 
optimal in this case. The convex shape of the switching threshold is due to our 
assumption that incremental reductions of large stocks in a given patch are less 
costly than incremental reductions of small stocks. This means that for a given sum 
of the stock across both patches, it is less costly to eradicate an invasion which is 
very unevenly distributed across the two patches.  
We can also consider the, potentially more realistic, case of heterogeneous damage 
costs. In order to identify the effects of heterogeneity, we will take the damage costs 
from Figure 3.2(B) (𝛤 = [4,4]) and redistribute them between the patches. The results 
are shown in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.2: The state-dependent optimality of IE and NR for two homogenous damage cost 
parameterisations (given by Γ ) where 𝛼𝑡 = 0 and 𝑙 = 1. The arrows depict the state trajectory which results 
from applying the optimal intervention. In the NR area, single arrows are used to show how the invasion 
grows in deterministic steps to the steady state (𝑠1, 𝑠2) = (0.95, 0.95). Two arrows emanating from a single 
state show how deterministic growth increases the invasive population within an invaded patch as well as 
the possibility for spread to the non-invaded patch. In the IE area, removal occurs in one immediate step, 
with a single arrow indicating the immediate transition to (𝑠1, 𝑠2) = (0, 0). 
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Figure 3.3: The state dependent optimality of IE or NR for a heterogenous damage cost parameterisation, 
𝛤 = [0,8], where  𝜎𝑡 = 0, 𝑙 = 1. In the NR area, multiple arrows are used to show how the invasion grows in 
deterministic steps to the steady state (𝑠1, 𝑠2) = (0.95, 0.95). In the IE area, removal occurs in one 
immediate step, so only 1 arrow is used to indicate the immediate transition to (𝑠1, 𝑠2) = (0, 0). 
Redistributing the damage costs between the patches changes the switching point 
such that more states with greater stock sizes in Patch 2 and fewer states with lower 
stock sizes in Patch 1 are subject to IE. IE or NR are still the only optimal 
interventions. Comparing Figure 3.2(B) and Figure 3.3, shows that heterogeneity has 
a minor effect on the optimal policy, even in the extreme case when damage cost in 
one of the patches is zero. When this is the case, as in Figure 3.3, there are no direct 
benefits from reduced damages resulting from eradication in Patch 1. The benefits 
from reducing the future expected costs of damages in the other patch are sufficient 
to ensure that eradication of small populations in the patch with zero damage costs 
is still optimal.  
Steeper cost specification 𝐄2 
Interventions other than NR and IE can be optimal if the incremental cost function is 
steeper as in specification 𝐄2. We identify Partial Removal (PR) as an optimal 
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intervention. PR is defined as the removal of some but not all of the invasion in a 
given patch. It does not remove all invasion in all patches. For a given state, when PR 
is only applied to one patch, NR is applied to the other.  
Figure 3.4(A) shows a second switching threshold in addition to the switching 
threshold between IE and NR. The second switching threshold determines the states 
to which PR is applied. The application of PR maintains stock size at less than its 
maximum possible size and is therefore an interior solution. Hence interior solutions 
may be optimal if the incremental cost function is sufficiently non-linear.  
Figure 3.4(B) tests the effect of redistributing damage costs between the two 
patches. Heterogeneity affects both the switching point between NR and IE and the 
switching threshold between PR and the other two interventions (NR and IE). The 
amount of removal under PR is also different from Panel (A). The interior solution in 
Panel (B) involves less removal in Patch 1 but more removal in Patch 2. Panel (B) 
therefore shows that heterogeneity in damage costs affects both switching 
thresholds. However, this effect is more marked for the threshold between NR and 
PR than for the switching threshold between NR and IE.  
 
3.3.2 Introducing the possibility for containment 
We now continue by adding a second type of intervention: containment. 
Containment limits the ability of the invasion to invade adjacent patches without 
affecting the size of the invasion in patches which are already invaded. Unlike in the 
previous section, where small changes were made to the model to identify and 
establish causality for the basic features of the model, this section will simply use 
reasonable parameters which give the most interesting results.  
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Figure 3.4: The state dependent optimality of IE, NR and PR for a heterogonous and homogeneous 
damage cost parameterisations where αt = 0 and 𝑙 = 2. In Panel (A), PR reduces stock size to 0.713 in any 
patch where stock size is greater than 0.713. The steady state is therefore (0.713, 0.713) . In Panel (B), PR 
reduces stock size in Patch 1 to 0.808 if stock size is greater than 0.808. PR reduces stock size in patch 2 to 
0.665 if the stock size is greater than 0.665. The steady state is therefore (0.808, 0.665) . The arrows depict 
the interventions and the location of the steady state which results from each intervention. The black arrow 
refers to PR. 
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Containment with flatter cost specification  𝐄1 
The containment option may be used to slow down the spread of the invasion. 
Containment reduces the probability of spread between patches. Slowing the spread 
of the invasion between patches pushes damages further into the discounted future 
and therefore is intuitively attractive when the costs of containment are sufficiently 
low. This is demonstrated in Figure 3.5(A). Figure 3.5(B) demonstrates Full Removal 
(FR), which removes all the invasion from a single patch.  
Figure 3.5(A) shows the two steady states resulting from the IE intervention (0,0) and 
the NR intervention (0.95, 0.95). The steady state (0.95, 0.95) also results from the 
patches where containment is implemented. Containment is only implemented in 
states which are not subject to IE and where the invasion is only found in one of the 
two patches. The containment option reduces the probability of spread, thus 
deferring damages further into the discounted future. Here, the possibility for 
containment has not affected the steady states. 
The reduced costs of containment used in Figure 3.5(B) mean that maintaining a 
stochastic limit cycle using both removal and containment becomes optimal. This 
requires using the FR intervention. The combination of FR and containment results 
in two stochastic limit cycles, each of which consists of two states. The first state 
consists of one fully invaded patch and a non-invaded patch. The second state 
consists of one fully invaded patch and a patch which has been invaded in the 
previous time period. The first state of the stochastic limit cycle will lead to the 
second state according to the stochastic spread process. As soon as this occurs, FR is 
enacted on the newly invaded patch, thus returning the system to the first state. 
There are two stochastic limit cycles. The stochastic limit cycle in the bottom right of 
Panel (B) cycles between (0.95, 0) and (0.95, 0.0475) and the stochastic limit cycle in 
the top left of Panel (B) cycles between (0, 0.95) and (0.0475, 0.95). 
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Figure 3.5: The state dependent optimality of IE, NR, FR and containment for homogeneous damage cost 
and varying costs of containment (given by λ) where 𝛼𝑡 = 0, 𝑙 = 2 and 𝛤 = [2.4,2.4]. FR stands for Full 
Removal and involves the removal of all invasion from one patch. Arrows for FR are not shown in this case 
to allow for ease of interpretation.  
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Containment with steeper cost specification 𝐄2 
The previous section has shown how multiple types of interventions can be used to 
maintain a stochastic limit cycle and how containment can be used to slow the 
spread of the invasion. We now proceed to show that under the steeper incremental 
cost specification 𝐄2 and heterogeneous damage costs, the optimal policy for an 
invasion which is only found in one patch can depend heavily on the size of the 
population in that patch.  
We will separately address three aspects of Figure 3.6. The first is seen in the bottom 
right of Figure 3.6. Here, containment is used for any invasion which is only in Patch 
1 and is greater than 0.238. In addition, any invasions limited only to Patch 1 which 
are greater than 0.885 are subject to PR which reduces the stock size in Patch 1 to 
0.885. This has the effect of further minimising the probability of spread. This is 
therefore a spread-slowing policy which is achieved by combining two types of 
interventions.  
Eventually, the spread-slowing policy described above will lead to spread into the 
second patch. This leads us to the second interesting aspect. After spread into Patch 
2, the invasion in Patch 2 grows until it becomes larger than 0.713 in Patch 2. At this 
time period, any invasion in Patch 2 above 0.713 is removed. The stock in Patch 1 
will grow and remain at its maximum. In each time period then, the state of the 
system will change between (0.95, 0.903) and (0.95, 0.713). This is a similar effect to 
that seen in Figure 3.4(A) and Figure 3.4(B) whereby heterogeneity in damage costs 
has a large effect on the stock size in patches where the interior solution is 
maintained. The case of Figure 3.6 is a more extreme example because the 
heterogeneity results in an internal solution whereby it is only optimal to employ PR 
in one of the patches.  
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Figure 3.6: The state dependent optimality of IE, NR, PR and containment for heterogeneous damage costs 
Γ = [5,145] where l = 2 , 𝛼t = 1 and λ = 70. The black arrow shows the PR intervention. Arrows relating to 
PR in Patch 1 are omitted for ease of interpretation.  
The third interesting aspect is seen in the extent in the state space over which the 
containment intervention is optimal. When the invasion is only found in Patch 1, 
invasions less than 0.1425 are eradicated, 0.1425 up to and including 0.2375 are 
subject to a NR intervention, and invasions greater than 0.2375 are subject to a 
containment intervention. The reason for this is that higher probabilities of spread 
without containment result in greater reductions in spread probability due to 
containment. Therefore, it is not necessarily optimal to implement a containment 
intervention in a given location if the population is not sufficiently large. 
The first and third interesting aspects combined mean that there are a total of four 
different ways that interventions can be used to control an invasion which is found 
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in only one patch. Small invasions are subject to IE, somewhat larger invasion are 
subject to NR, most invasions are subject to containment and the largest invasions 
are subject to both containment and PR.  
 
3.4 Extension to three patches 
 
This section demonstrates how the invasion grows within, and spreads between, 
patches in a three-patch system under the optimal policy, allowing for both 
containment and removal. Under a three patch system, the state is given by 
𝐒𝑡 = [𝑠1,𝑡 , 𝑠2,𝑡 , 𝑠3,𝑡]. We choose a parameterisation such that IE, NR, containment and 
PR are all employed depending on the state. All parameters values are provided in 
Appendix 3.2. Damage costs are heterogeneous between patches such that 
γ1 < γ2 < γ3 and we employ the steeper cost specification. Due to the increased 
dimensionality of the three-patch case, we demonstrate the application of these 
interventions in a forward simulation, which shows how the state of the system 
changes over time, given optimal interventions and an initial state. Because invasion 
of a non-invaded patch is probabilistic, we present the expected manner in which 
the state of system will change over time i.e. the most likely transition path. Figure 
3.7 shows the transition path from the smallest state which is not subject to IE. 
Specifically, the starting state in Figure 3.7 is 𝐒0 = [0.19, 0, 0]. The incrementally 
smaller state, 𝐒0 = [0.095, 0, 0], is subject to IE such that the invasion is present only 
at time 𝑡 = 0. Therefore, this scenario is not shown in Figure 3.7.  
Figure 3.7 shows results which follow directly from the results for a two-patch 
system. As in the two-patch case, states with a smaller population are subject to IE, 
but this intervention is not optimal for large states, such as the initial state in Figure 
3.7. Containment is employed only when the invasion is confined to Patch 1 because 
there are two uninvaded patches and as such, the reduced future damages resulting 
from reducing the probability of spread to Patch 2 are greatest. This is similar to 
Figure 3.5(A). If there are more patches in the system, there can be more non-
invaded patches. In general, it holds that the greater the number of non-invaded 
patches, the greater the future damages which can be avoided by reducing the 
probability of spread between patches and hence, the optimality of containment 
increase. In Figure 3.7, once Patch 2 becomes invaded, containment is no longer 
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optimal. It is however optimal to employ PR to limit the size of the invasion in each 
patch in the steady state, which is reached in the eighth period. This is a similar 
result to Figure 3.4(B), because the steady state in each patch varies depending on 
the damage cost. Just like in Figure 3.4(A), if the damage cost is homogenous 
between patches, the steady state population size within patches would be equal.  
 
Figure 3.7: The expected growth and spread of an invasion in a three-patch system, with parameters given 
in Appendix 3.2. The initial state is 𝐒0 = [0.190, 0, 0]. A smaller initial state size 𝐒0 = [0.095, 0, 0] is subject to 
IE (not shown). The state of the system is given by the points indicated by a cross (Patch 1), a circle (Patch 
2) and a square (Patch 3). For clarity, arrows link the population size in each patch over time. Optimal 
interventions by patch are indicated by, for example, NR(1), meaning No Removal in Patch 1, or PR(3) 
meaning Partial Removal in Patch 3. The population within each patch converges to a steady state in the 
eigth time period. The population sizes in the steady state are maintained by PR at a level which varies 
according to the varying damage cost between patches.  
 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion  
 
This study explored a spatially explicit dynamic progamming model for the optimal 
control of stochastically spreading invasive species. The model is relevant for the 
optimal control of invasions spreading in coastal and riparian habitats. Optimal 
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management interventions are derived in a two-patch model and the 
generalisability of the model is demonstrated in a three-patch setup, which shows 
how the invasion grows and spreads under the optimal policy in a larger system. The 
insights provided by the model result principally from allowing for varying stock 
sizes within patches. This study focuses on optimal management once the invasion 
has arrived and therefore does not consider policies aimed at preventing the arrival 
of the invasive species in the system in the first place. 
This study provides new insights into the optimal control of invasive species. This is 
best demonstrated with respect to Epanchin-Niell and Wilen (2012), who consider 
two-dimensional space with a deterministic spread process, patches which are either 
invaded or not invaded and allow for both removal and containment. Firstly, by 
allowing for varying stock sizes within patches, our model facilitates the optimization 
of the timing of containment. In Epanchin-Niell and Wilen (2012), if it is optimal to 
apply containment, then containment must be applied as soon as a patch becomes 
invaded. We have shown that this is not neccessarily optimal. Postponing 
containment for a given patch until the population within that patch has reached a 
certain size may be optimal if the reduction in the probability of spread resulting 
from the containment strategy increases as the invasive population size within that 
patch increases. In this case then, and borrowing the terminology of Buhle et al. 
(2005), obtaining the most “bang for the buck” from containment can only be 
achieved via optimally timing its implementation. 
Secondly, we identify optimal policies in the (often more realistic) case where 
containment can only reduce the probability of spread, not prevent it entirely. This is 
in contrast to Epanchin-Niell and Wilen (2012), who assume that containment is 
always perfectly effective. When containment reduces the probability of spread in a 
model with varying stock size in patches, several novel and interesting policies may 
result. Preventing spread entirely may still be optimal, even if containment alone 
cannot achieve this. Thus, policies to stop the spread can still be optimal, but require 
a combination of containment and removal of any new spread. 
When containment alone cannot fully prevent the spread of the invasion, it is 
obvious that slowing the spread is a potentially optimal strategy. However, and 
thirdly, we identify the possibility for complex optimal policies for slowing the 
spread which depend on the stock size in the invaded patch. Allowing for varying 
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stock sizes has shown that up to four disctinct interventions may be applicable 
depending on the population size. These vary from Immediate Eradication for small 
populations, to No Removal or containment for intermediate populations and finally 
a combination of containment and Partial Removal for larger stock sizes. 
These results can be evaluated with respect to the literature on the optimal control 
of epidemics in metapopulations, for which two-patch models have been employed 
(e.g. Mbah and Gilligan, 2011; Alpízar and Gordillo, 2013 and most notably by 
Rowthorn et al., 2009). Rowthorn et al. (2009) consider two populations of 
individuals who are susceptible to infection by a disease in an optimal control model 
which aims to minimise the number of infected individuals. The authors find that 
treatment should be directed at the population with the lower level of infection. In 
order to compare results between this study and Rowthorn et al. (2009), let us 
identify which of our results are derived in a situation most comparable to that 
considered in Rowthorn et al. We find that comparisons to our results can best be 
made where damage cost is homogenous, incremental costs are flatter and 
containment is not possible, i.e. Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2 shows that it is optimal to 
immediately eradicate the invasion in both patches or to do nothing in both patches 
for all possible states. Hence, unlike Rowthorn et al., we find that it is not optimal to 
focus on the patch with the lowest stock size. The principal reason for this difference 
is that Rowthorn et al.’s result is derived in the case where the budget constraint is 
binding. There is no budget constraint in our study. When the budget constraint is 
non-binding, Rowthorn et al.’s results are more similar to those in our study. 
However, if the budget constraint is binding, then some method of prioritisation is 
required. In Rowthorn et al. (2009), the population with the greatest number of 
suseptible individuals is prioritised. 
Could we then expect a similar result if a budget constraint was applied in our 
model? The degree to which the results will be similar depends on how steep 
incremental costs are. If incremental costs are linear, as in Rowthorn et al., then a 
binding budget constraint would prioritise patches with smaller stock sizes. As 
incremental costs become steeper, however, this effect would reduce, because 
incremental reductions in stock of the invasive species are more costly in a patch 
with a smaller stock. This will, to some extent, offset the benefits of prioritising a 
patch with the largest potential for growth in the stock size, i.e. a patch with the 
smallest stock size. Overall then, comparison of our study to the literature on the 
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optimal control of epidemics in metapopulations reveals the importance of 
assumptions regarding the existence of a budget constraint, and that the 
implications of such assumptions depend heavily of assumptions regarding the 
nature of incremental (marginal) cost of removal (treatment).   
Applications of this modelling framework need to account for two principle 
constraints. The first is the availability of parameters. This can be achieved using 
statistical habitat suitability models (Sadeghi et al., 2014) as correlates for invasibility 
among patches. Economic data is also required, which can be partially provided by 
valuation studies, as in, for example Nunes and Markandya (2008). The second is 
computational burden. This can be addressed by trading off the number of patches 
against the number of different values which the invasive population in a given 
patch can take (i.e. the number of elements in the vector 𝐐). If the system in 
question cannot be accurately modelled within reasonable computation time, then 
more advanced and efficient computational approaches, such as constraint integer 
programming (Achterberg, 2009, as in Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012) could be 
employed. 
In conclusion, the results show that allowing for varying population sizes within 
patches facilitates more accurate optimal policy prescriptions. Future research could 
focus on parameterizing the existing case studies for stochastically spreading 
species while extending the range of possible management options, for example to 
include the use of biological control agents (Impson et al., 2004). 
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Appendix 3.1 Parameterisations for Section 3.3 
 
𝜓 = 0.1  
𝐐
= [0, 0.0475, 0.095, 0.1425, 0.19, 0.2375, 0.285, 0.3325, 0.38, 0.4275, 0.475, 0.5225, 0.57, 
0.6175, 0.665, 0.7125, 0.76, 0.8075, 0.855, 0.9025, 0.95] 
 
𝐆 = [0, 0.048, 0.238 , 0.475, 0.618, 0.713, 0.76, 0.808, 0.808, 0.808, 0.855, 0.855, 0.855, 
0.855, 0.903, 0.903, 0.903, 0.903, 0.903, 0.903, 0.95, 0.95] 
 
Appendix 3.2 Parameterisations for Section 3.4 
 
𝐐 = [0, 0.095, 0.19, 0.285, 0.38, 0.475, 0.57, 0.665, 0.76, 0.855, 0.95] 
𝐆 = [0, 0.38, 0.57,0.665, 0.76, 0.85, 0.85, 0.85, 0.95, 0.95, 0.95] 
𝜓 = 0.8 
𝜆 = 600 
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Farsightedness, changing stock location and the stability 
of international fisheries agreements  
  
 
ABSTRACT 
Changes in stock location may affect the stability of international fisheries 
agreements. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the stability of Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) in a non-cooperative, coalition 
formation game based on the classic Gordon-Schaefer model. We employ a new 
stability concept which modifies Farsighted Stability (Chwe, 1994). We call this 
concept Farsighted Downwards Stability (FDS). We also employ the internal stability 
concept for comparison. Analytical results regarding FDS for symmetric players 
without changing stock location show stable Grand Coalitions for 𝑛 ≤ 4 player 
games and the possibility for partial cooperation. Sensitivity analysis deals with 
changing stock location and cost asymmetry. Stability decreases in n, increases when 
costs are asymmetric and increases when FDS is employed. Farsighted conjectures 
on behalf of RFMO members can thus help to maintain cooperation as stock 
location changes. However, FDS is more sensitive to changes in stock location than 
internal stability. 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper: Walker, A.N., Weikard, H-P., 2014. Farsightedness, changing stock 
location and the stability of international fisheries agreements Environmental and Resource Economics (in 
press). DOI 10.1007/s10640-014-9853-1 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
There is a general recognition that cooperation is needed for the management of 
international fisheries to ensure the sustainability of stocks. With this in mind, 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) were set up to facilitate 
cooperation . The need for cooperation has sparked a recent literature concerned 
with the potential for, and the stability of, such agreements (e.g., Kaitala and 
Lindroos, 1998; Bjørndal et al., 2000; Lindroos, 2008, Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008; 
Pintassilgo et al., 2010; Breton and Keoula, 2012; Rettieva, 2012; Punt et al., 2012; 
Bjørndal and Lindroos, 2012). Such research is especially important because RFMO 
agreements are not binding or enforceable (Bjørndal et al., 2000). Much of the 
literature rightfully focuses on the potential for cooperation and the new-member 
problem (for a summary see Bailey et al., 2010).  
In addition to these established research lines, recent research has begun to focus 
on the issue of changes in stock location which is likely due to climate change 
(Cheung et al., 2009). For example, mackerel stocks in the North East Atlantic have 
recently shifted northwards (Jansen and Gislason, 2011). This has led to unilateral 
setting of national fishing quotas which constitute a violation of the existing RFMO 
agreement (Arnason, 2012; Haraldsson and Carey, 2011). Ellefsen (2012) studies this 
specific problem with a calibrated model to assess the effects on the stability of the 
RFMO after the entrance of Iceland into the game. In general, uncertainty regarding 
the effects of climate change on stocks and the inflexibility of agreements to 
changes in stock locations have also been shown to be a significant barrier to 
maintaining cooperative agreements (Miller and Munro, 2004). Further motivation is 
provided by Munro (2008) who calls for more applied game theoretic research on 
this issue. 
In addition to Ellefsen (2012), three other studies address changes in stock location. 
Ekerhovd (2010) is concerned with both the area which is under RFMO management 
and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of given countries, wherein those countries 
have exclusive fishing rights. Ekerhovd (2010) considers changes in the shares of 
stock of blue whiting distributed between the high seas and EEZs and shows 
whether or not coalitions are stable. The scenarios of changes in stock location have 
a strong impact on the stability of coalitions. Further, Brandt and Kronbak (2010) 
consider the case of cod in the Baltic under IPCC climate change scenarios. They 
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analyse the size of the possible set of cooperative agreements under changes to 
recruitment and size of the stock. They conclude that cooperative solutions are less 
likely under changes in stock location. The most recent work, by Ishimura et al. 
(2012) has been concerned with the Pacific sardine under climate variability and its 
exploitation by Mexico, Canada and the USA. Different cooperative and non-
cooperative regimes are analysed. They conclude that unilateral efforts to maximise 
conservation and management benefits would not be successful under climate 
change. The stability of the different cooperative and non-cooperative regimes is, 
however, not analysed. 
This paper conceptualises the stability of cooperation under changes in stock 
location and hence adopts a different approach from Brandt and Kronbak (2010), 
Ekerhovd (2010), Ishimura et al. (2012) and Ellefsen (2012). Cooperation is most 
beneficial when the RFMO is a “Grand Coalition” consisting of all nations with a 
genuine interest in a given stock. Accordingly, we examine the stability of Grand 
Coalitions for a fixed number of players under changes in stock location.   
Changes in stock location can be included in a model by allowing for changes in the 
“catchability” (usually denoted by q in the standard Gordon-Schaefer model). 
Catchability is normally considered to represent the fishing technology and thus the 
productivity of fishing effort. As a stock of a constant size changes its position 
relative to the fishing harbours of different countries, we can consider their 
productivity of effort as changing. This would be due to changing sailing time 
before reaching fishing grounds or an increased concentration of fish in proximity to 
the harbour. We assume that the productivity of fishing effort is determined only by 
the stock location and therefore that fishing technology is identical across states. 
This approach is most suitable for high seas fisheries where biological change does 
not affect the spatial distribution of stock across EEZs. We also assume that climate 
change, while it affects location, does not affect other aspects of the biology of the 
stock.  
In addition to addressing the theory of changes in stock location, and in order to 
address the question of how fully cooperative agreements can be stabilised, we use 
two solution concepts. First, we employ a variant of the farsightedness concept 
which is based on farsighted conjectures (Chwe, 1994). Farsighted conjectures are 
used in the context of a Great Fish War by Breton and Keoula (2012). In comparison 
to Nash conjectures, farsighted conjectures do not restrict players to remain in the 
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coalition structure resulting from the deviation of one player. Farsighted conjectures 
therefore allow players to respond to deviations by making further deviations. 
Second, we employ the internal stability solution concept. This is based on Nash 
conjectures and is used most frequently in the literature. Nash conjectures do 
restrict players to remain in the coalition structure resulting from the deviation of 
another player.  
This paper analyses implications of changes in stock location for the stability of 
Grand Coalitions under these different solution concepts. Comparing results under 
different solution concepts allows us to analyse the degree to which the (credible) 
responses to deviations, as conjectured by farsighted players, can affect the stability 
of Grand Coalitions under changing stock location.    
Our study uses analytics to explore the characteristics of a farsighted solution 
concept in the symmetric setting and to derive some basic results in the asymmetric 
setting. A more detailed analysis of the asymmetric case is achieved via sensitivity 
analyses, which allow us to draw conclusions about the effects of asymmetry and 
changes in stock location on internal and farsighted stability in 3 and 4-player 
games. 
This chapter makes three contributions to the literature. Firstly, we broaden the 
literature on asymmetric fishing games by comprehensively analysing the effects of 
asymmetric catchability. This builds on work by Pintassilgo et al. (2010). In turn, and 
secondly, this allows us to produce a theoretical framework to analyse the effects of 
changes in stock location on the stability of cooperation. Thirdly, and as will become 
clear later in this chapter, we develop a modified solution concept based on 
farsighted stability which addresses the problem of myopia while also being 
applicable in asymmetric coalition formation games which use sharing rules. We 
now continue into our model and analysis.   
 
4.2 The bioeconomic model 
 
The set of 𝑁 players represents n different fishing nations i who choose effort 𝑒𝑖; 
𝐸 = (𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑛). We restrict effort such that 𝑒𝑖 ∈ ℝ0
+ . Efforts affect harvests ℎ𝑖 and, in 
turn, profits П𝑖 . We employ the Gordon-Schaefer model of fisheries which has a long 
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tradition in the literature. A single commercial fish stock is given as x. Stock grows 
according to 
𝑔(𝑥) = 𝑟𝑥 (1 −
𝑥
𝑘
).                        (4.1) 
Here, 𝑟 > 0 refers to the intrinsic growth rate of the stock and k is the carrying 
capacity of the ecosystem. The production function (harvest) is given by 
 ℎ𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑥.                                        (4.2) 
Here, 0 < 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 1 is the catchability coefficient which we use to represent changes in 
stock location. Unlike most studies, we allow catchability to vary between players 
and therefore become a source of potential asymmetry in the model.  
This paper analyses the steady state where growth (Equation (4.1)) is equal to total 
harvest, ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 . This allows us to determine the steady state stock as a function of 
efforts and obtain 
𝑥 = 𝑘 −
𝑘
𝑟
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 .                                                                          (4.3) 
Fish is sold on a common market and profit is given by 
П𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑥 − 𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑖,             (4.4) 
where p is price and 𝑐𝑖 is 𝑖’s unit cost of effort. Costs may differ between players. 
This bio-economic model is used to calculate profits for any vector of efforts 
(𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑛).  
 
4.3 The fisheries game 
 
Because there can only be one RFMO for a given fish stock, we model RFMO 
stability as a cartel game. We examine the incentives to participate in an RFMO in a 
two stage game. In the first stage, players’ strategy space is {𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛, 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛} and this 
determines their RFMO membership. A coalition structure is denoted by the set 𝑆 of 
players who join where |𝑆| = 𝑠 . The set 𝑁\𝑆 contains 𝑛 − 𝑠 singletons who do not 
join the RFMO. We have a Grand Coalition when 𝑆 = 𝑁, i.e. where all players are in 
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the RFMO. Given a coalition structure, players choose their effort levels in the 
second stage. 
 
4.3.1 Choosing effort levels 
Effort levels are chosen to maximise profits in a strategic setting. Coalition members 
cooperate by choosing effort levels to maximise joint profits. Effort is a function of 
the efficiency of players. We define inverse efficiency as 𝑏𝑖 ≡
𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘
. Further, we define 
𝛾𝑖 ≡
𝑐𝑖
𝑞𝑖
, which we term the cost-catchability ratio of a given player. The term 𝛾𝑖  thus 
denotes the cost of fishing effort adjusted for the catchability and contains all the 
terms of 𝑏𝑖 which we allow to be asymmetric. Furthermore, let 𝑙 ∈ 𝑆 be the member 
with the lowest cost-catchability ratio such that 𝛾𝑙 ≡ min𝑖∈𝑆 𝛾𝑖 . Under these 
definitions, the following holds: 
Lemma 1.1: Under a common market, the only coalition member whose effort is 
non-zero is the member with the lowest cost-catchability ratio, 𝛾𝑙 ≡ min𝑖∈𝑆 𝛾𝑖 ∀ 𝑆 ⊆
𝑁. 
Players can only have a relative advantage via the individual parameters, 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖. 
Therefore, the player with the lowest cost-catchability ratio must be the most 
efficient fisher. Coalition members cooperate to maximise joint profits and therefore 
the most efficient fisher will assume the task of fishing for the coalition. In this way, 
it is always efficient for player l in a coalition to fish since we have assumed, for 
simplicity, that cost is linear in effort and therefore marginal and average costs are 
also constant. Non-linear costs would usually merit multiple active fishers in the 
coalition and Lemma 1.1 would no longer apply. 
We introduce transfers between coalition members to compensate members with 
zero fishing effort under Lemma 1.1 and thus incentivising membership. Transfers 
allow the profit of player 𝑙 to be shared among the members. Transfers (or “side” 
payments) have met much resistance in the policy world and are not implemented in 
direct financial terms (Munro, 2008). However, transfers are implicit in various policy 
instruments. Transfers can be made through bargaining over catch shares for other 
commercial species within an RFMO or with Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQs). 
Selling ITQs to the most effective member constitutes a transfer.  
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Given Lemma 1.1 and the choices of each player to join or not join, we can, via 
reaction functions, provide equilibrium effort strategies for coalition members and 
non-members. The reaction function and equilibrium strategy for the All Singletons 
structure is derived in Appendix 4.1. Because Lemma 1.1 holds for all coalition 
structures, the effort levels determined in the second stage for a game with coalition 
S will be the same as the efforts levels seen in an All Singletons structure consisting 
of 𝑛 − 𝑠 + 1 players. 
The reaction function of a singleton in the All Singletons and partial cooperative 
structures is given by 
𝑒𝑖 =
𝑟
2𝑞𝑖
(1 − 𝑏𝑖) −
1
2𝑞𝑖
∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑒𝑗𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑖} .                      (4.5) 
The reaction function for the coalition in partially cooperative and Grand Coalition 
structures is given by 
𝑒𝑙 =
𝑟
2𝑞𝑙
(1 − 𝑏𝑙) −
1
2𝑞𝑙
∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑒𝑘𝑘∈𝑁\{𝑆} .                          (4.6) 
The equilibrium strategies for the Grand Coalition and both the coalition and 
singletons in partial cooperation structures can be expressed in one equation, 
namely,  
𝑒𝑖 =
(𝑛−𝑠+1)𝑟
(𝑛−𝑠+2)𝑞𝑖
(1 − 𝑏𝑖) −
𝑟
(𝑛−𝑠+2)𝑞𝑖
∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑗)𝑗∈((𝑁\𝑆)∪{𝑙}){𝑖}   for 𝑖 ∈ (𝑁\𝑆) ∪ {𝑙} 
              (4.7) 
and 𝑒𝑖 = 0  for 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆\{𝑙}.         
Equation (4.7) also represents the equilibrium strategy for the All Singletons 
structure in the special case that the coalition consists of only one player, i.e. 𝑆 = {𝑙} 
such that ((𝑁\𝑆) ∪ {𝑙}) = 𝑁. 
Even before searching for solutions to the game, the equilibrium strategies permit 
insights into the presence and nature of the externalities in the model. Equations 
(4.2) and (4.3) show how harvest is a function of stock and therefore the harvest of 
one player will negatively affect other players because less fish can be caught with 
the same effort. This negative externality offers scope for beneficial cooperation. 
There is no competition when only one player in a Grand Coalition fishes. This allows 
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the player with the lowest cost-catchability ratio to maximise the profit for the whole 
coalition by fishing from a large stock. 
Equilibrium efforts, calculated in Equation (4.7), can then be substituted into the 
profit function (Equation (4.4)) to obtain the partition function 𝑉(𝑆) which gives 
payoffs as a function of the coalition structure. The partition function is the basis for 
the following section where we introduce two stability concepts.  
 
4.3.2 Stability, solution concepts and sharing rules 
Coalition stability depends on how much profit a coalition generates and how that 
profit is shared. A cartel partition function gives the profit of the coalition and every 
singleton. The coalition profit is then shared between coalition members via a 
sharing rule, which determines the payoffs. We will first provide a general definition 
of a sharing rule and then the particulars of the sharing rule for the two solution 
concepts. 
We use a sharing rule which maximises potential for cooperation, namely the 
“almost ideal sharing scheme” proposed by Eyckmans and Finus (2004), McGinty 
(2007) and Weikard (2009).  This sharing scheme uses “outside options” to 
determine how surplus is shared. Outside options are defined as the payoff that a 
player will receive when he leaves a coalition. The sharing scheme demands that 
every player receives the value of his outside option 𝜔𝑖 plus a share 𝜆𝑖(𝑆) of the 
surplus that the coalition generates in excess the sum of the values of the outside 
options 𝑉𝑆(𝑆) − ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑖∈𝑆  such that the payoff 𝑉𝑖(𝑆) of a coalition member in 𝑆 is given 
by 
𝑉𝑖(𝑆) = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖(𝑆)[𝑉𝑆(𝑆) − ∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑗∈𝑆 ]                                (4.8) 
 where     ∑ 𝜆𝑖(𝑆) = 1𝑖∈𝑁    and     𝜆𝑖(𝑆) ≥ 0.    
In our numerical analysis, we will use coalition surplus as a measure of coalition 
stability. A positive (negative) surplus implies a stable (unstable) coalition. Our 
measure of stability is therefore defined as   
𝑌𝑆 ≡ 𝑉𝑆(𝑆) − ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 .                                 (4.9) 
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How the outside option is defined depends on the stability concept used. We 
consider two stability concepts: Nash stability and a modified farsighted stability 
concept. A stability concept stipulates whether or not a player will deviate from a 
given coalition. A player’s decision regarding deviation depends on the type of 
“conjecture” which is employed.  
The first type of conjectures are Nash conjectures. This assumes that all players will 
remain in the coalition structure which directly results from a deviation. Other 
players may adjust their efforts but no player will enact further deviations. Therefore, 
for Nash stability, 𝜔𝑖 = 𝑉𝑖(𝑆\{𝑖}). The following inequality is a necessary condition 
for the Nash stability of a coalition: 
𝑉𝑖(𝑆) ≥  𝑉𝑖  (𝑆\{𝑖})     ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆.                                (4.10) 
The general formulation for Nash stability is that both internal stability (where no 
member wants to leave) and external stability (where no singleton wants to join) 
must hold. Here, we are concerned with the Nash stability of the Grand Coalition 
which cannot be enlarged and hence cannot be externally unstable. Internal stability 
is therefore a sufficient condition for a stable Grand Coalition.  
The second type of conjecture is based on farsightedness. Farsighted conjectures do 
not assume that players will remain in structures imposed upon them by a deviation. 
Should further deviation from such structures be beneficial, then players will deviate. 
Whether further deviations are beneficial is based on farsighted conjectures 
developed by Chwe (1994). 
Farsighted conjectures require a different definition of the outside option. 
Specifically, we introduce the Farsighted Downwards Stability (FDS) concept. This 
concept is a restricted version of Farsighted Equilibrium (Chwe, 1994). FDS is a 
pragmatic solution concept which restricts Farsighted Equilibrium such that it can be 
operationalized in a game with transfers and asymmetric players. We now define 
FDS via the concepts of ordered sequences and credible induction.  
Definition 4.1.1: A strictly ordered sequence is defined as a vector of coalition 
structures (𝑆1, 𝑆2, … 𝑆𝑘) which are ordered such that 𝑆1 ⊃ 𝑆2 ⊃ ⋯ ⊃ 𝑆𝑘  where 
|𝑆𝑗| = |𝑆𝑗+1| + 1  ∀ 𝑗 < 𝑘.  
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Definition 4.1.2: A coalition 𝑆𝑘 can be credibly induced via an ordered sequence iff 
 ∀ 𝑆𝑗 ∈ (𝑆1, 𝑆2, … 𝑆𝑘−1), there exists a player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑗 such that 𝑉𝑖(𝑆𝑘) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝑆𝑗) and 
∀ 𝑆𝑚 ⊂ 𝑆𝑘 , there does not exist an ordered sequence (𝑆𝑘 , … , 𝑆𝑚) such that 
∀ 𝑆𝑗 ∈ (𝑆𝑘 , … , 𝑆𝑚) there is an 𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑗  such that  𝑉𝑖(𝑆𝑚) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝑆𝑗). 
Definition 4.1.3: A coalition S satisfies FDS iff there does not exist a coalition  𝑆𝑘 ⊂ 𝑆 
which can be credibly induced from S. 
Intuitively then, we consider sequences of deviations from a coalition where one 
player after another deviates. Deviations by particular players are credible only if the 
payoff in the structure at the end of the sequence of deviations provides a greater 
payoff for every deviator. Therefore, by construction, the All Singletons structure 
always satisfies FDS. Structures satisfying FDS are those from which outside options 
are derived. These are used to calculate coalition stability as in Equation (4.9).   
Definition 4.1.1 refers to sequences of deviations. Sequences allow players to 
“induce” certain structures (Definition 4.1.2). If a player deviates from a Grand 
Coalition, the payoff which results directly from that deviation alone may be very 
large. However, if the new coalition is not FDS, the initial deviation would induce 
further deviations by the remaining coalition members until an FDS structure is 
reached. In the FDS structure, the player who deviated first may receive a payoff 
lower than what he received in the Grand Coalition. As such, FDS addresses the 
problem of myopia in Nash conjectures (Harsanyi, 1974) and, can potentially result 
in a larger set of stable coalitions than under internal stability.   
Although the FDS concept may not be behaviourally convincing in all settings, we 
would argue that it applies in our case where the main concern is the stability of the 
Grand Coalition. Implicitly, the FDS concept implies a punishment strategy whereby 
players who have deviated from the Grand Coalition are not allowed to benefit from 
re-joining. The FDS concept thus reflects a plausible restriction on the action space 
of players. 
The FDS solution concept also has several pragmatic advantages in games with 
transfers and asymmetric players. These advantages result directly from the 
exclusion of external stability considerations. If coalitions in asymmetric games can 
be externally unstable, then a stable structure from which to draw the outside option 
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may not exist. Furthermore, one of the structures that could be reached is the Grand 
Coalition itself. This is due to the potential for cycles in coalition structures. 
To illustrate how cycles can occur, consider 𝑛 = 3 and the Grand Coalition {1, 2, 3}. 
Player 1 considers what structure his deviation from the Grand Coalition would 
eventually induce in order to decide if his initial deviation is worthwhile. His initial 
deviation would lead to coalition {2,3}. Suppose he knows that partial coalition {2,3} 
is internally unstable and that player 2 will deviate, resulting in All Singletons. He 
also knows that player 3 prefers {1,3} to All Singletons (it is externally unstable) so he 
knows that coalition structure {1,3} will form. Finally, he knows too that {1,3} is 
externally unstable so player 2 will join the coalition. This brings us back to the 
Grand Coalition, and thus results in a cycle. This process is summarised in Figure 4.1. 
Note also that cycles cannot occur if players are symmetric. The presence of cycles 
mean that there is no stable structure from which player 1 can draw his outside 
option to decide whether his deviation from the Grand Coalition is beneficial. A 
further practical implication is that if outside options are not calculable, then optimal 
sharing cannot be implemented.
4 
              
Figure 4.1: The potential for cycles. The dashed arrows indicate moves that are ruled out under FDS and 
thus how cycles are prevented. 
The issue of external stability, asymmetric players and farsightedness has been 
addressed by Caparrós and Giraud-Heraud (2011). They suggest an alternative 
definition of external stability such that a coalition is externally stable if the addition 
of a player to that coalition would lead to an internally unstable coalition. Such an 
approach combined with optimal sharing rules would, however, not preclude the 
possibility of cycles. 
 
                                                 
4  Consider also that in this example, the set of imputations whose values could be considered to 
inform the outside option includes the Grand Coalition itself. Needing to know 𝑉𝑖 when we need to know 𝑉𝑖 
in order to know 𝑉𝑖 is a paradox best avoided. 
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The problem of cycles and the need to define outside options is avoided if there are 
no transfers in the game. Transfers are not used in IEA analyses such as de Zeeuw 
(2008), Osmani and Tol (2009) and Biancardi and Di Liddo (2010). In these examples, 
players receive the benefits of cooperation directly. In our game, a requirement for 
stable coalitions is that benefits are realised by the most efficient player and then 
distributed to coalition members.  
In our specific circumstances, one option for dealing with this problem is to limit the 
information required for the sharing rule for a given structure to that which can be 
provided purely by the imputation for that particular structure. Various methods to 
achieve this such as the nucleolus and the Shapley value are found in cooperative 
game theory. However, optimal sharing rules perform best to stabilize coalitions for 
the provision of public goods (McGinty et al., 2012). Therefore, employing methods 
such as the Shapley value under any solution concept would lead to a reduction in 
the stability of Grand Coalitions (McGinty et al., 2012). Hannesson (2011) argues that 
non-cooperative approaches are too pessimistic regarding the potential for 
collaboration. Sharing rules which are not “optimal” are therefore undesirable.  
In games with asymmetric players and transfer, the FDS concept therefore 
represents a plausible restriction in the action space of players, prevents possible 
cycles and permits a consistent application of optimal sharing rules. Additionally, if 
Grand Coalition stability under changing stock location is improved when the FDS 
solution concept is employed, we can suggest that restricting the action space of 
players as implied by the FDS concept could be beneficial for ensuring stability. 
Later, we will return to the FDS concept in order to show how it can be applied to 
asymmetric players using computational methods. 
 
4.3.3 Some established results 
Before we continue with our analysis, we briefly review some established results 
using internal stability. Increasing the number of players leads to reduced internal 
stability of the Grand Coalition (Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008). Internal Stability of 
the Grand Coalition can however be achieved by introducing cost asymmetry into 
the model (Lindroos, 2008). Cost asymmetry increases the relative efficiency at which 
a coalition can fish. In coalitions, the most efficient player fishes. Should this most 
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efficient player have a sufficiently large advantage, the removal of externalities 
resulting from coalition formation allows the most efficient player to fully exploit his 
advantage to the extent that he can compensate those in the coalition enough to 
prevent them from deviating.  
 
4.4 Analysing FDS coalitions with n symmetric players 
 
For a given n and symmetric players, coalition structures are sufficiently described by 
the number of coalition members s. For different numbers of symmetric players, 
structures can be described by a pair (𝑛, 𝑠). In this section, we characterise the set of 
structures satisfying FDS in a symmetric setting. 
First note that, by construction, All Singleton structures (𝑛, 1) satisfy FDS. Next, a 
larger coalition 𝑠 > 1 cannot satisfy FDS if members’ payoffs are less than what they 
get in All Singletons. Hence, it is a necessary condition for a structure to satisfy FDS 
that 
 
1
𝑠
𝑉𝑆(𝑛, 𝑠) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝑛, 1).                                         (4.11)  
The right-hand side of Inequality (4.11) represents a player’s payoff in the All 
Singletons structure. The left-hand side represents a member’s payoff in a coalition 
of size s. If this inequality holds, then members (weakly) prefer to remain in structure 
(𝑛, 𝑠) rather than induce (𝑛, 1).   
Inequality (4.11) can be simplified by cancelling out the economic and biological 
parameters. This is shown in Appendix 4.2a. We obtain the following inequality 
which only contains 𝑛 and 𝑠. 
1
𝑠(𝑛−𝑠+2)2
≥
1
(𝑛+1)2
                                    (4.12) 
Inequality (4.12) trivially holds for 𝑠 = 1. Solving for 𝑠 shows that for 𝑠 > 1, the 
inequality holds when.  
𝑠 ≥
3
2
+ 𝑛 −
1
2
√4𝑛 + 5.                      (4.13) 
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Using Inequality (4.13) we can, for a given n, identify the smallest integer 𝑠 for which 
(4.13) holds. This gives us a set of coalition structures from which no player would 
deviate because any deviation would induce (𝑛, 1), which gives a smaller payoff. This 
set of coalition structures thus satisfies FDS. In Figure 4.2, all structures that satisfy 
FDS are marked by . Structures satisfying FDS where 𝑠 = 1, display trivial FDS and 
those where 𝑠 > 1 display non-trivial FDS.  
                             
 
Figure 4.2: Coalition structures satisfying FDS. Pairs (𝑛, 𝑠) marked by  satisfy FDS. Coalition structures 
marked by 𝛼 and 𝛽 do not satisfy FDS. From structures marked by 𝛼, the structure (𝑛, 1) will be induced. 
From structures marked by 𝛽, structures displaying non-trivial FDS will be induced. 
For a given n, coalitions for which s is too small to satisfy Inequality (4.14) therefore 
do not satisfy FDS. Such structures are marked by 𝛼. To complete the 
characterisation of structures satisfying FDS, note that Inequality (4.13) is only a 
necessary condition for FDS. While all structures satisfying FDS must satisfy (4.13), 
satisfying (4.13) is not sufficient for FDS. For example, consider a Grand Coalition 
with 15 players. While (15,15) satisfies Inequality (4.14), we have not yet shown that 
this structure does not satisfy FDS because, as we will show, (15,13) is credibly 
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inducible from (15,15). Hence, our final step is to prove that structures marked by 𝛽 
in Figure 4.2 do not satisfy FDS.  
Consider the incentives to leave the Grand Coalition. A player would deviate if his 
payoff in the structure which is induced by his deviation (and hence satisfies FDS) 
provides a larger payoff than his Grand Coalition payoff: 
 𝑉𝑗∉S(𝑠, 𝑛) ≥
1
𝑛
𝑉𝑁(𝑛, 𝑛).                      (4.14) 
Similar to the derivations in Appendix 4.2a, when substituting the payoffs into (4.14), 
again, economic and biological parameters cancel and we obtain  
𝑠 ≥ 2 + 𝑛 − 2√𝑛 .                      (4.15) 
We compare the conditions for 𝑠 in (4.13) and (4.15) in Appendix 4.2b. The 
comparison shows that the minimum coalition size required for positive incentives 
to deviate from the Grand Coalition (4.15) is always smaller than the minimum size 
of a coalition satisfying FDS, determined by (4.13). Hence, there are incentives to 
deviate from Grand Coalitions marked by 𝛽 because structures displaying non-trivial 
FDS satisfy (4.15). Furthermore, member payoffs in any coalition 𝑠 < 𝑛 in structures 
marked by 𝛽 are lower than the Grand Coalition member payoff. Therefore members 
of these partial coalitions also have an incentive to deviate. We have thus fully 
characterised the set of structures satisfying FDS in our symmetric fisheries game.  
 
4.5 Analytics of asymmetry and changing stock location 
 
We will now begin to analyse the role of asymmetry in the model. This section 
presents analytical results on the effects of changes in stock location. These results 
will allow us to understand the results to be presented in the sensitivity analysis to 
follow. Asymmetry in the Gordon-Schaefer model has been studied by Pintassilgo et 
al. (2010) who consider cost-asymmetry. It turns out that there are important 
differences between the effects of cost-asymmetry and catchability-asymmetry in 
the model. Understanding these differences allow us to understand and compare 
results. 
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Firstly, let us consider the equilibrium effort strategy given in Equation (4.7). It is 
immediately obvious that effort is decreasing 𝑐𝑖 . However, taking the first derivative 
of Equation (4.7) with respect to 𝑞𝑖 shows us that a threshold value of 𝑏𝑖 exists which 
determines whether changes in 𝑞𝑖 have a positive or negative effect on the 
equilibrium effort strategy. The threshold, where changes in 𝑞𝑖 have no effect on the 
equilibrium effort strategy, is given by  
?̂?𝑖 =
1
2
−
∑ (1−𝑏𝑗)𝑗∈((𝑁\𝑆)∪{𝑙})\{𝑖}
2(𝑛−𝑠+1)
,                     (4.16) 
where 𝑙 refers to the coalition member with the lowest cost-catchability ratio. If 𝑏𝑖 is 
greater than the threshold value, equilibrium effort is increasing in 𝑞𝑖. Given that 𝑏𝑖 is 
the inverse efficiency parameter, players who are inefficient in terms of 𝑏𝑖 respond to 
increases in 𝑞𝑖 by increasing their effort, whereas those who are efficient in terms of 
𝑏𝑖 respond to increases in 𝑞𝑖 by decreasing their effort. Because effort is always 
decreasing in 𝑐𝑖 , we can see that different asymmetries may have very different 
effects. 
Intuitively, cost reductions or catchability increases for a given player relative to 
other players will increase the harvest of that player. The key difference between the 
marginal effects of 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 is that increases in harvests due to decreases in 𝑐𝑖 will 
be achieved by increasing effort, whereas, from the derivation of (4.16), we know 
that increases in harvest due to increases in 𝑞𝑖 can be achieved with a reduction in 
effort. Therefore, increases in catchability allow efficient players to reduce effort and 
costs while simultaneously increasing harvests. On the other hand, reductions in cost 
can only be exploited by increasing effort, which is costly, if albeit at a lower unit 
rate. This suggests that favourable marginal changes in 𝑞𝑖 may be more profitable to 
a player than favourable marginal changes in 𝑐𝑖 . We examine this proposition for the 
n player case, and find that  
−
∂П𝑖
∂𝑐𝑖
<
∂П𝑖
∂𝑞𝑖
      𝑞𝑖 <  𝑐𝑖 .                      (4.17) 
Therefore, marginal increases in 𝑞𝑖 are more beneficial than marginal reductions in 𝑐𝑖 
as long as 𝑞𝑖 is less than 𝑐𝑖 . We provide more details on the derivation of condition 
(4.17) in Appendix 4.4.  
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4.6 Numerical and sensitivity analyses 
 
The purpose of this section is to expand our analysis to include asymmetric players 
in order to analyse the effects of changing stock location. Accordingly, we must 
operationalize the FDS solution concept to deal with asymmetric players in a 
numerical setting. The main challenge in doing so is in defining players’ outside 
options.  
By construction, FDS allows us to exclude the possibility of cycles. However, 
introducing asymmetry requires us to deal with two additional problems in order to 
identify outside options and calculate stability. The root of these problems is in 
Definition 4.1.2, which requires that for a coalition to be unstable, at least one player 
must have an incentive to deviate. If a coalition does not generate enough profit to 
satisfy outside options (i.e. there is a negative surplus), all players have an incentive 
to deviate because the negative surplus is shared among players. Therefore, the 
payoff of coalition membership will be less than the outside option.  Accordingly, 
there may be many ordered sequences which end with credibly inducible structures. 
In order to calculate the outside option for player i, we need to know which 
structures satisfying FDS could result from a deviation by player i from the Grand 
Coalition. We label this set of structures as the feasible set.  
Definition 4.2: The feasible set of player i, 𝑓𝑖, is defined as the set of all 𝑆𝑘 which can 
be reached from the Grand Coalition via ordered sequences resulting in credibly 
inducible structures.  
An example of the feasible set for player 1 is shown in Figure 4.3 which illustrates a 
4-player example where all coalition members have an incentive to deviate from the 
{2,3,4} structure. The structures {3,4} and {2,4} are stable such that the payoffs to 
player 1 in these structures are included in player 1’s feasible set. {2,3} is however, 
not stable but the All Singletons structure is. The payoff to player 1 in the All 
Singletons is therefore included and those in the {2,3} structure are excluded. In this 
case then, 𝑓1 has three elements because there are three structures which can be 
credibly induced via ordered sequences. We now need to use the elements of a 
player’s feasible set to define the outside option of that player. 
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Definition 4.3 assumes that players will always deviate if there is at least one 
structure in the feasible set which provides a higher payoff. This reflects a cautious 
approach because it is less likely to lead to stable Grand Coalitions than, for 
example, taking the mean. In this way, stability can only be underestimated. 
Finally, the FDS concept is based on static conjectures. Players foresee the eventual 
result of other players’ actions and do not hesitate by waiting for the next period to 
deviate.  
 
Figure 4.3: The elements of the feasible set for player 1 are marked by *. 
Definition 4.3: The outside option is defined as 𝜔𝑖 = max𝑆∈𝑓𝑖 𝑉𝑖(𝑆). 
Having fully defined our FDS concept and illustrated how it is applied in practise, we 
can now continue the analysis. In reality, fisheries games are characterised by 
asymmetries in catchability and costs. We work on the assumption that fishing 
nations are asymmetric in their catchability and we wish to see how stability of 
Grand Coalitions is affected by changes in catchability.  
 
4.6.1 Changes in stock location with three players 
To begin, we consider the 3-player case with a specific scenario for changing stock 
location whereby catchability shifts entirely from Player 1 to Player 2. For simplicity, 
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let us assume that Player 3 is not affected by the changing stock location. In this 
way, the sum of the catchability of the three players remains constant. Following the 
illustrative example, we carry out a sensitivity analysis to obtain more general results.  
We define the vector 𝑄 = (𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑞3) to denote position of the fish stock relative to 
the three players. In our illustrative example, we consider 80 different values of 𝑄, 
which are ordered to represent gradual stock change as shown in Figure 4.4.  
 
                     
Figure 4.4: Values of catchability for 3 players across 80 ordered sets of 𝑄. 
We limit our analysis to values of 𝑞𝑖 which ensure that players are always efficient 
enough to choose positive fishing effort. This allows us to isolate the effect of 
catchability change from changes in the number of players who are actively fishing. 
Therefore, we never consider values of 𝑞𝑖 lower than 0.6. Figure 4.5 shows stability 
results for our illustrative example using the following parameterisations; 𝑝 = 1;  𝑘 =
10; 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐3 = 1.5. We do not specify a value for the parameter r because r has 
no effect on the stability of coalitions. This is proven in Appendix 4.3.We choose this 
parameterisation because it allows us to fully illustrate the potential differences 
between the Internal Stability and FDS solution concepts.  
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Here, the Grand Coalition is internally unstable under all parameterisations of 
catchability. Precisely the opposite is true when the FDS is considered. The Grand 
Coalition satisfies FDS under all parameterisations of catchability.  
To explain these results, note that under Internal Stability, the outside options are 
always drawn from the remaining 2-player coalition (regardless of its stability). Note 
also, that under FDS, the set of stable partial coalitions changes and hence the set of 
coalition structures from which outside options are drawn changes also. Figure 4.5(a) 
shows how, as symmetry increases (perfect symmetry exists where 𝑄 = 40), internal 
instability becomes more severe. This conforms with previously established results. 
Similarly, for a given set of stable partial coalitions, FDS of the Grand Coalition also 
decreases as symmetry increases. However, under FDS, the set of stable partial 
coalitions changes. These changes result in discontinuous jumps in stability. 
Increasing asymmetry increases the size of the set of stable partial coalitions and 
this decreases FDS while, for a given set of stable partial coalitions, increasing 
asymmetry increases FDS.  
In order to make more general comparisons between the effects on changing stock 
location under the two solution concepts, we carry out a sensitivity analysis. We use 
bold type face to denote sets of values of a given parameter used in the analysis. 
The analysis tests over a discrete parameter space given by θ × 𝑄 where θ =
(𝐩, 𝐜1, 𝐜2, 𝐜3, 𝐤). Our approach is to determine appropriate values for the set θ and 
analyse the properties of each element of θ as stock location changes.  
Appropriate values of θ need to allow for comparison of results with Pintassilgo et 
al. (2010). As such, we require a uniform distribution of 𝑏𝑖 over a suitable range. 
However, the asymmetric 𝑞𝑖  in our case precludes collecting terms 𝑝, 𝑐𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑘 
into the single parameter 𝑏𝑖 in the profit function a la Pintassilgo et al. (2010). We 
therefore require a procedure which tests a uniform distribution of 𝑏𝑖 but also 
specifies specific parameters for 𝑝, 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑘, thus determining the set θ.  
The results of the sensitivity analysis in Table 4.1 demonstrate that outcomes similar 
to those in Figure 4.5(a) occur for 34.1% (Never IS) of parameterisations for θ. 
Outcomes similar to those in Figure 4.5(b) occur for 18.8% (Always FDS) of 
parameterisations of θ. Further analysing the cost-symmetric case, the results also 
show that Sometimes FDS and Sometimes IS are the most common outcomes. 
However, Always IS never occurs but Always FDS occurs for 18.8% of 
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parameterisations of θ in the cost-symmetric case. Additionally, Sometimes IS is less 
common than Sometimes FDS. Within our range of catchability changes, the use of 
the FDS solution concept offers significant stability improvements compared to 
Internal Stability.  
                                  
                              
Figure 4.5: Stability values for a 3-player Grand Coalition with cost symmetry for the different 
parameterisations indicated in Figure 4.4. Panel (a) shows internal stability which is always negative, 
indicating an unstable Grand Coalition across all parameterisations. Panel (b) shows FDS. Different 
parameterisations result in varying FDS of partial coalitions, which in turn affects the outside options for 
players in the Grand Coalition and thus the stability of the Grand Coalition. For example, at 
parameterisation 10, the partial coalition {1,2} satisfies FDS. This means that the outside option of Player 3 
leaving the Grand Coalition is determined in the structure given by coalition {1,2}.  
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In determining θ, we note that the variables 𝑝, 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑘 have no upper bound. 
However, a necessary condition for positive effort of player i is that 𝑏𝑖 must be in the 
interval 0 ≤ 𝑏𝑖 < 1. Therefore, we choose the values 𝑝, 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑘 such that 𝑏𝑖 does not 
exceed its bounds for any tested value of 𝑞𝑖. Additionally, we select values for 𝑝, 𝑐𝑖 
and 𝑘 such that the values of 𝑏𝑖 are uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1). Values 
for 𝑝, 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑘 are chosen from sets of random draws from uniform distributions in 
the following intervals; 0 < 𝑐𝑖 < 2, 0 < 𝑝 < 2 and 1 < 𝑘 < 100. We select these 
intervals because they are reasonable and allow for a full range of 𝑏𝑖. In addition, 
due to the result given in (4.17), it is appropriate to allow 𝑐𝑖 to be less and greater 
than 𝑞𝑖. 
We retain our assumption that changes in stock location occur in the range 
0.6 ≤ 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 1. Elements of 𝑄 are drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval of 
[0.6, 1] and obey the criterion that 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 + 𝑞3 = 2.4. The summation criterion 
ensures that total catchability is always constant and thus represents the case where 
catchability is redistributed between players
5
. 
The parameter space θ × 𝑄 has approximately 100,000 elements which provides 
sufficient confidence in the results. For the cost-symmetric and cost-asymmetric 
case and for each element of θ × 𝑄, we test for FDS and internal stability. The 
sensitivity analysis is programmed in Matlab to classify each element of θ into 
certain categories (see Table 4.1) depending on the stability of the Grand Coalition 
as stock location changes. 
Table 4.1 also shows that cost-asymmetry increases stability for both solution 
concepts. When cost asymmetry is introduced, the potential range of the cost-
catchability ratio for the three players is greater when costs are asymmetric and 
thus, it is more likely that the most efficient member of the coalition can satisfy 
outside option requirements. We therefore see an increase in stability for both the 
FDS and IS solution concepts. Cost-asymmetry has a greater effect under the 
Internal Stability solution concept, as evidenced by the larger increase in Always IS. 
                                                 
5  In this way, we lose the ordering of 𝑄 as seen in Figure 4.4. Given our method of statistical 
analysis, losing ordering does not affect the interpretation of the results. If the random draws were ordered 
to represent a changing stock location scenario over time, as in Figure 4.4, the results would be the same 
as without ordering. Further, this method benefits from not presenting scenarios as in Figure 4.4 because 
imposing such a scenario is restrictive, particularly in the case of the four player game. 
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This indicates that the FDS solution concept is less reliant on cost-asymmetry to 
improve stability than Internal Stability.  
Table 4.1: Results of sensitivity analyses for the cost-symmetric and cost-asymmetric cases in a 3-player 
game.  There are three categories. FDS and Internal Stability (IS) are reported for each of the three 
categories as percentages of the elements of θ which fall into each category. Firstly, “Always FDS / Always 
IS”; where the stability concept is satisfied across all parameterisations of 𝑄. Secondly, “Sometimes FDS / 
Sometimes IS”; where the stability concept is satisfied for at least one, but not all parameterisations of 𝑄. 
Thirdly, “Never FDS / Never IS”; where the stability concept is not satisfied for any parameterisation of 𝑄. 
 Cost-symmetric Cost-asymmetric 
Always FDS (%) 18.8 38.98 
Sometimes FDS (%) 81.2 61.02 
Never FDS (%)  0  0 
Always IS (%) 0 25.17 
Sometimes IS (%) 65.9 48.16 
Never IS (%) 34.1 26.67 
 
In general then, stability increases under the FDS solution concept and in 
asymmetry. An interesting aspect of the results is that the FDS solution concept 
results in more frequent occurrences of “Sometimes FDS” in both the cost-
symmetric and asymmetric cases. This means that, under the FDS solution concept, 
changing stock location is more likely to render a stable Grand Coalition unstable (or 
vice versa). Therefore, while the FDS concept results in more stability in general, it 
also shows more sensitivity to changing stock location.  Sensitivity to changing stock 
location increases for FDS relative to Internal Stability because of the different way 
that the outside option is calculated. Using the 3-player game as an example, under 
Internal Stability, the outside options are always drawn from the payoffs of free-
riders playing against partial coalitions. Under FDS, each outside option is calculated 
according to the stability of the partial coalitions. Changes in stock location can 
change the stability of partial coalitions and thus lead to greater variation in the 
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outside options as stock location changes. In turn, this increases the sensitivity of 
stability to changing stock location.  
 
4.6.2 Changes in stock location with four players 
We now examine the effect of a unit increase in the number of players. In order to 
do so, we employ the same sensitivity analysis procedure as in the previous sub-
section. The only changes are that θ = (𝐩, 𝐜1, 𝐜2, 𝐜3, 𝐜4, 𝐤), the random draws for 
catchability must now obey the criterion that 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 + 𝑞3 + 𝑞4 = 3.2 and the 
increased number of players increases the number of elements in θ × 𝑄.   
The results in Table 4.2, in comparison to Table 4.1, show that, as expected, 
increasing the number of players from 3 to 4 decreases stability for both solution 
concepts and in both the  cost-symmetric and asymmetric cases. Cost-asymmetry 
increases Internal Stability and FDS. Again, FDS offers improvements in stability 
overall, but also increases the frequency of “Sometimes FDS” in both cost-symmetric 
and asymmetric cases and thus increases the sensitivity of Grand Coalition stability 
to changing stock location. Comparison of Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 shows that the 
problem of sensitivity with FDS becomes more severe as the number of players 
increases. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, in general, stability decreases in n. 
Secondly, in the 3-player case there are only 4 structures (3 partial coalitions and All 
Singletons) from which the outside options can be drawn. In the 4-player case, there 
are 11 structures. Thus, changes in stock location can change the stability of a 
greater number partial coalitions and thus lead to greater variation in the outside 
option. 
In addition to analysing the stability properties of each element of θ, we can also 
analyse each element of θ × 𝑄 individually. This allows for direct comparison to 
Pintassilgo et al. (2010). For four player games, considering asymmetry in 𝑐𝑖 (which is 
represented by asymmetry in 𝑏𝑖), Pintassilgo et al. (2010) find that the Grand 
Coalition will be Internally Stable in 5.1% of cases. In our cost-symmetric case, the 
percentage of elements of θ × 𝑄 for which the Grand Coalition is internally stable is 
22% (not shown in Table 4.2). This shows that asymmetry in 𝑞𝑖 is more likely to lead 
to stability than asymmetry in 𝑐𝑖 .  
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Table 4.2: Results of sensitivity analysis for a cost-symmetric and cost-asymmetric case in a 4-player game. 
For definitions of the terms in the first column, see Table 4.1. 
 Cost-symmetric Cost-asymmetric 
Always FDS (%) 0 8.87 
Sometimes FDS (%) 100 78.29 
Never FDS (%) 0 12.84 
Always IS (%) 0 12.23 
Sometimes IS (%) 48.15 51.07 
Never IS (%) 51.85 36.70 
 
The reason for this difference has already been partially explained in Section 4.5, 
where we established that marginal increases in 𝑞𝑖 lead to a greater increase in profit 
than marginal reductions in 𝑐𝑖 if and only if 𝑞𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 . Therefore, when 𝑞𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 holds, a 
given degree of asymmetry in 𝑞𝑖 can lead to greater differences in payoffs between 
players than the same degree of asymmetry in 𝑐𝑖 . In our sensitivity analysis, due to 
our selection of parameter ranges, 𝑞𝑖 < 𝑐𝑖 may or may not hold. When it does hold, 
a given degree of asymmetry in 𝑞𝑖 can allow the most efficient coalition member to 
be more profitable than for a given degree of asymmetry in 𝑐𝑖 . Thus, the most 
efficient coalition member is more likely to be able to satisfy outside options. This 
explains the increased stability in our case relative to Pintassilgo et al. (2010).  
Of course, the selection of intervals for 𝑞𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 in the sensitivity analysis affects this 
result. For example, if 𝑐𝑖 is always greater than 𝑞𝑖 then the Grand Coalition will be 
stable for more elements of θ × 𝑄. In general, it holds that increases in 𝑞𝑖 which 
reinforce existing cost advantages of the most efficient coalition member will 
increase stability. However, the relative magnitudes of 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 are important in 
determining the marginal effect of changes in 𝑞𝑖 on coalition stability.  
The results show that the FDS solution concept offers consistently more Grand 
Coalition stability under stock location changes in both 3 and 4-player games. 
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Although, the improvements in stability due to the FDS solution concept are 
accompanied by an increase in the sensitivity of stability to changing stock location.  
 
4.7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The results of this study contribute to an improved understanding of the impacts of 
changing stock location on the potential for full cooperation regarding fish stocks. 
When players are symmetric and changes in stock location affect all players equally, 
the Grand Coalition satisfies FDS for 𝑛 ≤ 4. For 𝑛 > 4, large partial coalitions can also 
be FDS. When considering cost-symmetry and cost-asymmetry combined with 
changing stock location, we find that FDS leads to an increase in stability relative to 
Internal Stability. However, while stable Grand Coalitions are more likely under the 
FDS solution concept, changes in whether a Grand Coalition is stable due to 
changing stock location are also more likely. In this way, the use of the FDS solution 
concept increases stability, but also increases the sensitivity of stability to changes in 
stock location.  
 
Finally, we discuss some important issues highlighted by our results. We need to 
consider the positivist aspect of which solution concept best reflects reality and the 
normative aspect of which behaviours implied by the solution concept are 
preferable. The normative aspect is clear. Should policy makers wish to increase the 
stability of Grand Coalitions under changes in stock location, then mechanisms 
could be put into place to encourage further deviation, thereby forcing players who 
are considering a deviation to make farsighted conjectures about the effects of their 
deviation. In doing so, policy makers should consider that such farsighted 
conjectures may lead to more frequent switches been stable and unstable Grand 
Coalitions as a consequence of the increase in sensitivity to changing stock location 
associated with FDS. 
 
The positivist question is less clear cut. In the simplest, symmetric case, Grand 
Coalitions are unstable for more than 4 players. In reality, there have been examples 
of both success and failure of fisheries agreements for various numbers of fishing 
states (see Munro, 2008). This offers some support for the notion that fishing 
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countries are posing credible threats to deviation and that this facilitates stable 
coalitions.  
 
There are also other approaches which could be employed to analyse the issue of 
changes in stock location. For example, Long and Flaaten (2011) use a Stackelberg 
game to analyse the potential for cooperation to manage straddling fish stocks and 
have found more optimistic results than in the literature based on Cournot games. 
Breton and Keoula (2012) employ a dynamic farsightedness concept as well as a 
static version. A dynamic structure has the potential to increase the stability of the 
Grand Coalitions when stable coalition structures are reached after a large number 
of deviations (for example, the All Singletons structure) and the discount rate is 
sufficiently low. Higher payoffs from deviations will therefore be reduced through 
discounting and this will help to stabilise Grand Coalitions.  
 
Appendix 4.1 Equilibrium strategy for the All Singletons structure. 
 
Individual profits are given by 
П𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑥 − 𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑖.                         (4.i) 
Using the steady state condition, solving for x and substituting the value for x gives 
us 
П𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖 (
𝑘
𝑟
(𝑟 − 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖 − ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑒𝑗𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑖} )) − 𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑖,.                     (4.ii) 
The first order condition is 
П′𝑖 = 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘 −
2𝑝𝑞𝑖
2𝑘𝑒𝑖
𝑟
−
𝑝𝑞𝑖 ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑒𝑗𝑗∈𝑁−𝑖
𝑟
− 𝑐𝑖 = 0.        (4.iii) 
Solving for effort gives the reaction function 
𝑒𝑖 =
𝑟
2𝑞𝑖
(1 − 𝑏𝑖) −
1
2𝑞𝑖
∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑒𝑗𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑖}                      (4.iv) 
where 𝑏𝑖 =
𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑘
. 
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We manipulate the reaction function to obtain the following two identities. 
𝑒𝑖 =
𝑟(1−𝑏𝑖)
𝑞𝑖
−
1
𝑞𝑖
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖∈𝑁                            (4.v) 
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 =
𝑟
𝑛+1
∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁                             (4.vi) 
Substituting  the first identity into the second gives us the equilibrium strategy 
𝑒𝑖 =
𝑟(1−𝑏𝑖)
𝑞𝑖
−
𝑟
𝑞𝑖(𝑛+1)
∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 ,                     (4.vii) 
the RHS of which can be manipulated so that 𝑒𝑖 is a function of the inverse efficiency 
parameters of all other players such that, 
𝑒𝑖 =
𝑛𝑟
(𝑛+1)𝑞𝑖
(1 − 𝑏𝑖) −
𝑟
(𝑛+1)𝑞𝑖
∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑗)𝑗∈𝑁\{𝑖} .      (4.viii) 
 
Appendix 4.2a Derivation of Inequality (4.12) 
 
 
1
𝑠
𝑉𝑆(𝑛, 𝑠) ≥ 𝑉𝑖(𝑛, 1)               (4.ix) 
𝑟(1−𝑏)
𝑛+1
[𝑝𝑘 (1 −
𝑛(1−𝑏)
𝑛+1
) −
𝑐
𝑞
] ≤
𝑟(1−𝑏)
𝑠(𝑛−𝑠+2)
[𝑝𝑘 (1 −
(𝑛−𝑠+1)(1−𝑏)
𝑛−𝑠+2
) −
𝑐
𝑞
].      (4.x) 
Cancelling terms outside the square brackets and dividing both sides by 𝑝𝑘 yeilds 
1
𝑛+1
[(1 − 𝑏) −
𝑛(1−𝑏)
𝑛+1
] ≤
1
𝑠(𝑛−𝑠+2)
[(1 − 𝑏) −
(𝑛−𝑠+1)(1−𝑏)
𝑛−𝑠+2
].                   (4.xi) 
Removing (1 − 𝑏) from inside the brackets and cancelling yields 
1
𝑛+1
(
1
𝑛+1
) ≤
1
𝑠(𝑛−𝑠+2)
(
1
𝑛−𝑠+2
).                      (4.xii) 
Which simplifies to   
1
(𝑛+1)2
≤
1
𝑠(𝑛−𝑠+2)2
 . 
Solving for 𝑠 gives the result in (4.13).                                    (4.xiii) 
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Appendix 4.2b  Comparison of (4.13) and (4.15) 
 
We examine the difference between the right hand sides of (4.13) and (4.15).          
(
3
2
+ 𝑛 −
1
2
√4𝑛 + 5) − (2 + 𝑛 − 2√𝑛)                     (4.xiv)  
 −
1
2
+ 2√𝑛 −
1
2
√5 + 4𝑛                       (4.xv)  
Hence, the difference is positive (and increasing) for all 𝑛 > 2.  
 
Appendix 4.3 The independence of coalition stability from r 
 
We will demonstrate that the parameter r has no effect on stability. In order to do 
so, we prove that the ordering of any two profit functions, regardless of coalition 
size or membership, does not depend on r. The subscript j and k are used to denote 
the steady state stock size and effort under different coalition sizes or membership 
choices and hold their usual meaning for 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖. 
Consider the ordering 
𝑝𝑞𝑗𝑒𝑗𝑥𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗𝑒𝑗 >  𝑝𝑞𝑘𝑒𝑘𝑥𝑘 − 𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑘.                    (4.xvi)  
Equations (4.3) and (4.7) from the main text are repeated below.  
 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑘 −
𝑘
𝑟
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                                                               (4.3) 
𝑒𝑖 =
(𝑛−𝑠+1)𝑟
(𝑛−𝑠+2)𝑞𝑖
(1 − 𝑏𝑖) −
𝑟
(𝑛−𝑠+2)𝑞𝑖
∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑗)𝑗∈((𝑁\𝑆)∪{𝑙})\{𝑖}  for 𝑖 ∈ (𝑁\𝑆) ∪ {𝑙} (4.7) 
Substitution of (4.7) into (4.3) shows that 𝑥 is not a function of r because the r terms 
cancel. Effort 𝑒𝑖 is linear in r and can thus be entirely cancelled from the ordering. 
Given that the equality of any two profits does not depend on r, it holds also that 
the payoff of a given coalition member (Equation 4.8) also does not depend on r. To 
see this, note that given Equation (4.9), 𝑉(𝑆) > ∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑗∈𝑆  is a sufficient condition for 
stability.  The argument for the independence of the ordering of any two profit 
functions from r thus holds also for payoffs.  
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Appendix 4.4 The relative advantage of cost versus catchability asymmetries 
 
Beginning by substituting Equations (4.3) and (4.7) into Equation (4.4) and 
simplifying, we have equilibrium profit 
 П𝑖 = 𝑝𝑟𝑘 [𝐵𝑖
𝑎
𝑎+1
−
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
𝑎+1
] [
1 − 𝐵𝑖
𝑎
𝑎+1
+
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
𝑎+1
+
∑ (𝐵𝑗
𝑎
𝑎+1
−
∑ 𝐵𝑘𝑘
𝑎+1
)𝑗
] −
𝑐𝑖𝑟
𝑞𝑖
[𝐵𝑖
𝑎
𝑎+1
−
∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑗
𝑎+1
],                (4.xvii)  
where 𝐵𝑖 ≡ 1 − 𝑏𝑖 ∀𝑖,  𝑎 ≡ 𝑛 − 𝑠 + 1, ∑𝑗 sums over all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\𝑖 and ∑𝑘 sums over all 
𝑘 ∈ 𝑁\𝑗. 
The first differentials of the profit function are given below,  
∂П𝑖
∂𝑐𝑖
=
𝑟
𝑞𝑖(𝑎+1)
2 [(2𝑎 − 2𝑎
2)(1 − 𝑏𝑖) + (2𝑎 − 1)∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑗)𝑗 ],                (4.xviii)  
∂П𝑖
∂𝑞𝑖
= −
𝑐𝑖𝑟
𝑞𝑖
2(𝑎+1)2
[(2𝑎 − 2𝑎2)(1 − 𝑏𝑖) + (2𝑎 − 1)∑ (1 − 𝑏𝑗)𝑗 ].                  (4.xix) 
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The rise and fall of the great fish pact under endogenous 
risk of stock collapse  
  
 
ABSTRACT 
Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. 
We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the 
incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium 
harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and find that Grand Coalitions can be 
stable for any number of players if free-riding results in a total depletion of the fish 
stock. The results thus show conditions under which a Great Fish War becomes a 
Great Fish Pact. Importantly, this conclusion no longer holds upon dropping the 
standard assumption that payoffs are evaluated in steady states. If payoffs in the 
transition between steady states are included, the increased incentives to deviate 
offset the increased benefits from cooperation due to the presence of endogenous 
risk and the Great Fish Pact returns to being a Great Fish War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is based on the paper: Walker, A.N., Weikard, H-P., Richter, A., 2015. The rise and fall of the 
great fish pact under endogenous risk of stock collapse. FEEM working paper 2015.060. Submitted to a 
peer reviewed journal.  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Risks of catastrophe or regime shifts, if endogenously determined, have been shown 
to be an important incentive for precaution in strategic resource use (Nkuiya et al., 
2014; Ren and Polasky, 2014; Sakamoto, 2014). Further, such risks are relevant for 
understanding the decision to join climate treaties (Kolstad, 2007; Dellink and Finus, 
2012; Barrett, 2013) and are likely to affect the strategic harvest choices of fishing 
nations (Hannesson, 2014). From 1950 to 2000, 366 fisheries collapsed and the 
collapses are generally attributed to over-fishing (Mullon et al., 2005). Indeed, 
avoiding stock collapses was one of the principle motivations for the formation of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs), the institutions intended to 
facilitate cooperation in the management of high seas fish stocks. Surprisingly, the 
effect of endogenously determined catastrophes on the potential for cooperation in 
fisheries agreements has received little attention in the literature.  
In this paper, we fill this gap using the Great Fish War model of Levhari and Mirman 
(1980) and consider the effects of a risk of stock collapse which increases in harvest. 
We ask, whether an endogenous risk of stock collapse can transform the Great Fish 
War into a Great Fish Pact. We modify the Great Fish War model of Levhari and 
Mirman (1980) (henceforth LM) to estimate Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
(MPNE) harvest functions under an endogenously determined risk of irreversible 
collapse such that the stock after the collapse is zero, and remains zero, for all future 
time periods. It should be noted that “collapse”, as defined in the fisheries literature 
does not require the stock to be completely extinct (Cooke, 1984). Instead, we 
define collapse as an economic collapse, meaning that the fishery is no longer viable 
and no profits can be made. Our study therefore relates generally to the literature 
on uncertainty in resource management such as Clarke and Reed (1994) and Tsur 
and Zemel (1998). More specifically, our study relates to literature which considers 
endogenous risk of regime shift in resource games, namely, Sakomoto’s (2014) 
analysis of the subclass of dynamic renewable resource games of Sorger (2005) and 
Ren and Polasky (2014), who conduct a more general analysis. These two studies 
show that endogenous risk can lead to either more or less aggressive resource use. 
Additionally, Sakamoto (2014) demonstrates the importance of considering the 
transition between regimes, i.e. taking off-steady-state payoffs into account. Finally, 
our study fits directly into the literature using the LM model. Exogenous uncertainty 
in the LM model has been considered in three studies. Antoniadou et al. (2013) and 
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Agbo (2014) consider exogenous uncertainty in stock dynamics. Fesselmeyer and 
Santugini (2013) consider exogenous uncertainty in the quality of the resource as 
well as the probability of regime shifts in the growth rate of the stock.  
In our study, we compare analytically how incorporating endogenous risk affects the 
structure of the LM model. The inclusions of endogenous risk results in equilibrium 
harvest strategies which are non-linear in stock. Due to the technical difficulties in 
analytically solving for non-linear harvest functions (Antoniadou et al., 2013), we 
employ a numerical approach. Our model calculates the Internal Stability of Grand 
Coalitions across a range of growth and discount rates and for any number of 
players. In turn, this allows us to determine if an endogenous risk of stock collapse 
affects the potential for successful cooperation.  
Our study is the first detailed exploration of non-linear harvest functions in the LM 
model and the first study to explicitly consider endogenous risk of stock collapse 
from a coalition theory perspective. We find that endogenous risk of stock collapse 
may provide an incentive to entirely deplete the fish stock. Because entirely 
depleting the stock is a response to the presence of endogenous risk, we term this 
“pre-emptive depletion”. The effect of pre-emptive depletion on coalition stability 
depends on the assumptions adopted regarding how the payoff from deviation is 
calculated. The application of a two-stage game (d’Aspremont et al., 1983) to 
fisheries results in the commonly used assumption (Lindroos, 2008; Pintassilgo, 
2008; Pintassilgo et al. 2010; Long and Flaaten, 2011; Ellefsen, 2012) that players 
receive payoffs calculated in steady state according to the coalition formed. Under 
this standard assumption, we find that, in general, an endogenous risk of stock 
collapse increases Grand Coalition stability. This is particularly so if non-cooperation 
would result in pre-emptive depletion. When this is the case, the incentive to 
cooperate is so strong that the Grand Coalition is stable for any number of players 
and can therefore be described as a Great Fish Pact. This study therefore suggests a 
solution to the “puzzle of small coalitions” (Breton and Keoula, 2014), whereby the 
size of theoretically stable coalitions is smaller than what is observed in reality. 
Notably, the puzzle of small coalitions can be solved without the use of transfer 
payments. Transfer or “side” payments combined with asymmetric players is a 
frequently invoked and powerful method which increases the number of players for 
which cooperation can be sustained (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998; Kennedy, 2003; 
Lindroos 2008; Pintassilgo et al. 2010; Long and Flaaten, 2011; Ellefsen, 2012; Breton 
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and Keoula, 2014). However, transfers payments have met much resistance in the 
policy world in general (Folmer et al., 1993) and are not implemented in direct 
financial terms in fisheries agreements (Munro, 2008). Further, the puzzle of small 
coalitions is solved without the use of sequential move games (e.g. Long and 
Flaaten, 2011) or alternative solution concepts, such as farsightedness (e.g. Breton 
and Keoula, 2012).  
Thus, endogenous risk solves the puzzle of small coalitions (the Great Fish War 
becomes a pact). However, we find that this result is very sensitive to the 
assumptions implicit in the standard two-stage game. We relax the assumption that 
payoffs are determined in steady states by considering a transition period whereby 
the stock size gradually adjusts after a deviation has occurred (cf. Sakamoto, 2014). 
Deviators receive payoffs during this transition period (“transition payoffs”). 
Transition payoffs turn out to be a decisive incentive for non-cooperation. Without 
transition payoffs, if deviation leads to pre-emptive depletion, then the payoff of 
deviation is zero. With transition payoffs, the process of pre-emptively depleting 
provides a payoff. We find that transition payoffs motivate non-cooperation to the 
extent that the Grand Coalition is only stable in a two-player game, and then, only if 
the discount rate is sufficiently low and the stock grows sufficiently slowly. The Great 
Fish Pact thus returns to a Great Fish War. Overall then, the paper shows how 
endogenous risk of stock collapse leads to dramatic increases in the potential for 
cooperation but qualifies this with the important proviso that this result holds only if 
transition payoffs are not considered.  
The following Section 5.2 describes the bio-economic model and derives and 
analyses the envelope condition. Section 5.3 explains how Grand Coalition stability is 
calculated. Section 5.4 numerically analyses the model in terms of the stability of 
Grand Coalitions. Section 5.5 proceeds to consider the effects of including transition 
payoffs. Section 5.6 concludes.  
 
5.2 Bio-economic model 
 
We will first describe the biology of the system and introduce the objective 
functions. The objective functions determine the payoffs for a given coalition 
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membership choice, which are then used to determine coalition stability. The set 𝑁 
of identical players represents 𝑛 nations, indexed by i. Let us first define escapement 
𝑒 (the stock remaining after harvest) in a given period, 𝑡 as 
𝑒𝑡 ≡ 𝑥𝑡 − ∑ ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝑖  ,                         (5.1) 
where ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the harvest of player i in period t. The stock in the next period depends 
on escapement in the current period and is determined by the function 𝑓(𝑒𝑡) as 
follows: 
𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑓(𝑒𝑡) = 𝛽𝑒𝑡
𝛼,                        (5.2) 
where 𝛽 > 0 and 0 < 𝛼 < 1. If there is no harvest, 𝑥𝑡 increases over time to its 
carrying capacity, which is given by 
?̅? = 𝛽
1
1−𝛼.                         (5.3) 
We normalise the model such that the carrying capacity is fixed and not affected by 
the growth parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽. Specifically, we set 𝛽 = ?̅?(1−𝛼) (from Equation (5.3)) 
and thus the carrying capacity ?̅? can be treated as a parameter in the model and we 
only need to specify 𝛼, which we term the “growth parameter”. Note that lower 
𝛼 entails a higher growth rate. 
The probability of the fish stock surviving into the next period, 0 ≤ 𝑟 < 1, is 
endogenously determined by the escapement and is given by  
𝑟(𝑒𝑡) = max(0, 1 −
𝛾?̅?
𝑒𝑡
),                         (5.4) 
where 0 < 𝛾 < 1 and therefore 0 ≤ 𝑟(𝑒) < 1. The parameter 𝛾 determines the critical 
escapement level 𝛾?̅?, below which collapse is certain. For any escapement level 
𝑒𝑡 > 𝛾?̅? such that max (0, 1 −
𝛾?̅?
𝑒𝑡
) = 1 −
𝛾?̅?
𝑒𝑡
, it is easy to see that there is a strictly 
positive survival probability which is increasing in escapement at a decreasing rate. 
This means that there is a strictly positive risk of stock collapse at all stock sizes. This 
is reasonable because, for certain species, pressures from habitat loss or invasive 
species may mean that a risk of stock collapse is present even in the absence of any 
fishing (Field et al., 2009; Gjøsæter et al., 2009). 
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The instantaneous utility function for player 𝑖 is given by 
 𝑢(ℎ𝑖) = max(0, ln (ℎ𝑖)).                         (5.5) 
This utility function avoids the problem of being undefined when harvest is zero, 
which is useful in our numerical approach. Appendix 5.1 explains and validates the 
choice of utility function in more detail.  
The value function of player 𝑖 is given by 
𝑉𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑢(ℎ𝑖) + 𝑟(𝑒)𝛿𝑉𝑖(𝑓(𝑒)),                            (5.6) 
where 0 < 𝛿 < 1 is the discount factor. The value function depends on 
instantaneous utility and the value of the stock in the future, subject to discounting 
and risk of collapse. Both the risk of collapse and the future value of the stock 
depend on escapement. Escapement depends on ℎ𝑖 and the sum of the harvests of 
other players ℎ−𝑖. Therefore 𝑒 = 𝑥 − ℎ𝑖 − ℎ−𝑖 . Optimal harvest varies with stock size. 
Therefore, harvest level is represented as a function of stock size such that 
ℎ𝑖 = 𝒽𝑖(𝑥), which we term the harvest function. Similarly, escapement is also a 
function of stock size, i.e. 𝑒 = 𝑥 − 𝒽𝑖(𝑥)  − 𝒽−𝑖(𝑥). 
We can now begin to investigate how the harvest functions of our model differ from 
the LM harvest functions and what drives these differences. Optimal harvest 
maximises the value function for a given stock size. The envelope of these maxima 
across all stock sizes is the envelope curve. The envelope condition is a necessary 
condition for the maximisation of the envelope curve and thus gives insight into the 
conditions under which optimal stock size and harvest are achieved.    
Lemma 5.1: The envelope condition is given by  
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥
= (1 −
𝜕𝒽−𝑖
𝜕𝑥
)
𝜕𝑢
𝜕ℎ𝑖
. 
Proof: See Appendix 5.2. 
The envelope condition shows that player 𝑖’s harvest is optimal when the marginal 
value of the fish stock 
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥
 is equal to the marginal value of harvest 
𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ𝑖
, which is 
adjusted by the proportion of the marginal harvest of all other players. The general 
format of the envelope condition, as in Lemma 5.1, is identical to that of the LM 
model (Mirman, 1979).  However, the values of the derivatives are different because 
the endogenous risk function 𝑟(𝑒) affects the value function 𝑉𝑖 . Therefore, harvest 
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levels which satisfy the envelope condition will not be identical to the LM case. We 
can conjecture that the value function will be particularly steep at low stock sizes 
because small increases in stock size lead to large reductions in risk of collapse. 
Furthermore, the slope of the harvest functions will depend on whether 𝑥 is less or 
greater than 𝛾?̅?. By contrast, in the LM model the slope of the harvest function is 
constant. For a full analysis of the effects of endogenous risk in terms of Grand 
Coalition stability, we employ a numerical method, which is explained in the 
following section. 
 
5.3 Grand Coalition stability  
 
We now proceed to explain how the value function is optimised and how we use 
these results to analyse stability. We test for Grand Coalition stability across a 
parameter space 𝛺. Elements of 𝛺 are triples (𝑛, 𝛾, 𝜃) where 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝜌). The 
parameter 𝜌 is the discount rate where 0 < 𝜌 ≤ 1 and 𝛿 =
1
1+𝜌
. The set of players in 
the coalition is given by 𝑀, where 𝑚 ≡ |𝑀|. We consider and compare two coalition 
structures. The first is the Grand Coalition given by 𝑀 = 𝑁. A coalition member may 
deviate and will do so immediately should this be beneficial. This results in the 
second coalition structure; the partial coalition 𝑀 = 𝑁/{𝑘}, where {𝑘} is the free-
rider. Coalition members choose harvest levels to maximise their joint utility and the 
free-rider chooses harvest to maximise individual utility. For each element of 𝛺, and 
for an infinite time horizon, we optimise the value function 𝑉𝑖(𝑥) for a given 𝛺 to 
derive the optimised value functions 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑡; 𝛺) for Grand Coalition members and for 
free-riders. This is achieved via the Bellman equation. For a coalition member j, the 
optimised value function 𝑈𝑗(𝑥𝑡; 𝛺) is given by  
𝑈𝑗(𝑥𝑡; 𝛺) =
1
𝑚
max𝐻 {∑ (max (0, ln (
𝐻
𝑚
) ) +
𝑟(𝑒𝑡)
1+𝜌
𝑈𝑗(𝑥𝑡+1; 𝛺))𝑗∈𝑀 }    ∀  𝑗 ∈ 𝑀 ,           (5.7) 
where 𝐻 = ∑ ℎ𝑗𝑗∈𝑀  is the coalition harvest. The value function for a free-rider 𝑘 
playing against the coalition 𝑁\{𝑘} is given by  
𝑈𝑘(𝑥𝑡; 𝛺) = maxℎ𝑘 {𝑢(ℎ𝑘) +
𝑟(𝑒𝑡)
1+𝜌
𝑈𝑘(𝑥𝑡+1; 𝛺)}.                         (5.8) 
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Where 𝑛 = 1, the optimised value functions 𝑈𝑗(𝑥𝑡; 𝛺) and 𝑈𝑘(𝑥𝑡; 𝛺) are both 
equivalent to that in the sole owner case. Optimised value functions are calculated 
numerically using value function iteration. The harvest functions 𝒽𝑖(𝑥) ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 which 
result in optimised value functions over an infinite time horizon thus constitute 
Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) harvest functions. MPNE harvest functions 
allow us to determine the steady state stock size with harvesting at the stock size 𝑥∗ 
for which the following equality holds;  
𝑥∗ = 𝛽(𝑥∗ − ∑ 𝒽𝑖(𝑥
∗)𝑖∈𝑁 )
𝛼.                       (5.9) 
Evaluating the optimised value functions at 𝑥𝐺𝐶
∗  (the steady state under a Grand 
Coalition) and 𝑥𝐹𝑅
∗  (the steady state if free-riding occurs) gives payoffs, which 
determine Grand Coalition stability if transition payoffs are not included. We use an 
Internal Stability solution concept, under which the Grand Coalition is stable if the 
payoff to a Grand Coalition member is greater than that of a free-rider playing 
against the coalition of remaining members. If transition payoffs are not included, 
the Grand Coalition is therefore internally stable if  
𝑈𝑗(𝑥𝐺𝐶
∗ ; 𝛺) ≥ 𝑈𝑘(𝑥𝐹𝑅
∗ ; 𝛺).                      (5.10) 
The internal stability condition is also applied under the inclusion of transition 
payoffs, but in that case, payoffs in the transition between steady states after a 
deviation from the Grand Coalition are accounted for. For more details and 
discussion of the numerical techniques used, see Appendix 5.1. 
 
5.4 Results of the standard two-stage game 
 
This section presents stability results for our game under the assumption that 
transition payoffs are excluded. We begin by validating the numerical accuracy of 
our model. The validation demonstrates high statistical similarity of harvest 
functions from a numerical LM model with analytically derived LM harvest functions; 
see Appendix 5.1 for details. We thus proceed to analyse the numerical model of 
endogenous risk of stock collapse. We consider a range of parameters
6
 for 𝛼 and 𝜌 
                                                 
6  In the original LM model the discount factor is between 0 and 1 whereas we test the discount 
rate between 0 and 1. This means that we test discount factors between 0.5 and 1. 
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such that 𝛼 ∈ 𝐴 = [0.01, 0.02,… ,0.99] and 𝜌 ∈ 𝛲 = [0.01, 0.02,… ,1]. We denote the 
set of all possible 𝜃 = (𝛼, 𝜌) as 𝛩 such that 𝛩 = 𝐴 × 𝛲. The disaggregation of 𝐴 
and 𝛲 allows us to determine the stability of coalitions across a full range of 
parameters and therefore to acquire insights of a similar depth to those provided by 
analytical results. We do not analyse 𝛼 = 1 in order to retain strict concavity in the 
growth function. Further, we begin by analysing a low value for the parameter, 𝛾. 
Lower critical escapement levels ?̅?𝛾 mean that certain and immediate stock collapse 
occurs for a smaller range of stock sizes. We therefore set 𝛾 = 0.01 and consider the 
effect of changing 𝛾 later.  
Figure 5.1 presents the resource stock in steady state for the parameter space 𝛩 
using 𝑛 = 2 as a representative example. The analysis will distinguish results for the 
Grand Coalition (Panel A) and the case where free-riding occurs (Panel B). Note that 
the free-rider case for 𝑛 = 2 coincides with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. For each 
element of 𝛩, multiple steady states can exist. We first present and analyse the 
largest stable steady state for each element of 𝛩 and later, we will describe the 
different steady states which can exist for each element of 𝛩 in more detail.  
Figure 5.1 shows that the largest stable steady state is either zero, as in Region I, or 
positive as in all other regions. In Region I, it is optimal to fish the stock to extinction 
rather than waiting in the hope that stocks will increase and thus the risk of collapse 
will drop.  We refer to this effect as “pre-emptive depletion”. Pre-emptive depletion 
occurs when 𝛼 is high (the growth rate is low) and occurs for a greater range of 𝛼 as 
the discount rate, 𝜌 increases. Larger 𝛼 and 𝜌 mean that the stock has less value in 
the future: stock regeneration is limited, and any gains occurring in the future will be 
discounted. Further, the presence of endogenous risk makes those future gains 
uncertain. Hence, the choice is made to pre-emptively deplete the stock, thus 
gaining an immediate and certain payoff. In all other regions, “conservative 
management” occurs, whereby the largest stable steady state is positive. 
Conservative management occurs when the value of the future (in terms of 𝛼 and 𝜌) 
is greater and thus maintaining a positive steady state becomes optimal, despite the 
risk of stock collapse.  
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Figure 5.1: Largest stable steady states in the Grand Coalition case (Panel A) and the free-rider case (Panel 
B) in 𝛩 space where 𝑛 = 2, as an example. Using 𝑥𝐼
∗ to denote the steady state stock in Region I,  𝑥𝐼𝐼
∗  to 
denote the steady state stock in Region II and so on, the regions are defined as 𝑥𝐼
∗ =0, 0< 𝑥𝐼𝐼
∗ ≤1000, 
1000< 𝑥𝐼𝐼𝐼
∗ ≤2000, 2000< 𝑥𝐼𝑉
∗ ≤4000, 4000< 𝑥𝑉
∗ ≤7000 and 7000≤ 𝑥𝑉𝐼
∗ <10000. 
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Pre-emptive depletion occurs in a smaller area of the parameter space in the Grand 
Coalition than under free-riding. In general, free-riding reduces the steady state 
stock and therefore increases the risk of collapse. The increased risk of collapse 
stimulates pre-emptive depletion for lower values of 𝛼. 
To build intuition for the above result, we proceed to analyse the differences in 
harvest functions between cases where pre-emptive depletion occurs and where 
conservative management occurs. In principle, each stock size can support a certain 
harvest level in equilibrium, as is usually visualized in the Sustained Yield (SY) curve 
(Clark, 2010). In this case, the SY curve requires that the following equality holds 
𝑥 = 𝛽(𝑥 − ℎ)𝛼.                       (5.11) 
Solving Equation (5.11) for harvest gives the SY curve as follows 
𝓎(𝑥) = 𝑥 − (
𝑥
𝛽
)
1
𝛼.                         (5.12) 
The intersection of the SY curve with a given harvest function is thus a steady state, 
though not necessarily a stable one. The relationship between the SY curve and the 
harvest function determines whether pre-emptive depletion or conservative 
management occurs. In Figure 5.2, we provide generic figurative representations of 
SY curves and harvest functions under conservative management and pre-emptive 
depletion. We also show stock dynamics in order to aid in interpreting the steady 
states.  
A more detailed analysis of the properties of harvest rules is given in Appendix 5.3. 
Both harvest functions in Figure 5.2 are linear and have a slope of 1 when 𝑥 ≤ 𝛾?̅?. 
For these stock sizes, collapse is certain and therefore the entire stock is harvested 
immediately. A stock size of zero thus satisfies Lemma 5.1 and is a stable steady 
state under both conservative management and pre-emptive depletion. In the case 
of pre-emptive depletion, harvest is greater than growth for all stock sizes, and thus 
𝑥 = 0 is the only steady state. In the case of conservative management, harvest will 
be less than growth in some range of the harvest function. Therefore, both an 
unstable and stable steady state exist in addition to the zero steady state. Lemma 
5.1 is satisfied for both stable steady states. Thus, pre-emptive depletion is formally 
defined as the existence of only one stable steady state, which is zero, and 
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conservative management is defined as the existence of a positive stable steady 
state in addition to the zero stable steady state.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Generic representation of harvest functions, stock dynamics and steady states under 
conservative management and pre-emptive depletion where ∆𝑥 ≡ 𝑥𝑡+1 − 𝑥𝑡. Open circles indicate unstable 
steady states and closed circles represent stable steady states.  
Payoffs are determined in the stable non-zero steady state if it exists (i.e. 
conservative management is adopted). If it does not exist (i.e. pre-emptive depletion 
occurs) then payoffs are zero because the steady state is zero. Payoffs are shown in 
Figure 5.3.  
Both panels in Figure 5.3 show the same general pattern. Payoff increases as the 
discount rate decreases. The marginal effect of the discount rate is very pronounced 
at low discount rates. Also, payoff decreases as 𝛼 increases. Recall, high 𝛼 means 
that the stock grows more slowly. We also see an area for very high 𝛼 where payoff 
is zero due to pre-emptive depletion. 
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To further the analysis, it is useful to formally define the threshold in the parameter 
space 𝛩 which determines where payoffs change from non-zero to zero due to pre-
emptive depletion – referred to as the depletion threshold. The depletion threshold 
is given by the borders between Region I and Region II in Figure 5.3. By comparing 
the relative locations of the depletion thresholds, we can see that pre-emptive 
depletion occurs for a larger area of 𝛩 in the free-rider case, and the intuition is as 
follows. Free-riding reduces 𝑥∗, which increases the risk of stock collapse, and 
therefore provides greater incentives to harvest the entire stock in response to the 
higher risk. 
Endogenous risk of stock collapse thus has profound effects on the incentives 
whether or not to free-ride. Free-riding reduces 𝑥∗ which increases risk at an 
increasing rate due to the functional form of Equation (5.4). This means that free-
riding leads to increases in risk which are disproportionally larger than the reduction 
in 𝑥∗. In turn, this risk amplification reduces the payoff of free-riding relative to 
Grand Coalition membership. We term this effect the “risk amplification effect”7 of 
free-riding.  
In order to analyse the stability of Grand Coalitions for different numbers of players 
n, we calculate payoffs in the free-rider and Grand Coalition cases in 𝛩 space for 
each n. We can then explain how the risk amplification effect and changing numbers 
of players affect the stability of the Grand Coalition. 
The results are shown in Figure 5.4(A) and will be discussed according to the effects 
of changing 𝛼, 𝜌 and n and finally, we discuss the area marked ψ. Figure 5.4(A) 
shows “stability thresholds” which divide the parameter space into areas where the 
Grand Coalition is stable and unstable for a given number of players. Concerning 𝛼, 
in general, we see that for a given 𝜌, as 𝛼 increases, the Grand Coalition can shift 
from being unstable to being stable. Higher 𝛼 means a lower growth rate which in 
turns results in a lower 𝑥∗. Grand Coalitions maintain a higher 𝑥∗ than coalitions 
when free-riding occurs. In this way, the risk amplification effect discourages free-
riding disproportionally more at lower 𝑥∗. Accordingly, increasing 𝛼 can result in a 
shift from unstable to stable.  
 
                                                 
7  The risk amplification effect is similar to the “risk reduction effect” of Ren and Polasky (2014). 
The risk reduction effect refers to the reduction in endogenous risk when stock increases. 
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Figure 5.3: Payoffs for a Grand Coalition member (Panel A) and a free-rider (Panel B) in 𝛩 space where 
𝑛 = 2, as an example. Using 𝑈𝐼 to denote the payoff value in Region I,  𝑈𝐼𝐼 to denote the payoff in Region II 
and so on, the regions are defined as 𝑈𝐼 = 0, 0 < 𝑈𝐼𝐼 ≤10, 10< 𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼 ≤20, 20< 𝑈𝐼𝑉 ≤40, 40< 𝑈𝑉 ≤70, 
70< 𝑈𝑉𝐼 ≤110 and 𝑈𝑉𝐼𝐼 >110. Region I thus refers to parameterisations for which pre-emptive depletion 
occurs.  
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Concerning 𝜌, in general, we see that for a given 𝛼, as 𝜌 increases, the Grand 
Coalition can shift from being unstable to being stable. This is caused, again, by the 
risk amplification effect. Higher 𝜌 means that the future is less valuable. Therefore, 
players prefer current harvest relatively more than future harvest. Accordingly, 𝑥∗ 
decreases, the risk amplification effect increases and concurrently, Grand Coalition 
stability increases. Note also that the risk amplification effect explains the curved 
shape of the thresholds in Figure 5.4. This is because 𝑥∗decreases in 𝜌 and the risk 
amplification effect increases in 𝑥∗ at an increasing rate. 
Concerning n, we see that in general, increasing the number of players decreases 
the number of parameterisations for which the Grand Coalition is stable. Grand 
Coalition stability relies on internalising the externalities of fishing, which are two-
fold. Firstly, harvest by one player reduces the amount of fish available for the other 
player in the future. Secondly harvest by one player increases the risk amplification 
effect. Grand Coalitions internalize these externalities, but the benefits to each player 
of doing so are reduced as n increases because the socially optimal catch must be 
shared by more members. Thus, as n increases, we see a decrease in the number of 
parameterisations for which the Grand Coalition is stable. 
As n increases from 3 to 32, the stability threshold approaches the free-rider 
depletion threshold in progressively smaller steps. At 𝑛 = 32, the stability threshold 
is identical to the free-rider depletion threshold. This implies that the decision to 
free-ride by a single player will result in pre-emptive depletion, which gives a payoff 
of zero in steady state. As 𝑛 increases beyond 32, the socially optimal harvest must 
be shared by more players, but always remains non-zero, while the free-rider payoff 
remains zero. Hence, the stability threshold does not change for 𝑛 ≥ 32. In other 
words, the stability threshold has thus converged at 𝑛 = 32.  
The grey area ψ in Figure 5.4 refers to the subset of 𝛩 for which 𝑈𝑗(𝑥
∗;  𝛺 ) =
𝑈𝑘(𝑥
∗; 𝛺) = 0, i.e. where pre-emptive depletion occurs in both the Grand Coalition 
and free-rider cases. When this is the case, stability is trivial because, when payoffs 
are evaluated in the steady state, there are no incentives for players to fish either in 
or out of the coalition. Therefore, Grand Coalitions are non-trivially stable for some 
values of 𝛩 for all 𝑛 > 1. Grand Coalitions are non-trivially stable for stocks which 
are slow growing, but not so slow growing that the stock is pre-emptively depleted. 
This result is due to endogenous risk.  
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The above analysis of stability raises the question, what determines the location of 
the stability thresholds? Also, why do the stability thresholds converge at 𝑛 = 32? 
We will now demonstrate that this finding is sensitive to the parameter 𝛾, which 
determines the critical escapement level 𝛾?̅? below which stock collapse is certain. 
We do so by increasing 𝛾 from 0.01 to 0.05. Increasing 𝛾 leads to an increase in the 
probability of collapse for all stock sizes. Therefore, as would be expected, increasing 
𝛾 leads to an increase in the size of the area of 𝛩 displaying pre-emptive depletion. 
This, in turn has an effect on the stability thresholds as demonstrated in Figure 
5.4(B). 
 
Figure 5.4: Stability thresholds between stable and unstable Grand Coalitions for selected numbers of 
players in 𝛩 space with 𝛾 = 0.01 (Panel A) and 𝛾 = 0.05 (Panel B). We illustrate the interpretation of the 
thresholds explicitly for 𝑛 = 3. For all stability thresholds, to the left of the stability threshold, the Grand 
Coalition is unstable. To the right of the stability threshold, the Grand Coalition is stable. For 𝑛 = 2 the 
Grand Coalition is stable for all parameters. The grey area, marked ψ, is the subset of 𝛩 for which 
𝑈𝑗(𝑥
∗; 𝛺) = 𝑈𝑘(𝑥
∗; 𝛺) = 0, i.e. where pre-emptive depletion occurs in both the Grand Coalition and free-
rider cases.  
In comparison to Figure 5.4(A), Figure 5.4(B) shows that an increase in 𝛾 from 0.01 to 
0.05 shifts all stability thresholds for 𝑛 > 2 to slightly lower values of 𝛼 and reduces 
the number of players at which the stability thresholds converge 32 to 26. To recap, 
the parameter 𝛾 determines the critical escapement level below which collapse is 
certain. Therefore, for stocks with a higher critical escapement level, we observe 
more pre-emptive depletion. At the same time, cooperation exists for a larger part 
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of the parameter space because there are greater benefits to internalising the risk of 
stock collapse. 
 
5.5 Including transition payoffs 
 
The previous section has shown that a player receiving strictly positive payoffs in the 
Grand Coalition can receive a zero payoff upon deviation. This effect drives the 
possibility for a stable Grand Coalition for any number of players. However, zero 
payoffs from deviation are due to the assumption that the state of the stock jumps 
immediately from 𝑥𝐺𝐶
∗  to 𝑥𝐹𝑅
∗ . We therefore relax this assumption and thus account 
for transition payoffs. 
 
5.5.1 Method for including transition payoffs 
In order to test the effects of including transition-payoffs between steady states, we 
construct a forward model. Generally speaking, forward models take backwardly 
induced optimal control functions and applies them to a model which runs forward 
in time in order to fully identify the dynamics of the system. In our case then, for a 
given element of 𝛩, the forward model takes the harvest functions, 𝒽𝑖(𝑥) ∀ 𝑖 
corresponding to the free-rider case with a starting stock size of 𝑥𝐺𝐶
∗ . In the first 
period, we apply the harvest functions to the stock, thus calculating utility and 
escapement. Escapement and the growth function determine the stock in the next 
period and the process is repeated until the stock size converges to 𝑥𝐹𝑅
∗ . The time 
taken for convergence is given by 𝑇. The total payoff is given by the instantaneous 
utility in the Grand Coalition, plus the discounted expected sum of payoffs in the 
transition, plus the discounted lifetime value of the fisheries in the free-rider steady 
state. The payoff in the free-rider steady state is reduced as a result of these payoffs 
being pushed further into the future and the probability that collapse occurs during 
the transition period. Hence, we adjust the free-rider steady state payoffs by the 
function 𝜉(𝜌, 𝑇, 𝑅) where 0 < 𝜉(𝜌, 𝑇, 𝑅) < 1 and 𝑅 ≡ ∏ 𝑟(𝑒𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 . Thus the total payoff 
including the transition period is given by  
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𝑢(𝒽𝑘(𝑥𝐺𝐶
∗ ) ) + ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑟(𝑒𝑡−1)
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝑢(𝒽𝑘(𝑓(𝑒𝑡−1)) ) +  𝜉(𝜌, 𝑇, 𝑅)𝑈𝑘(𝑥𝐹𝑅
∗ ).                 (5.13) 
We can thus repeat the analysis of Section 5.4, accounting for transition payoffs. 
 
5.5.2 Results of including transition payoffs 
This section presents the results of including transition payoffs. We find that the 
maximum size of a stable Grand Coalition is two. We find that stability only exists for 
a small area of the parameter space, as shown in Figure 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.5: Stability of a two-player Grand Coalition in 𝛩 space with transition payoffs where 𝛾 = 0.01. The 
black area shows elements of 𝛩 for which the 2-player Grand Coalition is stable. The grey area, marked ψ, 
is the subset of 𝛩  for which 𝑈𝑗(𝑥
∗; 𝛺) = 𝑈𝑘(𝑥
∗; 𝛺) = 0, i.e. where pre-emptive depletion occurs in both the 
Grand Coalition and free-rider cases.  
The potential for stability is lower when transition payoffs are included due to the 
increased payoff to deviators available in the transition period. Grand Coalitions of 
two-players are stable when the discount rate is sufficiently low. Stability can also 
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exist for slightly higher discount rates when α is larger. This conforms closely to the 
result of Kwon (2006) who studies partial coalitions and finds that partial coalitions 
of two players are stable only if 𝛼(1 + 𝜌)−1 is sufficiently high. In our case however, 
the area of stability has a long tail which encompasses progressively lower discount 
rates. This is due to endogenous risk. Players who are more concerned with the 
future prefer Grand Coalition membership due to the reduced risk of stock collapse.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
This study analyses the classic Levhari and Mirman model of the Great Fish War 
(1980) under an endogenous risk of stock collapse. The objective is to analyse the 
effects of endogenous risk of stock collapse on the stability of Grand Coalitions. The 
results of the standard two-stage game show that a risk of stock collapse increases 
the potential for cooperation. Further, the results show that cooperation can be 
sustained for any number of players if the stock is sufficiently slow growing, but not 
so slow growing that exploitation is not sustainable in the long run (i.e. if pre-
emptive depletion occurs). Because the potential for cooperation exists for any 
number of players under an endogenous risk of stock collapse, the Great Fish War 
becomes a Great Fish Pact.  
Further considering the standard two-stage game, the result relating to the growth 
parameter 𝛼 has interesting management implications, particularly for deep-water 
fisheries which are often slow growing (Gordon, 2003). Slow growing stocks are 
more vulnerable to over-exploitation (Roberts, 2002; Neubauer et al., 2013). This 
paper supports this proposition for very slow growing stocks. Indeed, the results 
suggest that the stock would be fished to extinction. However, because Grand 
Coalitions are stable for slow (not very slow) growing stocks regardless of the 
number of players, the potential for sustainable management is somewhat less 
bleak. 
Most importantly, the results offer counter-evidence to a long-running implicit 
conclusion in the literature, namely that the number of players is the most important 
determinant of potential for stable Grand Coalitions. This study shows that when 
there are more than a certain number of players, further increases in the number of 
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players has no effect on the area of the parameter space for which the Grand 
Coalition is stable. The reason for this is that in previous models, increasing the 
number of players results in lower steady state stocks and these low steady states 
can be sustained ad infinitum with no risk that the stock might collapse. The result 
presented in this paper regarding the independence of stability from the number of 
players is entirely the result of relaxing this very common, yet inappropriate, 
assumption.  
In general, this study contributes to the discussion regarding what makes coalitions 
in fisheries management stable. We observe empirically that coalitions can be stable 
for large numbers of players but theoretical models tend to be more pessimistic 
(Hannesson, 2011). Breton and Keoula (2014) refer to this as the “puzzle of small 
coalitions” and show that larger coalitions can be achieved by using asymmetric 
players in a game with first mover advantage, thus partly solving the puzzle. 
Asymmetric players combined with transfer payments can contribute to solving the 
puzzle (e.g. Pintassilgo et al., 2010), as can the type of solution concept used (e.g. 
Breton and Keoula, 2014). We have shown that endogenous risk of stock collapse 
allows the potential for cooperation for any number a players; a possibility which has 
not yet been identified in the literature. Additionally, this cooperation of any number 
of players is sustained without the use of transfer payments. 
However, our results are sobering in the sense that the potential to seize transition 
payoffs swamps out the prospects for cooperation and hence, the Great Fish Pact 
returns to being a Great Fish War. Under the Great Fish Pact, farsightedness, 
sequential move games and transfer payments are not required to address the 
puzzle of small coalitions. However, because the Great Fish Pact does not hold if 
transition payoffs are included, farsightedness, sequential move games and transfer 
payments still have an important role to play in addressing the puzzle of small 
coalitions. Further study is required to determine the effects of these assumptions 
on coalition stability when transition payoffs are included. 
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Appendix 5.1 Utility function and numerical accuracy  
 
This appendix discusses numerical accuracy with respect to our utility function and 
interpolation error.  
The utility function  
The utility function 𝑢(ℎ) = ln(ℎ) is undefined when ℎ = 0. A risk of stock collapse 
implies that harvest level ℎ = 0 may occur. We therefore require a utility function 
which avoids this problem but is sufficiently similar to ln(ℎ), such that we know that 
differences in the stability of Grand Coalitions between our model and the LM 
model can be attributed solely to the presence of endogenous risk. Therefore, we 
use the utility function max(0, ln(ℎ)) which is equal to ln(ℎ) if ℎ ≥ 1. The range of 
the utility function is bounded in that it is non-negative and harvest cannot exceed 
the carrying capacity. We set the carrying capacity at ?̅? = 10,000 (by setting 
𝛽 = 10,0001−𝛼) such that our utility function differs from ln(ℎ) only for a small 
fraction of its range. Hence, using a large values for ?̅? ensures ℎ is extremely 
infrequently between zero and 1 and thus the utility function max(0, ln(ℎ)) 
performs, in practise, the same as ln(ℎ) for all ℎ > 0. Where ℎ = 0 however, the 
function max(0, ln(ℎ)) = 0 and thus performs differently from the original LM 
model.  
In order to evaluate whether our utility function has any effect on the outcome of 
the model, we numerically solve the deterministic (original) LM model with the utility 
function max(0, ln(ℎ)) and evaluate the similarity of the numerically derived harvest 
function to the analytical solution of the original LM model. We consider the sole-
owner case and consider all harvest functions in 𝛩 space, as defined in Section 5.4. 
To test the similarity, we calculate a standard 𝑅2 statistic to evaluate the extent to 
which the numerical harvest function can be explained by the analytical harvest 
function. The results are reported in Figure 5.i.  
The results show that the numerical model can recreate analytical results to a high 
degree of accuracy. It also shows that particular areas of 𝛩 space are more 
numerically challenging to estimate than others. The location of the area of largest 
error, consisting of the union of Regions III, IV and the larger of the two areas 
marked as Region II is particularly important. The accuracy of stability thresholds in 
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this particular region is therefore somewhat reduced. Overall, the high 𝑅2 values 
confer confidence in the accuracy of the numerical method, thus supporting our use 
of the max(0, ln(ℎ)) utility function. While numerical accuracy is high, we cannot be 
sure whether the inaccuracy is due to the utility function or due to interpolation 
error. 
 
                    
Figure 5.i: 𝑅2 statistics in 𝛩 space determining the accuracy of a numerical 1-player deterministic LM 
model. Each region (I through IV) represents a range of 𝑅2 statistics. Using 𝑅𝐼
2 to denote the 𝑅2 value in 
Region I,  𝑅𝐼𝐼
2  to denote the 𝑅2 in Region II and so on, the regions are defined as 0.9998 < 𝑅𝐼
2 ≤ 1, 
0.9994 <  𝑅𝐼𝐼
2 ≤ 0.9998, 0.9990 < 𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼
2 ≤ 0.9994 and 0.9984 ≤ 𝑅𝐼𝑉
2 ≤ 0.9990. 
Interpolation error  
Error in the model may also result from interpolation error. Interpolation error 
results from the discretised state space. We set the state space as 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑋 =
[0, 1000, 2000,… ,10000]. In the case that the steady state 𝑥∗ is less than 1000, the 
model increases the number of elements in the state space in order to more 
accurately identify the steady state. Discretisation of the state space means that 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑡+1; 𝛩) is only known for each element of 𝑋. Almost always, 𝑥𝑡+1 is not an 
element of 𝑋 and therefore we use interpolation to estimate 𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑡+1; 𝛺). Error in 
interpolation means that future value in the value function deviates from its true 
value and this results in deviations of the harvest function from their true form. The 
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effect of any interpolation error on the harvest function is reduced when the value 
function is determined by instantaneous utility relatively more than future value. 
Future utility has relatively less of an effect on the value function when the discount 
rate is high. This can be seen in Figure 5.i, where error in the numerically estimated 
LM model tends to be higher for lower discount rates. This suggests that some of 
the inaccuracy in Figure 5.i is due to interpolation error. Finally, it is useful to note 
that future value also has relatively less of an effect on the value function if future 
value is reduced due to endogenous risk. Therefore, endogenous risk has the side 
effect of reducing the effect of interpolation error in our model, thus increasing our 
confidence in the results.  
 
Appendix 5.2 Deriving the envelope condition  
 
Deriving the envelope condition requires determining the first order conditions of 
Equation (5.6) with respect to harvest and stock. The first order condition w.r.t. 
harvest ℎ𝑖 is given by  
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
=
𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ𝑖
+
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑒
𝜕ℎ𝑖
𝛿𝑉𝑖(𝑓(𝑒)) + 𝑟(𝑒)𝛿
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑒
𝜕ℎ𝑖
= 0.         (5.i) 
From Equation (5.1) it follows that 
𝜕𝑒
𝜕ℎ𝑖
= −1. Equation (5.i) therefore simplifies to  
𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ𝑖
=
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑒
𝛿𝑉𝑖(𝑓(𝑒)) + 𝑟(𝑒)𝛿
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑒
.                       (5.ii) 
Substituting 𝒽𝑖(𝑥) for ℎ𝑖 and 𝒽−𝑖(𝑥) for ℎ−𝑖 in Equation (5.6) such that 𝑒 ≡ 𝑥 −
𝒽𝑖(𝑥) − 𝒽−𝑖(𝑥) and differentiating Equation (5.6) w.r.t. 𝑥 gives  
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥
=
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝒽𝑖
𝜕𝒽𝑖
𝜕𝑥
+ 𝛿 [
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑒
(1 −
𝜕𝒽𝑖
𝜕𝑥
−
𝜕𝒽−𝑖
𝜕𝑥
) 𝑉𝑖(𝑓(𝑒)) + 𝑟(𝑒)
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑒
(1 −
𝜕𝒽𝑖
𝜕𝑥
−
𝜕𝒽−𝑖
𝜕𝑥
)].     (5.iii) 
Substituting 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝒽𝑖
 in the above with 
𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ𝑖
, then substituting 
𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ𝑖
 with the right hand side 
of Equation (5.ii), then simplifying gives  
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥
= (1 −
𝜕𝒽−𝑖
𝜕𝑥
) (
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑒
𝛿𝑉𝑖(𝑓(𝑒)) + 𝑟(𝑒)𝛿
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑒
).                    (5.iv) 
Equation (5.ii) is substituted into Equation (5.iv), thus giving the envelope condition 
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𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑥
= (1 −
𝜕𝒽−𝑖
𝜕𝑥
)
𝑑𝑢
𝑑ℎ𝑖
.                 (5.v) 
 
Appendix 5.3 The properties of harvest functions.  
 
This appendix discusses the properties of harvest functions in terms their 
monotonicity and their form in relation to point 𝑥 = 𝛾?̅?. We present the harvest 
function for 𝛼 = 0.99, 𝜌 = 0.01, 𝛾 = 0.02 and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 = [0, 100, 200,… ,10000] in the 
sole-owner case in Figure 5.ii. We find that harvest functions are not necessarily 
monotonic, which is expected given that it may be optimal to harvest the entire 
stock at low resource levels. Furthermore, Figure 5.ii also indicates that the harvest 
function does not necessarily attain a (local) maximum where 𝑥 = 𝛾?̅?. It can still be 
optimal to harvest all of the stock immediately, even if collapse is not certain. Thus 
the maximum of the harvest function occurs at 𝑥 = 300 whereas 𝛾?̅? = 200. 
        
Figure 5.ii: The harvest function where 𝛼 = 0.99, 𝜌 = 0.01 and 𝛾 = 0.02 demonstrates non-monotonicity. 
Stars are actual data points. The harvest function is defined up to 𝑥 = 10000. We limit the 𝑥 axis to focus 
on lower values of 𝑥. 
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Synthesis  
  
 
 
6.1 Summary and answers to research questions 
 
Invasive alien species spreading across the world and fish stocks responding to 
changes in climate and overfishing: these have been the topics of this thesis. The 
economic aspects of these topics are the optimality of invasive species management 
strategies, as considered in Part A, and the stability of International Fisheries 
Agreements (IFAs), as considered in Part B. The chapters in Part A separately 
consider the prevention and control of invasive species. Prevention is studied in the 
context of Ballast Water Management (BWM) and control is studied in a spatially 
explicit metapopulation model. The chapters in Part B separately consider the 
implications of changing fish stock location and an endogenously determined risk of 
fish stock collapse on cooperative fisheries agreements. Each chapter addresses a 
specific research question, as was outlined in Chapter 1.  
 
6.1.1 Ballast Water Management 
In Chapter 2, we constructed a model to analyse the optimality of BWM standards, 
as are set in the BWM convention (IMO, 2004). The model focused on specific 
features of BWM in order to understand their implications for optimal management. 
To do so, we constructed a model of an irreversible invasion, because irreversibility 
is the most appropriate general assumption for marine Invasive Alien Species (IAS) 
(Vitousek et al., 1997; Parker et al., 1999). The model consists principally of the 
expected damage function, which gives the relationship between the ballast water 
treatment standard and the present expected value of damage from the invasion. 
The damage function depends on the hazard function, which determines how the 
6 
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hazard rate of invasion establishment depends on the intensity of ballast water 
treatment. The hazard rate function includes network effects, a Minimum Viable 
Population (MVP) and the possibility for an Allee effect in order to answer the 
following research question: 
Research Question 1: What are the implications of minimum viable populations 
and Allee effects for optimal ballast water management standards? 
We address this research question by analysing the marginal properties of the 
expected damage function in terms of the conditions under which the standard 
adopted in the BWM convention can be optimal. We find that a discontinuous 
marginal expected damage function is required for the current standard to be 
optimal. We therefore proceed to analyse whether MVPs or Allee effects could result 
in discontinuity in the marginal expected damage function. We find that if the 
hazard function approaches zero at the limit where treatment effort approaches the 
level of effort required to achieve the MVP, then the marginal damage function is 
continuous and the current BWM standard cannot be optimal. We find that this can 
only occur in the presence of an Allee effect. Therefore, our model shows that an 
Allee effect is a critical determinant of whether the current BWM standard can be 
optimal.  
 
6.1.2 Invasive species control 
In Chapter 3, we considered the control problem. This concerns the situation where 
the invasion has already become established outside of its native range. There has 
been a significant amount of literature on this topic. The key issue is how to 
optimally control the invasion over time (e.g. Eiswerth and Johnson, 2002) and space 
(e.g. Sharov, 2004), in addition to other important issues such as optimization of 
monitoring regimes to detect invasions (e.g. Mehta et al., 2007) and how to deal 
with the complexities imposed by invasions spreading across jurisdictional or private 
property boundaries (e.g. Kovacs et al., 2014 and Zhang et al., 2010, respectively). 
We focus on the spatial aspects of control within a non-native range in the case that 
the whole of the non-native range falls under a single jurisdiction, e.g. a single 
nation. We consider a non-native range divided into patches (cf. Salinas et al., 2005 
and Burnett et al., 2007). Each patch can contain a population of the invasive species 
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such that the invasive population size can vary between patches (as in Burnett et al., 
2007). We allow for a management intervention which reduces the population size 
within a selection of patches by any amount. This is an extension of modelling 
approaches which consider patches which either do not allow for varying invasive 
species populations within areas (i.e. areas are modelled in binary terms: either 
invaded or not invaded) or which restrict removal of invasions in a given area to 
complete eradication only (Carrasco et al., 2010a; Finnoff et al., 2010a; Epanchin-
Niell and Wilen, 2012; Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012). In addition to removal, we allow 
for a second control option, termed “containment”, which reduces the probability of 
spread between patches without affecting the population size within patches, as in 
Sharov (2004). Optimal application of removal and containment is derived for the 
case where the non-native range can be accurately described as a one-dimensional 
landscape, or line-network (Chadès et al., 2011). This is relevant for invasive species 
spreading along coastlines, and also through riparian systems. The model is used to 
answer the following research question.  
Research Question 2: What are the implications for optimal spatial control of 
invasive species when the invasive population is modelled with varying invasive 
population sizes within patches?  
Our results identify three implications for management. The first pertains to the 
timing of containment interventions. When patches can only be either invaded or 
non-invaded, if it is optimal to apply containment to reduce the probability spread 
from that particular patch, then it will always be optimal to do so immediately. When 
the population within a patch can vary, it becomes possible to time the application 
of containment depending on the size of the population within that patch. Greater 
population size means that the probability of spread is greater. Under our 
assumption that containment reduces the probability of spread by a fixed factor, 
containment results in a greater reduction in the probability of spread to non-
invaded patches when the invasive population in adjacent invaded patches is larger. 
Accordingly, it may be more efficient to wait for the population to reach a certain 
size before implementing containment, or in other words, the timing of containment 
depends on population size. This is a different result from the case when invasive 
population size does not vary within patches over time, as in Epanchin-Niell and 
Wilen (2012). In that case, containment can only be applied as soon as the patch is 
invaded.  
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The second implication pertains to the policies aimed at slowing the spread of the 
invasion. In some cases, it is optimal to let the entire non-native range become 
invaded, but it is optimal to slow down the process of spread. Doing so pushes the 
damages of a fully invaded non-native range further into the discounted future. To 
optimally slow the spread, we identify the possibility for four distinct interventions 
that can be applied to one patch depending on the size of the population in that 
patch. Let us categorize the size of the invasive population in a patch as either very 
small, small, large or very large. Very small invasive populations are immediately 
entirely removed. Then, for small population sizes, the optimal policy is to do 
nothing and to let the invasive population grow. For large population sizes, 
containment is implemented to reduce the probability of spread. Finally, for very 
large population sizes, it becomes optimal to supplement the containment 
intervention with removal within the invaded patch. This provides more detailed 
specifications of management aimed at slowing the spread of invasions than in, for 
example, Sharov (2004).  
The third implication pertains to policies aimed at stopping the spread of the 
invasion such that spread through the entire non-native range is prevented. In the 
setting in Chapter 3, containment is not perfectly effective; it can only reduce the 
probability of spread. In practice, this means that containment can only slow the 
invasion down. Despite this, stopping the spread can still be optimal if containment 
and removal policies are combined. Containment can be used to reduce the 
probability of spread into a non-invaded patch and then, any invasion which does 
occur can be immediately removed. This demonstrates that stopping the spread can 
still be an optimal management strategy, even if containment is not perfectly 
effective, as in Epanchin-Niell and Wilen (2012). 
 
6.1.3 Changing fish stock location 
In Chapter 4, we considered the effects of changing fish stock location on Grand 
Coalitions in fisheries agreements. We employed the Gordon-Schaefer model of 
fisheries to analyse the stability of Grand Coalitions and thus build on the work of 
Lindroos (2008), Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008) and Pintassilgo et al. (2010) by 
examining changing fish stock location. We conceptualize the entire fish stock as 
existing at a single point in space which may change. The nations (players) in the 
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fishery agreement relating to that fish stock are conceptualized as single points at 
fixed locations. When fish stock location changes, the distances between the fish 
stock point and the players’ locations changes.  
We focus on how the effects of changing stock location on the stability of IFAs are 
determined by the type of stability concept used. Stability concepts embody 
behavioural assumptions about how players respond to the cooperative choices of 
others, or alternatively, the “conjecture” that a given player makes about how other 
players will respond to changes in the cooperative choice of that given player. In the 
literature, it is often assumed that players adopt shortsighted conjectures, more 
generally referred to as Nash conjectures (e.g. Kwon, 2006; Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 
2008; Pintassilgo et al., 2010; Long and Flaaten, 2011; Breton and Keoula, 2014). 
Under shortsighted conjectures, a given player assumes that other players will not 
change their cooperative choices in response to a change in the cooperative choice 
of that given player. An alternative stability concept is based on farsighted 
conjectures (Chwe, 1994), whereby a given player assumes that other players will 
change their cooperative choices, if such a change is beneficial, in response to a 
change in the cooperative choice of that given player. Farsighted conjectures have 
been analysed in fisheries games by Breton and Keoula (2012). Our analysis focused 
on the following research question. 
Research Question 3: To what extent can farsightedness stabilize IFAs in the face of 
changing fish stock location? 
To answer the question, we define and employ a new variant of the Farsighted 
stability concept (Chwe, 1994), which we term Farsighted Downwards Stability (FDS). 
Because the FDS concept is new, and to establish a baseline, we begin by analytically 
determining the properties of FDS in the simplest setting, i.e. where players are 
symmetric and fish stock location is constant. Where 𝑛 is the number of players, we 
find that the Grand Coalition displays FDS for 𝑛 ≤ 4. We consider asymmetry in the 
costs of fishing and changing fish stock location using sensitivity analysis for the 
cases of three and four players. We thus test Grand Coalition stability for many 
different fish stock locations. We find that Grand Coalitions are more likely to be 
stable under the FDS stability concept than under internal stability concept. 
However, while stable Grand Coalitions are more likely under the FDS stability 
concept, changes in whether a Grand Coalition is stable due to changing fish stock 
location are also more likely. In this way, the use of the FDS stability concept 
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increases stability, but also increases the sensitivity of stability to changes in fish 
stock location. Overall then, the results suggest that the stability of Grand Coalitions 
can be improved if players employ farsighted conjectures in deciding whether or not 
to deviate. Policy mechanisms which encourage further deviation will force players 
to make farsighted conjectures about the effects of their deviation, which in turn, 
increases the stability of the Grand Coalition.  
 
6.1.4 Endogenous risk of fish stock collapse 
In Chapter 5, we considered the effects of an endogenous risk of fish stock collapse 
on the stability of Grand Coalitions. Unlike in Chapter 4, we employed the Levhari 
and Mirman (LM) (1980) model of fisheries. In order to model a risk of fish stock 
collapse, we adapted the LM model such that the lower the fish stock size, the 
greater the risk of a fish stock collapse. Players are assumed to be symmetric. We 
addressed the following research question: 
Research Question 4: What are the implications of an endogenously determined 
risk of fish stock collapse on cooperation in IFAs? 
We find that the implications of an endogenously determined risk of fish stock 
collapse depend heavily on the assumption, implicit in the standard two-stage 
game, that payoffs are evaluated at the steady state fish stock sizes corresponding 
to the size of the coalition. We find that when standard assumptions are followed 
such that payoffs are evaluated at steady states, then an endogenously determined 
risk of stock collapse increases the number of players for which a Grand Coalition is 
stable. This is a similar result to those obtained by Nikuiya et al. (2014), Ren and 
Polasky (2014) and Sakamoto (2014). In comparison to deterministic models, non-
cooperation leads to not only a lower stock of fish, but also a greater risk that the 
fish stock will collapse in the future. Endogenous risk of fish stock collapse thus 
increases the stability of Grand Coalitions. In fact, the addition of endogenous risk 
into the model means that, for specific discount and growth rates, a Grand Coalition 
of any number of players is stable. This is because it is possible that the Grand 
Coalition is the only coalition structure for which it is optimal to attempt to maintain 
a non-zero steady state fish stock. If any deviation from the Grand Coalition occurs, 
then the fish stock will be intentionally harvested to zero. Thus, under the 
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assumption that payoffs are calculated in the steady state, the choice for members 
of a Grand Coalition is between receiving some payoff (although this may be 
extremely small if there are many players in the coalition) or receiving no payoff at 
all. Accordingly, the Grand Coalition is stable for any number of players. 
An important part of the incentive to stay in a Grand Coalition under the 
assumptions implicit in a standard two-stage game, is that no payoffs are received in 
the process of intentionally harvesting the fish stock to zero (transition payoffs). 
Transition payoffs have been shown to be important in understanding the effects of 
endogenous risk (Sakamoto, 2014). We include transition payoffs and find that the 
stability of Grand Coalitions drastically reduces. Grand Coalitions are never stable for 
more than two players, and are only stable for two players for specific 
parameterizations. This is almost exactly the same result as that in the absence of 
endogenous risk (Kwon, 2006). From a theoretical perspective then, the answer to 
the research question is that the implications depend heavily on the assumptions 
about transition payoffs. If transition payoffs are excluded then endogenous risk 
results in dramatic increases in the potential for cooperation, but this effect 
disappears if transition payoffs are included.  
 
6.2. Evaluation  
 
In this section, we discuss the appropriateness of the methodologies employed in 
this thesis to answer the research questions. 
 
6.2.1 Evaluation of Part A 
In Chapter 2, we employ an analytical modelling approach. The model contains no 
actual parameterizations for the costs of, and reduced expected damages resulting 
from BWM, nor does it use explicit functional forms for the hazard function. As such, 
we do not suggest what the actual optimal BWM standard is. This modelling 
approach is chosen due to the complexity and large data requirements of the 
problem. Information requirements are large and complex for several reasons. 
Firstly, IAS is a global issue. Data collection must therefore deal with the challenges 
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of aggregating local, national or regional data which may not use consistent formats 
or definitions, as well as the challenges of international collaboration and data 
quality assurance (Ricciardi et al., 2000; Crall et al., 2006). Secondly, any data set 
which succeeds in addressing the first issue must contain a great amount of data. 
This is due to the large number of species which are currently, or may become, 
invasive. In Molnar et al. (2008), aggregation of data sets identified 329 invasive 
species, ranging from fish to plants, and algae to molluscs and crustaceans. For each 
species, diverse information must be collected. In general, non-exclusive terms, data 
should include ecological and economic impact, geographic extent, invasive 
potential and possible management options including their costs and efficacy.  
Due to the large and complex data requirements, it would be very challenging to 
produce a parameterized model to estimate an optimal standard. Our method 
instead provides general insights into the determinants of optimal BWM policies. 
These insights can be used to evaluate current BWM standards and inform future 
research priorities. For example, our results point to the important role of Allee 
effects. Empirically identifying and measuring the severity of Allee effects is 
challenging for several reasons (Sakai et al., 2001), but given the fundamental 
implications of Allee effects for optimal standards, a better understanding of Allee 
effects in IAS is very useful. If, for example, research suggests that the most harmful 
IAS are unlikely to display Allee effects then this constitutes an argument that 
current standards are optimal. Additionally, the results provide economic support for 
the widely held understanding that better information on MVPs would be extremely 
valuable (Gollasch et al., 2007). In summary, while our method is not suitable for 
estimating an actual optimal standard, it can still provide useful insights for decision 
making in terms of prioritizing future research and understanding the implications 
of different features of BWM for the optimality of standards. 
In Chapter 3, we employ dynamic programming, which has been frequently applied 
to the problem of controlling IAS (e.g. Blackwood et al., 2010; Cacho et al., 2008; 
Chalak-Haghighi et al., 2008 and Haight and Polasky, 2010). Dynamic programming 
suffers from two related drawbacks. Firstly, dynamic programming problems may 
not be analytically tractable. This means that closed-form solutions cannot be 
derived, which limits understanding of the drivers of optimal policies. Accordingly, 
numerical analysis is adopted. Numerical analysis of dynamic programs requires that 
an understanding of model outcomes be developed by experimenting with different 
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parameterizations (e.g. Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012), whereas analysis of closed-
form solutions provides general insights for all parameterizations (e.g. Blackwood et 
al., 2010). Nonetheless, through experimentation with parameterizations, a detailed 
understanding of the drivers of model outcomes can be developed (as in Sanchirico 
et al., 2010 and Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012). The second problem of dynamic 
programming is the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1957), which is essentially a 
problem of computational burden. Computational burden is potentially significant in 
our modelling approach because of the spatial set-up of the model, the stochastic 
spread process and the use of two management options (removal and containment). 
In Chapter 3, computational burden is minimised by identifying and adopting the 
simplest relevant spatial set-up and careful programming. Accordingly, the majority 
of our analysis is carried out in the simplest relevant spatial setup whereby space is 
divided into two patches. Two-patch models are common in the literature and have 
been shown to produce useful insights (Salinas et al., 2005; Rowthorn et al., 2009; 
Sanchirico et al., 2010). However, applied models are likely to suffer from the curse 
of dimensionality because two patches will be insufficiently detailed. Therefore, our 
method is most suitable to provide generalized management insights. 
 
6.2.2 Evaluation of Part B 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we employ game theory. Game theory, being concerned with 
the strategic interaction between agents, is chosen as a modelling approach 
because it allows for nations to formulate their decisions, not only in terms of the 
state of the system (the size of the fish stock), but also in terms of the decisions of 
other players. We employ coalition theory as a lens through which to analyse the 
common-pool resource problem. The advantage of coalition theory is that it gives 
us further insight into the common-pool resource problem. Many studies consider 
the common-pool resource problem in terms of the situations in which it is more or 
less severe. For example, Sakamoto (2014) shows that endogenous risk may lead to 
either more or less resource exploitation. This means that the common-pool 
resource problem may be worsened or ameliorated under endogenous risk. The 
number of players for which the Grand Coalition is stable provides a concrete 
measure of the severity of the common-pool resource problem. If a Grand Coalition 
exists for a given number of players then the common-pool resource problem does 
not exist for that number of players. Because an increase in the number of players 
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generally decreases the potential for stable Grand Coalitions in fisheries 
management, the greater the number of players for which a Grand Coalition can be 
sustained, the less severe the common-pool resource problem. Accordingly, 
coalition theory is a popular means to analyse the common-pool resource problem 
(e.g. Breton and Keoula, 2012; Rettieva, 2012; Breton and Keoula, 2014). Further, 
coalition theory provides a useful bridge to real-world issues. Cooperative 
agreements play an important role in dealing with various common-pool resource 
problems, the most significant of which being climate change (Carraro and 
Siniscalco, 1998).  
Specific to Chapter 4, several of the most important modelling assumptions should 
be mentioned for evaluative purposes. These relate to our assumptions about 
changing fish stock location, and to the assumptions employed in the FDS concept. 
In order to analyse changing fish stock location, we conceptualized the fish stock as 
existing at a single point in space, the location of which is defined relative to the 
fishing nations, which are also single points in space. We assumed that only the fish 
stock location point changes while other parameters are constant. However, climate 
change may warm more northerly waters such that they are suitable for a fish stock 
without warming the southerly waters so much that they become unsuitable 
(Cheung et al., 2009). This means that it may be more accurate to consider change in 
fish stock “range” rather than change in location. If fish stock range changes then it 
is no longer accurate to consider the fish stock as existing at a single point. Instead, 
describing the location of the fish stock would require consideration of the 
dimensions of the fish stock (i.e. the size and shape of the area which it occupies). In 
addition to changing fish stock location and range, the carrying capacity of the fish 
stock may also change, i.e. climate change alters the ecosystem such that it can 
support a greater fish stock. In summary, to determine the implications of changing 
stock location in specific cases, one must also account for possible changes in fish 
stock range and carrying capacity. These points are important to take into account 
when constructing more applied models.  
The outcomes, in terms of coalition stability, resulting from the FDS concept depend 
heavily on Definition 4.3. Definition 4.3 is an assumption designed to deal with the 
following problem. The benefit of being in the Grand Coalition depends on the 
payoff which a player would receive outside of the coalition. However, there may be 
several coalition structures which could result from a deviation from the Grand 
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Coalition and therefore several different possible payoffs. The stability of the Grand 
Coalition depends on how we use the information about the set of possible coalition 
structures, which might result from a deviation from the Grand Coalition. Definition 
4.3 assumes that players use this information in an optimistic way by assuming that 
they will always reach the most profitable coalition after a deviation from the Grand 
Coalition. In turn, this means that the stability of the Grand Coalition is lower than it 
would be under other assumptions such as taking the mean of the payoffs in all 
coalitions which could result from a deviation from the Grand Coalition. This 
suggests that, not only do farsighted conjectures help to stabilize Grand Coalitions 
in the face of changing fish stock location, but also, a healthy dose of pessimism 
regarding the payoffs after deviation from the Grand Coalition helps too. Pessimism 
can therefore also play a role in ensuring stable Grand Coalitions under fish stock 
location change, although this was not explicitly discussed in Chapter 4.   
In Chapter 5, we employ the Levhari and Mirman (LM) model (Levhari and Mirman, 
1980) to analyse the implications of an endogenously determined risk of fish stock 
collapse for the stability of Grand Coalitions. The most important methodological 
limitation of Chapter 5 is that we adopt a numerical approach. The logarithmic utility 
function in the LM model is unsuited to numerical approaches because it returns a 
computational problematic utility of minus infinity if harvest is zero. We deal with 
this by assuming that utility is zero when harvest is zero and by scaling the model to 
very large stock sizes such that harvest is never between zero and one. However, the 
changes to the utility function result in another problem. In order to understand the 
effects of endogenous risk on Grand Coalition stability in the LM model, we need to 
keep everything else in the model constant so that any differences in stability 
relative to the deterministic LM model can be attributed solely to the inclusion of 
the endogenous risk of fish stock collapse. We therefore test the effect of the 
change to the utility function on the ability of the model to reproduce the 
analytically derived results from the original LM model. We find that the changes to 
the utility function have a negligible effect. This allows us to isolate the effects of 
endogenous risk from changes in the utility function. 
Another problem with numerical approaches is that it may be less clear what drives 
the results. In order to help understand what drives the results, we present results 
for the entire parameter space. The importance of this approach can be illustrated in 
the context of Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we present results for a very limited set of 
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parameterizations. This is principally because many variables in Chapter 3 are only 
bounded from below, meaning that the range of possible parameterizations is 
infinite. Not only is the range infinite, but there are more variables in total. In 
Chapter 5, all variables are bounded from both above and below and thus have 
finite ranges. Further, there are only three variables. This allows us to present results 
across much of the parameter space in a way which is reasonably easy to interpret. 
Most importantly, adopting a numerical approach has allowed us to let the 
pertinence of possible research questions dictate our line of enquiry, rather than 
allowing our research questions to be dictated by the confines of analytical 
tractability.   
 
6.3 Reflections and policy relevance  
 
This section provides some broader reflections about the research in this thesis. Our 
discussion of Part A focuses on how the results can be used in decision making and 
our discussion of Part B deals with broader methodological concerns relating to the 
economics of IFAs. Reflections for both parts end by considering the institutional 
perspective.  
 
6.3.1 Discussion of Part A 
As discussed in the previous section, Chapters 2 and 3 provide generalized 
management insights for the prevention and control, respectively, of invasions. We 
also justified the approach of producing generalized management insights. In order 
to understand the value of these generalized management insights, we must 
consider the settings in which decisions are made. In the context of BWM, 
management decisions have, up to now, been made deliberatively (Gollasch et al., 
2007). An alternative to a deliberative approach is to formally calculate optimal 
ballast water treatment standards. As discussed, due to the complexity and 
magnitude of information requirements, a formal calculation is unlikely to be 
feasible. Proponents of evidence-based policy making may consider formally 
calculated ballast water treatment standards to be the best approach for deriving 
standards. However, literature in the domain of public administration is often critical 
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of evidenced-based policy making (Sanderson, 2006). This literature argues that 
policy making is not a purely technical process (Dryzek, 1990; Fischer, 1990; 
Schwandt, 1997). The literature lends support to a process based on dialogue and 
argument (Majone, 1989). This approach is rooted in the concept of Aristotelian 
deliberation, whose influence can be traced through to the more modern Rawlsian 
concept of “reflective equilibrium” (Rawls, 1972), whereby, through debate, the 
judgements of stakeholders come to coincide. However, despite the rejection of the 
idea of policy making as a technical process, proponents of more deliberative 
approaches emphasize the importance of sound “scientific knowledge” (Schwandt, 
2000) and “factual statements” (Majone, 1989) upon which deliberative decision 
making can be based. A sound theoretical understanding of the implications of the 
features of BWM (i.e. Allee effects) for the optimality of standards provides such 
“scientific knowledge” and “factual statements”. These can be employed in decisions 
which relate not only to the strictness of the standards themselves, but also to the 
chosen metric of the standards and the details of the policy, such as the percentage 
of global shipping which is required to be covered by the agreement before it 
comes into force. In particular, a sound theoretical understanding of the features of 
BWM will be useful in formulating next steps after the current BWM convention 
comes into force. Such next steps should be based first on an evaluation of the 
current BWM convention, for which Chapter 2 provides some useful insights, 
principally regarding the role of Allee effects. 
In Chapter 3, our contribution to decision making is achieved by establishing new 
generalized management insights for decision making. The value of generalized 
management insights is justified in the context of the challenges of formally deriving 
management strategies, and further, this approach is justified in the context of 
existing literature. In practice, when an invasion arrives in a new area and is 
detected, managers are faced with a series of very challenging questions. 
Addressing these questions can be aided by theoretically well-founded generalized 
management insights. The first of these questions, as addressed by Sims and Finnoff 
(2013), is whether or not managers should delay making decisions to gain more 
information about the invasive species by observing, for example, their rate of 
spread. Sims and Finnoff demonstrate that, while waiting and seeing is a popular 
option, it is rarely optimal. The generalized management insight is therefore, that if 
managers decided to wait and see, they should have good reason to do so (Sims 
and Finnoff provide such reasons). This generalized management insight is valuable 
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to decision makers, even if they do not possess the data or the ability to formally 
determine whether they should act now, or wait and see. In reality, data will always 
be lacking to inform the formal determination of management policies and there 
will always be uncertainty regarding different aspects of the invasion. In this context, 
generalized management insights are particularly valuable. Chapter 3 contributes 
generalized management insights in the context of the spatially explicit 
metapopulation model where space is divided into patches (as in Burnett et al., 
2007; Carrasco et al., 2010a; Finnoff et al., 2010a; Epanchin-Niell and Wilen, 2012; 
Epanchin-Niell et al., 2012 and Chadès et al., 2011). Our model shows that, under the 
assumption that containment reduces the probability of spread by a fixed factor, it 
may be optimal to delay the application of containment until the invasive 
population in a given patch has reached a certain size. The generalized management 
insight is therefore that implementing measures to reduce the spread of an invasion 
to another patch need to be timed according to the size of the population of the 
invasive in adjacent patches.  
The extent to which generalized management insights are useful depends on the 
institutional setting in which policies are made and implemented. It is therefore 
pertinent to quickly discuss this setting in the European context, given the focus of 
research within the VECTORS project. The most recent EU legislation on the topic of 
invasive species is Regulation 1143/2014 of 22 October 2014 on the prevention and 
management of the introduction and spread of invasive alien species. Thanks to this 
regulation, it is now EU policy to “take all appropriate steps to encourage Member 
States to ratify [the BWM] Convention” (Article 5). Unfortunately, this regulation has 
not been greeted warmly by invasion ecologists (Genovesi et al., 2015) because this 
action is less concrete than that in the draft proposal (COM/2013/0620). In the draft 
proposal, an action plan for all member states was proposed which included actions 
based on an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the BWM convention (Article 
11), but this was not included in the final version. There is no information available 
on the reason for the removal of this policy from the draft version. We can speculate 
that it may be because of the impracticality of estimating the costs and benefits of 
the BWM convention. Alternatively, it may be because of the EU’s apparent 
unwillingness to take unilateral action on BWM relative to other countries. Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand all have well established domestic ballast water regulatory 
regimes, as do the states of California and New York, in addition to the United 
States’ federal regulations (Albert et al., 2013). Therefore, while many EU countries 
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have ratified the BWM convention, there is, relatively speaking, less emphasis on 
prevention in Europe. Fortunately, Regulation 1143/2014 represents an important 
step in a unified policy on management of established invasions (Genovesi et al., 
2015). In general terms, the strategy in Regulation 1143/2014 is to detect new 
invasions early such that they can be eradicated, with “containment and control” 
measures employed only if eradication is unfeasible. The regulation refers to both 
terrestrial and marine invasive species. Given the difficulties of eradicating marine 
invasions and the relatively lower emphasis on BWM in Europe, containment and 
control measures, such as those studied in Chapter 3 of this thesis, are likely to 
remain important mechanisms for the management of marine IAS in Europe. This is 
especially the case given Descriptor 2 of Good Environmental Status under the 
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008/56/EC) which states that “non-
indigenous species introduced by human activities are at levels that do not 
adversely alter the ecosystems”. Again, this suggests that the focus of European 
policy is on managing existing invasions rather than preventing them.   
 
6.3.2 Discussion of Part B 
The puzzle of small coalitions (Breton and Keoula, 2014) provides a useful lens 
through which to evaluate our application of game theory in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Firstly, it is important to note that the literature supporting the puzzle of small 
coalitions is firmly grounded in the assumption that decision makers act as homines 
economici. Relaxation of the assumption of homo economicus has been shown to 
give rise to greater levels of cooperation in other contexts such as climate 
agreements (see, for example, van der Pol et al., 2012). Chapters 4 and 5 retain the 
assumption of homo economicus. This allows us, particularly in Chapter 5, to 
contribute to the debate on the puzzle of small coalitions according to the terms in 
which it was set. The puzzle of small coalitions exists because theoretical evidence 
suggests that only relatively small Grand Coalitions can be stable, whereas larger 
coalitions have been observed in reality. The General Fisheries Commission for the 
Mediterranean (GFCM), for example, is a Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization with 23 member countries (www.fao.org/gfcm/en). Theoretically, in the 
simplest cases where players are symmetric, the Levhari and Mirman model (1980) 
shows that not even a Grand Coalition of two players is stable. For the Gordon-
Schaefer model with symmetric players, Grand Coalitions are not stable for more 
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than two players (Lindroos, 2008). While there are doubts about the extent to which 
the nations within agreements such as the GCFM are genuinely cooperating 
(Hannesson, 2014), there is clearly a discrepancy between theoretical predictions 
and empirical observations.  
Chapter 5 shows how the puzzle of small coalitions, under the standard assumption 
that payoffs are evaluated only in steady states, can be solved by the inclusion of 
endogenous risk. However, after relaxing standard assumptions by including payoffs 
in the transition between steady states (as in Sakamoto, 2014), only small coalitions 
can be maintained and thus endogenous risk no longer solves the puzzle. While the 
term “puzzle of small coalitions” was coined by Breton and Keoula (2014), the term is 
justified because many previous studies have found similar results (e.g. Lindroos, 
2008; Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008; Pintassilgo et al., 2010; Breton and Keoula, 
2012). Our result regarding transition payoffs has implications for this body of work 
which justifies the puzzle of small coalitions. If previous work was repeated under 
the inclusion of transition payoffs, then the already limited number of players for 
which Grand Coalitions can be stable would be even less. This suggests that relaxing 
the assumption of homo economicus is a promising avenue for solving the puzzle of 
small coalitions. Further work could also be carried out to explore aspects of 
cooperation such as issue linkage (Folmer et al., 1993), the implications for 
cooperation of minimum participation requirements (Long, 2009) or the opportunity 
costs of fishing (Jensen et al., 2015).  
The puzzle of small coalitions has not yet been resolved. Therefore, there is a 
shortage of predictive power in our game theoretic models. However, we can still be 
confident in our conclusions in a relative sense. For example, while we cannot be 
confident in predicting the size of stable coalitions under farsighted conjectures, we 
can confidently say that farsighted conjectures will increase the size of stable 
coalitions. Therefore, we can still provide some conclusions relevant for policy or 
decision making. Specific to Chapter 4, we find that if fish stock location shifts 
towards a given player, then that player can increase their harvest while decreasing 
their fishing effort. This means that if fish stock location shifts towards a player, then 
that player can increase their revenue while also decreasing their costs. This 
highlights the importance of changing fish stock location, with respect to, for 
example, changes in the cost of fishing. If unit costs of fishing effort go down then 
the model shows that profit will increase overall, but the total cost of fishing 
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increases as well. Hence, the responses of fishing nations to change in fish stock 
location are fundamentally different to the responses to, for example, changes in 
fishing costs. Specific to Chapter 5, we find that the analysis excluding transition 
payoffs provides important insights for the management of slow-growing stocks. 
Deep-water fisheries, for example, are often slow-growing (Gordon, 2003) and more 
vulnerable to over-exploitation (Roberts, 2002; Neubauer et al., 2013). The results 
show that even if a Grand Coalition is stable for slow growing fish stocks such that 
the fish stock is managed in a socially optimal way, it may still be socially optimal to 
deplete the fish stock entirely. Cooperation is then, in this case, insufficient to ensure 
sustainability.   
It is important to consider the institutional perspective in reflecting on the work in 
Part B. We do so by considering the relationship between theoretical Grand 
Coalitions and real-world IFAs. The institutional bodies used to managed high seas 
fisheries (which are the type of fisheries most relevant for the analyses in Part B) are 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). Nominally, an RFMO is a 
Grand Coalition if no unregulated fishing occurs (Pintassilgo et al., 2010), which 
means that only members of an RFMO agreement fish the stock of concern in the 
agreement. The question is, if a fish stock is managed by an RFMO which does not 
suffer from unregulated fishing, can that RFMO be considered to be a Grand 
Coalition? For this to be the case, the RFMO should be maximizing the joint benefit 
from the fish stock of all of its members. Hannesson (2014) provides evidence that 
the management fish stocks under RFMOs is better described as quasi-cooperation 
rather than the full cooperation required for an RFMO in the absence of unregulated 
fishing to be truly considered a Grand Coalition. Additionally, the management of 
high seas fisheries by RFMOs has been criticized on the grounds of poor discard 
governance and surveillance (Gilman et al., 2014), their untransparent use of 
scientific evidence (Polacheck, 2012), and indeed the ability of RFMOs to prevent 
overexploitation (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010). It is therefore clear that RFMOs are 
not ideal institutions for managing high seas fisheries. Therefore, the existence of an 
RFMO in the absence of unregulated fishing does not guarantee the socially optimal 
fishing implied by the term “Grand Coalition”. This suggests that Grand Coalitions 
are a necessary but not sufficient condition for optimal management. Indeed, in the 
case of common-pool resource problems in general, the central coordination 
implied by a Grand Coalition is not even a necessary condition (Ostrom, 1990).  
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An RFMO is therefore clearly not the same as a Grand Coalition. There is therefore a 
need to consider, not only the conditions under which all fishing nations are 
nominally members of an agreement, but the conditions under which these 
agreements can meet their stated objectives. For example, Hoffmann and Quaas 
(2014) consider the incentives of policy makers to set particular Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) levels under heterogeneous discount rates and demonstrate how this 
heterogeneity results in inefficiently high TACs. Hoffmann and Quaas take the 
involvement of all relevant fishing nations in the TAC setting process as given. In 
general then, a two pronged approach is necessary. The first prong, as in this thesis, 
should consider the conditions for stability of Grand Coalitions, and the second 
prong should consider the conditions for these Grand Coalitions to achieve socially 
optimal outcomes, as in Hoffmann and Quaas (2014). By doing so, deeper insights 
can be gained into the research questions dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5.  
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the introduction, the research in this thesis was 
conducted as part of the EU Seventh Framework Program project named VECTORS. 
The aim of VECTORS was to examine the changes taking place in European seas, 
their causes, and their impacts on society in order to determine the economic 
implications of change and to formulate management strategies. The researchers in 
VECTORS were predominantly biologists and ecologists, with a good handful of 
economists to boot. Economic research within VECTORS consisted of environmental 
valuation, applied models of fisheries management, general equilibrium modelling, 
and the work of this thesis. For further information on the economics of marine 
ecological change, one can consult www.marine-vectors.eu, which contains all 
research within the VECTORS project. Clearly then, VECTORS has involved many 
disciplines.  
Let us define the “disciplinarity” of the VECTORS project using the definition of Choi 
and Pak (2006: 351), who state that “multidisciplinarity draws on knowledge from 
different disciplines but stays within their boundaries. Interdisciplinarity analyses, 
synthesizes and harmonizes links between disciplines into a coordinated and 
coherent whole. Transdisciplinarity integrates [different ] sciences in a humanities 
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context, and transcends their traditional boundaries”. According to this 
categorization, the research carried out in this thesis is multidisciplinary. We have 
drawn on insights from biology and ecology but have stayed within the boundaries 
of economics. This is not to say that this is a shortcoming of the research, but rather 
to say that there is much potential for further integration between disciplines and 
that such integration would facilitate different kinds of results, and potentially, ones 
with more direct policy implications. The multidisciplinary research in this thesis can 
serve as a base from which further multidisciplinary research can be conducted, as 
well as serving as a basis for progressing to more interdisciplinary, and potentially 
transdisciplinary approaches.  
Finally, it should be noted that this thesis has covered a limited range of changes in 
marine ecosystems and its focus, partly due to the requirements of funding sources, 
has been dictated by issues of particular concern in Europe. Climate change is 
having much more varied effects on marine ecosystems than changing stock 
location alone (Hoegh-Gulberg and Bruno, 2010). These include changes in 
productivity, changes in food-web dynamics and a greater incidence of disease. 
These changes are driven not only by increases in ocean temperatures, but also 
ocean acidification due to increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations 
(Gattuso et al., 2015). The impacts of these changes for ecosystem services provision 
may be severe (Gattuso et al., 2015), and this holds particularly true for less 
developed countries (Allison et al., 2009). Two points should therefore be made. 
Firstly, changes in marine ecosystems are not confined to only changes in fish stock 
location, risk of stock collapse and the arrival of invasive species. Secondly, the 
effects of marine ecological change depend on local economic and ecological 
conditions. There is therefore significant scope to consider other aspects of marine 
ecological change, and also to consider their effects and management in other 
contexts, such as the context of non-European countries. 
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Summary 
 
This thesis is divided into two parts, as explained in Chapter 1, which focus on 
different aspects of marine ecological change. Part A considers marine Invasive Alien 
Species (IAS), which are taxa introduced outside of their native range. The 
detrimental consequences of invasions for human welfare necessitate management 
of IAS. There are two types of IAS management. These are (i) management of the 
risks that an invasion will become established, termed “prevention”, and (ii) 
management of already established invasions, termed “control”. Chapter 2 considers 
prevention of invasive species with Ballast Water Management (BWM). Vessels 
transport invasive species in their ballast water. BWM involves treating ballast water 
to reduce the risk of successful invasion establishment. Chapter 2 studies the 
determinants of optimal ballast water treatment standards from a theoretical 
perspective. Chapter 3 considers control of already established invasions from a 
spatial and dynamic perspective. We model a non-native habitat divided into 
patches, where each patch may contain a population of the invasive species, and 
where spread of the invasion between patches is a stochastic process. In this 
context, we derive optimal management policies.  
The second part of this thesis: Part B, considers International Fisheries Agreements 
(IFAs). IFAs facilitate cooperation in the management of fish stocks. Cooperation is 
necessary to ensure sustainable management. Part B focuses on two issues which 
may affect the stability of cooperation within IFAs. These are; in Chapter 4, changes 
in stock location, which may occur due to climate change, and in Chapter 5, the risk 
of stock collapse, which may exist due to overfishing. Part B uses game theory to 
analyse the effects of these two issues on the stability of the Grand Coalition, which 
is the state of affairs where all parties cooperate to maximize their joint benefit from 
the fish stock.  
The methods and findings of the thesis are summarized as follows: in Chapter 2 (Part 
A), we construct a model to study optimal BWM standards. The model is built 
around the assumption that invasions arriving via ballast water are irreversible, i.e. 
once an invasion has arrived, it is not possible to reduce the size of the invasive 
population to zero. The hazard rate of invasion establishment can be reduced by 
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setting a BWM standard. The hazard rate is also affected by the Minimum Viable 
Population (MVPs) of the species and the possibility of an Allee effect. An MVP exists 
if there is some population size below which there is an insufficient number of 
invasive individuals to sustain a population. An Allee effect exists if the probability 
that a population survives increases at an increasing rate in the size of the 
population. Our analysis focuses on the conditions under which a BWM standard 
which aims to reduce invasive populations in ballast water to below their MVPs (as is 
aimed for by the BWM convention) can be optimal. We find that the current aim of 
the BWM convention can only be optimal in the case that the hazard function (which 
determines the hazard rate) is not continuously differentiable around the MVP. We 
find that Allee effects are a requirement for a continuously differentiable hazard 
function. Therefore, we find that whether or not an Allee effect exists fundamentally 
affects whether it is optimal to aim to reduce an invasive population in ballast water 
to marginally below its MVP.  
In Chapter 3 (Part A), we combine aspects of previous modelling approaches to 
provide new generalized management insights for controlling established invasions. 
We employ a metapopulation network consisting of patches which are arranged 
one-dimensionally (i.e. in a line), which is relevant, among other cases, for invasive 
species spreading along coastlines. We allow for the population size of the invasion 
within patches to be reduced, which we term “removal”, and we allow for the 
probability of spread between patches to be reduced without affecting the 
population sizes directly, which we term “containment”. We employ numerical 
stochastic dynamic programming to explore how these two interventions (removal 
and containment) can be optimally applied to minimize the sum of damages from 
the invasion and the costs of removing and containing the invasion. We find that 
allowing for varying stock sizes within patches facilitates optimal timing of the 
application of containment. We also identify two novel optimal policies: the 
combination of containment and removal to stop spread between patches and the 
application of up to four distinct policies for a single patch depending on the size of 
the invasion in that patch.   
Chapter 4 (Part B) considers how Grand Coalitions can be stabilized in the face of 
changing stock location. To do so, we employ the Gordon-Schaefer fisheries model. 
We consider farsightedness as a mechanism by which stability of the Grand 
Coalition can be increased in the face of changing stock location. Farsightedness 
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allows players to respond to deviations of other players by deviating themselves. 
This reduces the incentives to leave the Grand Coalition. This is in contrast to 
shortsightedness, whereby players cannot decide to leave the Grand Coalition in 
response to such a choice by another player. We begin by modifying the 
farsightedness concept such that it can be used in games with asymmetric players 
and transfer payments. We proceed to analyse the modified farsightedness concept 
in the case where players are symmetric (stock location does not change) in order to 
identify the properties of the concept in the base case. We find that farsightedness 
increases Grand Coalition stability with respect to shortsightedness. We proceed to 
analyse the extent to which farsightedness increases Grand Coalition stability, 
relative to shortsightedness, as fish stock location changes, using sensitivity analysis. 
We find that farsightedness increases the stability of the Grand Coalition, but also 
increases the sensitivity of stability to changes in fish stock location. Thus, for any 
fish stock location, a Grand Coalition is more likely to be stable if players are 
farsighted, but shifts between a stable and an unstable Grand Coalition will occur 
more frequently if players are farsighted. 
In Chapter 5 (Part B), we analyse how the stability of Grand Coalitions is affected by 
an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse. We do so using the Levhari and 
Mirman (LM) fisheries model, which is adapted such that there is a risk of stock 
collapse which increases as the fish stock size decreases. We numerically solve the 
model and calculate the stability of the Grand Coalition. We find that the effect of an 
endogenously determined risk of stock collapse depends heavily on the 
assumptions made regarding how payoffs are determined. A common assumption 
in the literature is that payoffs are determined at the steady state fish stock. Under 
this assumption, endogenous risk means that for specific discount and growth rates, 
a Grand Coalition is stable for any number of players. This is a very different result 
from the original LM model whereby Grand Coalitions can never be sustained. This 
is because players can essentially follow two strategies in response to the risk. Firstly, 
they can attempt to maintain  the fish stock by fishing less. In doing so they are 
running the risk of collapse. Secondly, they can avoid the risk by pre-emptively 
depleting the fish stock, i.e. harvesting the stock to zero immediately to avoid the 
risk. Grand Coalitions of any number of players are stable for parameterizations for 
which a Grand Coalition attempts to maintain a non-zero fish stock and if a 
deviation from the Grand Coalition would result in pre-emptive depletion. We 
proceed by relaxing the assumption that payoffs are determined in the steady state 
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by allowing for deviators to obtain payoffs in the transition between steady states. In 
this case, only Grand Coalitions of two players are stable, and then only for certain 
parameterizations. The reason is that players can now gain payoffs in the process of 
pre-emptively depleting the stock, i.e. payoffs are received from the process of 
fishing the stock down to zero. This increases the benefit of deviating from the 
Grand Coalition. In this case, Grand Coalitions are only stable for two players for 
specific parameterizations. 
Chapter 6 summarises the research questions formulated in Chapter 1 and evaluates 
the work of the thesis. Regarding Chapter 2, we justify our theoretical approach with 
the following two points. Firstly, BWM management is a global and complex 
problem, which means that the information required to formally calculate an optimal 
standard is prohibitively burdensome. Secondly, we argue that the complexity of 
BWM necessitates a sound theoretical understanding of the problem in order to 
evaluate the current BWM standard, and also to aid in future policy formulation. 
Similarly, in Chapter 3, we focus on deriving generalized management insights which 
are applicable to a variety of real-world cases, as opposed to deriving an optimal 
management strategy for a specific case. In addition to the data requirements 
necessary to derive such a management strategy, the complexity of such applied 
cases leads to potentially excessive computational burden. Chapter 3 analyses 
systems of two and three patches, which are likely to be too simple to analyse 
specific real world cases, but are sufficient to derive generalized management 
insights. 
The game theoretic methodologies in Part B are evaluated principally in terms of the 
assumptions about changes in stock location in Chapter 4 and the numerical 
method in Chapter 5. In Chapter 4, the fish stock is conceptualised as existing at a 
single point in space. The location of this point is determined in relation to fishing 
nations, which are also conceptualised as single points in space. Changes in stock 
location result from rises in ocean temperatures due to climate change. Such rises in 
temperature are likely to lead to other changes in the fish stock such as the size of 
the area where the fish stock can be found and increases in the maximum fish stock 
size which the ecosystem can support. These other aspects of changing stock 
location need to be considered in evaluating Chapter 4, as well as in formulating 
more applied models. In Chapter 5, a numerical method is adopted to analyse the 
effects of an endogenous risk of stock collapse. To do so, the utility function in the 
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LM model is adapted such that it can be used in a numerical model. In order to 
isolate the effect of endogenous risk from changes in the utility function, a 
validation procedure is carried out by comparing analytically derived results in the 
deterministic case (without endogenous risk of stock collapse) to numerically 
derived results in the deterministic case. This reveals that changes to the utility 
function have a negligible effect and thus the results, in terms of the stability of 
Grand Coalitions can be attributed solely to endogenous risk of stock collapse. 
Overall, Part A of this thesis presents new insights into the determinants of optimal 
BWM standards. These insights demonstrate the conditions under which the current 
BWM standard, which aims to eliminate the risk of invasion establishment, may or 
may not be optimal. Part A therefore provides a novel theoretical framework which 
aids in the evaluation of current, and the determination of future standards. Part A 
also provides new insights into the control of established invasions, by extending 
existing spatially explicit optimal control models. Specifically, dividing space into 
patches and allowing for varying invasive population sizes within patches facilitates 
the optimal timing of management interventions and, in general, more detailed, and 
thus more efficient, management strategies. Part B provides a novel analysis of the 
effects of changing stock location on Grand Coalitions by explicitly introducing fish 
stock location in the analysis, and shows how farsightedness can stabilize Grand 
Coalitions in the face of such changes. Part B also shows how the effects of an 
endogenous risk of stock collapse on the stability of Grand Coalitions depends 
vitally on whether transition payoffs are included. These results can form the basis 
for more interdisciplinary analyses, analyses of different types of marine ecological 
change, and analyses of these changes in different settings, such as non-European 
countries.    
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